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STUDIES IN HERODOTUS

Studies in Herodotus

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PREFACE

THERE is an ancient story—no doubt an invention—that the proposer of a new law at Locri had to justify his proposal on peril of his life. I have always thought there ought to be some such summary justice for every new book, though very probably the publishers would not agree.

My justification for publishing these papers is twofold. In the first place they are intended to supplement the edition of Herodotus which I published some years ago (in 1912) jointly with Mr. W. W. How, of Merton. In an edition intended primarily for undergraduates, there was no room, nor would it have been desirable, to put forward views that either were new or had not been generally accepted.

In the second place, during long experience as a teacher of Greek History and as a student of Herodotus, I have come to a certain number of conclusions on difficult and disputed points, which, if not new (who can claim novelty in a field so well studied?), yet have perhaps not been adequately stated or considered. Hence I hope that I may be allowed to put them forward now that, owing to other circumstances, my time as a teacher of Greek History may be looked upon as nearly over. So far as they have any definite point of view, it is to emphasize the importance of tradition, and the danger of rewriting (on a priori theories) the evidence we possess. It needs no long experience of the teaching of Ancient History to know of many brilliant attempts to rewrite it, which have been welcomed as conclusive by one generation and forgotten by the next—or at least the next but one. At the same time the labour of critics is not all in vain; though many suggestions are forgotten, yet some few remain and obtain general acceptance, and so the standard of knowledge advances. I

should be happy if I could think that two or three of the suggestions put forward in these papers might find this acceptance.

The papers have been written at intervals during the last thirty years, and one or two of them have been printed in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (*e.g.* IV. and V.).

But for the War and the crushing amount of work it brought with it, and entailed after it, they would have been republished years ago. As it is, they have all been revised in the past year, and five new ones (i., vii. and ix.–xi.) have been written.

The paper on 'Herodotus and English Literature' is of a more popular kind than the rest. I do not know that the subject has been treated before; at any rate I hope that it may have a little interest both for lovers of Herodotus and for lovers of our own great writers.

I have ventured to criticize freely the views of scholars whom I know to be far more learned than myself. It seems to me most in the interests of scholarship that plain speaking should be used, but I have often regretted the disuse of Latin in discussions of this kind.

I have, as a rule, only referred to modern authorities when either I wished support for the view I was maintaining or was trying to refute a view maintained by them. But I must especially mention my obligation to three scholars, to the late Professor G. Busolt for the storehouse of well-arranged references in the notes to his *Griechische Geschicte* (2nd edition), to Professor E. Meyer, the greatest of all living writers on ancient history, and to Dr. Macan, whose commentary on the last six books of Herodotus is indispensable for all students of the first Greek historian. I have to thank Mr. W. W. How of Merton College, and my own colleague, Mr. H. T. Wade Gery for kindly reading my proofs and for many suggestions; I need hardly add that they are not responsible for the views put forward or for the mistakes I may have made in putting them forward.

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ABBREVIATIONS, ETC.

Abh. K.P.A. — *Abhandlungen der Königlichen Preussischen Akademie.*

Arch. Jahr.—*Archaologische Jahrbucher.*

C.I.A.—*Corpus Inscriptionum Atticarum.*

C.I.G.—*Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum.*—4 vols., ed. A. Boeckh.

Dittenberger, G. *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, 1898-1900.

E.B.—*Encyclopaedia Britannica* (11th ed., 1910).

E.H.R.—*English Historical Review.*

f.—following pages.

F.H.G.—*Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum.* 5 vols., ed. C. Müller (Paris, Firmin-Didot edition).

H. & W.—How and Wells. *A Commentary on Herodotus* (Oxford, 1912).

Ins. Grae.—*Inscriptiones Graecae Insularum Maris Aegaei* (Berlin, 1895).

J.H.S.—*Journal of Hellenic Studies.*

Meyer. *Forschungen zur Alten Geschichte.* 2 vols., 1892.
Ges. des A.—*Geschichte des Alterthums.* 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1884, 1893. Unfortunately a large part of these volumes has never been reissued).

P.L.G.—*Poetae Lyrici Graeci.* (Bergk, 4th ed., 1882.)

P.-W.—Pauly-Wissowa. Real.—*Encyclopädie der Klassischen Alterthums Wissenschaft.*

Plut., *Mor.*—Plutarch, *Moralia* (Teubner ed.).

Rev. des Ét. Grec.—*Revue des Études Grecques.*

S.B.K.P.A. — *Sitzungs-Berichte der Königlichen Preussischen Akademie.*

u.s.—*ut supra.*

Woch. für Klass. Phil.—*Wochenschrift für Klassischen Philologie.*

I.

The Account of the Colonization of Ionia in Herodotus

NOT the least interesting point in the history of Herodotus is the fact that in it first we can trace the developed and systematized version of early Greek History which has ever since held the field. Thus, scattered over his books, can be found clear evidence that he had accepted an account of the Dorian Invasion which is substantially that which is given in modern textbooks as the authorized Greek tradition.[1] The colonization of Asia Minor furnishes us with another instance of the same kind.

The importance in every department of Greek life of the Ionic settlements in this district may justify a somewhat detailed examination of the oldest account of it, and of the various modern theories put forward in criticism of this. Before summarizing the statements of Herodotus and suggesting their probable sources, it should be noted at once that, in all the main points, they are accepted by his successors;[2] the importance of this will be referred to later.

The main points in Herodotus's account are :—

(1) That the Greeks in Asia Minor were immigrants, and that they looked on European Greece as their original home. This is assumed throughout.

(2) That the settlement was one containing very various elements; he writes with the express aim of pointing out that the Ionian cities contained many citizens of non-Ionian origin (i. 145-7).

[1] For the story of the Dorian Invasion in Herodotus, cf. H. & W. on i. 56. 2.

[2] The two main passages repeating and supplementing the account in Herodotus of the Ionic Settlements are Strabo, Bk. XIV. ad init. (pp. 632 f.), and Pausanias, Bk. VII. cc. 1-4.

(3) He connects the Ionian cities with Attica. But it should be noticed that he states this fact in a very guarded form; he mentions only one Codrid oecist;[1] and though he says (i. 147. 2) that all are Ionians who ἀπ' Ἀθηνίων γεγόνασι, and who keep the Athenian feast of the Apaturia, he goes on at once to say that Ephesus and Colophon (though undoubtedly Ionian) do not keep this feast, while in the preceding chapter he contrasts the Milesians—who consider themselves the 'most genuine of the Ionians' (γενναιότατοι), and who 'set forth from the Prytaneum of Athens'—with the rest of the Ionians.

It is true that in ix. 106. 3 the Ionian cities are spoken of as 'colonies' of Athens; but this is an argument put in the mouth of an Athenian.

(4) There was some connection between the immigrants and two districts in the Peloponnese, viz. the South coast of the Corinthian gulf, afterwards called 'Achaia' and Pylos in the S.W. of the peninsula.[2]

(5) Whether Herodotus describes the colonization as one great movement or as a gradual process may be disputed; he probably had never considered the question. When he speaks of it, he uses the phrases of his own day, *e.g.* in the passages already referred to, the colonists start from 'the town-hall of Athens,' and have an Athenian κτίστης (i. 146: ix. 97). But these are conventional phrases, and

[1] Neileus of Miletus ix. 97, and he has a fellow oecist, apparently of different race.

[2] The ruling houses came from Pylos; cf. ix. 97 for Miletus and the general statement i. 147; v. 65. 3 gives the further statement that these 'Pylian Kings' had ruled in Athens.

The references to Achaia are less clear; in vii. 94, 95 their migration thence to Attica is clearly implied, though not definitely stated; but in viii. 44 it is apparently only Ion who comes to Athens. In the main passage (i. 145-6) the migration of the Ionians from Peloponnese by way of Attica is assumed, though the stress is laid on the fact that they gathered other alien elements on their way; the reason why Herodotus mentions their Peloponnesian origin is to explain the number 'twelve' in the Panionium, and the question of race is quite secondary.

his whole account would most naturally be taken as describing a gradual process of settlement.

To sum up these statements briefly—it may be said that three points stand out in the account of Herodotus: (1) the Greeks of Asia Minor looked on European Greece as their original home, (2) they have a special connection with Athens, (3) through Athens they have a connection with the Peloponnese. On the other hand, it is at least doubtful whether he looks on the colonization as one great movement, and the only indication he gives of the date is the indirect one, viz. that the son of Codrus took a lead in part of it; as Codrus was King of Attica when the Dorians 'colonized Megara' (v. 76), and as this event was usually looked upon as part of the Dorian Invasion, Herodotus may be quoted for the view that the colonization of Asia Minor synchronized with that movement, and may have been the result of it. But this is an inference from Herodotus, not his definite statement.

This account was clearly derived by Herodotus from his home in Asia Minor. It was the established view, and probably was based, in part at any rate, on family or priestly traditions. As an instance of these may be quoted the statement in Strabo that in his day[1] the descendants of Androclus, the founder, were still called Βασιλεῖς and had certain 'royal' honours, the 'purple robe' and a special kind of 'sceptre,' with the priesthood of the Eleusinian Demeter. Traditions that were the foundation of such honours were likely to be kept carefully and with some accuracy. This assumption is disputed by some historians; Meyer (*Forsch.* i. 142, n.) holds that heroic ancestors are as much inventions as the admittedly fictitious stories which do duty for early Roman history, *e.g.* the 'Asylum of Romulus' or 'The Rape of the Sabines;' both alike, he thinks, are literary fictions to explain the unknown, but the Roman ones were formed at a later

[1] The change to *Oratio Recta* (p. 633) seems to imply that Strabo is no longer quoting Pherecydes, to whom he refers in the preceding sentences.

stage in the history of the State, when it would have been ridiculous 'to conceive it as a developed family.' It must be urged, however, that persons are much easier to remember than institutions, for they impress the mind of the ordinary man so much more. So, in a well-known passage (ii. 143. 3), Herodotus refers to the family pride with which his predecessor Hecataeus traced back his ancestry for 'sixteen generations.' The famous inscription[1] of Halicarnassus, recording, 'from an ancient pillar,' the priests of Poseidon for 15 generations, covering over 500 years, must be only typical of numerous inscriptions existing in Herodotus' time, which, though not composed for historical reasons or on historical principles, yet contained information as to 'origins' which was probably based on genuine tradition, and so is of some historical value.

One special way in which traditional history would be preserved is in connection with the tombs of 'Founders'; Pausanias records these at Miletus and at Ephesus. It is of course easy to invent a founder and then to confirm the invention by supplying him with a tomb; but the Greek custom of honouring an oecist is a very ancient one, it is based on a common instinct of human nature, and there is at least a strong possibility that the tombs of the 'Founders' represented genuine tradition.[2]

It is not suggested that Herodotus set himself to collect information from such sources as these: the 'origins' of Ionia lay outside the subject he had chosen. But there can be no doubt that his narrative represents the views held in intellectual circles in Ionia as to the beginnings of their state life, and there can be little doubt that the view was based on such sources as those suggested.

[1] Boeckh, C. I. G., II., 2655, and Dittenberger (ed. 1900), No. 608.

[2] For the tomb of an oecist in historic times, cf. Thucydides v. 11: for the tombs of Neileus at Miletus and of Androclus at Ephesus, cf. Pausanias vii. 2. secs. 6 and 9. It is a little hard to see why Meyer speaks so contemptuously of the 'religious respect' which historical research still feels for 'funeral mounds and the names attached to them.' (*Forsch.* i. 148.)

As has been said above, this account is practically unchallenged in Greek tradition. On some points it is supported by evidence much older than Herodotus; the Athenian connection with the Ionians is found in Iliad xiii. 685-689,[1] where the Athenians are προλελεγμένοι among the Ionians; and Solon at the beginning of the sixth century calls Athens πρεσβυτάτην γαῖαν Ἰαονίας, thus tacitly assuming[2] that Athens was the 'metropolis' of the Ionian cities in Asia Minor. Many other details are given in later writers, but these can be fitted into the narrative of Herodotus without difficulty. The importance of this unanimity of tradition can hardly be over-estimated.

But the traditional account has other evidence also in its favour. The geographical conformation of the Aegean, where Attica juts out Eastward as a natural 'pier of departure,' and where crossing is rendered easy by the chain of the Cyclades, at least shows how the events described by tradition could have happened. It of course might be argued that this fact is really against the tradition, because it furnishes an obvious explanation for its invention; in itself, therefore, it is not convincing; but on the whole it seems more likely that the migration actually took place where geographical facts favoured it, than that historical facts were invented simply because geography rendered them possible.

One more kind of evidence for the accepted tradition must be mentioned, viz. that of institutions, secular and

[1] Cf. also *Il.* xv. 337, where Ἴασος is leader of the Athenians. It is usual to say these passages come in the 'later parts of the Iliad'; but the chronological arrangement of the different parts of Homer is so subjective that it is hardly worth while considering this point. At all events there is in ancient writers no suggestion that these passages are Athenian interpolations, such as is made in Plut. Sol. 10 as to *Iliad* ii. 557-8.

[2] Wilamowitz (*S.B.K.P.A.* 1906, p. 72) interprets this of precedence in *rank*, not in *time*; as Meyer says, speaking of this view as held by earlier scholars (*Forsch.* i. 144, n.), this is 'bezeichnend für die Macht des Vorurtheils.'

religious. The four old tribes at Athens are called by Herodotus (v. 66) 'Ionic,' and are found in inscriptions from Delos and Teos, from the Milesian colonies of Cyzicus and Tomi, and from the Samian colony of Perinthus, while Αργαδις is not only one of the minor divisions of population at Ephesus,[1] but has been found in an inscription at Miletus (*S.B.K.P.A.* 1904, p. 85). And the evidence of religious institutions points the same way. The great Attic family festival of the Απατούρια (i. 147) was kept in all the Ionic cities of Asia Minor except Ephesus and Colophon.[2] Plato also definitely states that the cult of Απόλλων Πατρῷος was common to Athens and to 'all cities colonized from her.'[3] And Athens had her vote in the Amphictyonic Council as representing the Ionians, an arrangement that must go back to very early times.[4] The evidence of similar customs in dress may also be quoted for the early connection of Attica with Ionia; Thucydides (i. 6. 3)

[1] For the evidence, cf. Busolt i. 279, nn. 3 and 4. Wilamowitz (*S.B.K.P.A.* 1906, i. p. 71) denies the validity of this argument, because Miletus 'had originally only three tribes,' of which one only was identical with an Attic tribe. It is difficult to understand his reasoning; no one denies that there were many non-Attic elements in Ionia, but the positive evidence of identical institutions surely outweighs the negative evidence of differences. It would be as reasonable to argue that the importance of the English Common Law in the United States proves nothing as to their origin, because the American courts have developed on their own lines and introduced many new elements.

Bilabel (*Die Ionische Kolonisation* 1921, p. 118) assumes the existence of the four Attic tribes at Miletus, with two others for the Non-Ionic Greek elements; he takes for granted (p. 2) that the origin of the colonies was in the main Attic.

[2] No doubt it was dropped in these cities because of the strong Oriental element in the population. If, as is probable, there is also some truth in the reason given by Herodotus, (i. 147) κατὰ φόνου τινὰ σκῆψιν, this reason would be only secondary.

[3] The context implies that they were 'Ionian' (Euthydemus, 302 c.); but no evidence of the cult has been found in any Ionic community in Asia (Farnell, *Greek Cults* iv. 160).

[4] Busolt i. 685, n., however, argues that the arrangement is late, because the Euboeans also had a vote as 'Ionians.'

lays stress on this for men, Herodotus for women (v. 88. 1).

But strong as the evidence is for the accuracy in general outline of the Herodotean account, it has been disputed on every one of its material points. The main criticisms are :—

I. The Ionic settlements in Asia Minor were not derived from the European mainland at all, but were independent in origin; the affiliation to Attica is an invention.

II. An Ionic race had no real existence in Greece proper; though the migrants came largely thence, they did not form a racial unity till they had settled in their new home.

III. The connection of the Ionians with Achaia in the Peloponnese and the connection of Pylos with Attica are later combinations and not historical facts.

These criticisms must be examined separately. The first may be mentioned as made in two distinct forms.

As long ago as 1855 Curtius[1] published his famous paradox that the Ionians came from Asia into Greece, and not, as tradition asserted, from Greece into Asia. He maintained that this was really the belief of Herodotus. One passage may suffice to illustrate his kind of argument; when Herodotus (i. 56) says of the Ionian race that it οὐδαμῇ κω ἐξεχώρησε, Curtius says that he means the Ionians had always been at home in Asia Minor; of course, however, Herodotus is referring to the Ionians in Attica and their claim to be αὐτόχθονες; the passage in Herodotus never has been, nor could it be, taken to mean what Curtius says. But it is not necessary to examine this view further; it was accepted by Holm,[2] but is now universally given up; as E. Meyer well says: 'a population which is confined to a narrow coast strip . . . while on the other hand it has never been able to push into the broad

[1] *Die Ionier vor der Ionischen Wanderung*, 1855; the view was defended by him in *Hermes* xxv., (1890) pp. 141 f.

[2] *Gr. Ges.* i. 87.

plains of the interior . . . cannot be native, but must have come by sea.[1]

The essential point, however, in the view of Curtius, viz. that the Ionian settlers had no definite connection with Greece proper, but, so far as they were a distinct race, appear in history first in Ionia, has been put forward by Wilamowitz Möllendorf in the paper already referred to. The view in this form has met with very considerable acceptance.[2]

The great Berlin Professor has no difficulty in proving that there was no one organized Ionic migration, and his comments on the detailed foundations are full of interest. He himself admits that Herodotus 'knows nothing of a single expedition of Athenian settlers under the leadership of the sons of Codrus' (p. 70). His view, however, differs from that of Herodotus in the following points; he maintains that:—

(1) The settlement of the Asiatic coast has nothing to do with Attica. 'Fragments of peoples are hurled this way and that, and out of them in the course of centuries new peoples are formed' (p. 73). This is the origin of the 'Ionians,'[3] who originally had a wider extension—to the South. The name was used for all who belonged to the 'culture circle,' which had its centre at Delos (p. 72);[4] when the league of twelve cities was formed in the seventh century, the name was used in a new and more restricted sense of them (p. 68).

(2) An important element in the settlement is Cretan (p. 73).

(3) The racial divisions arise in Asia. 'It will never be possible really to know why in the end out of the chaos

[1] *Forsch.* i. 135.

[2] *S.B.K.P.A.* 1906, Vol. I., pp. 59 f. It is curious that the main points of W.-M. are not stated in the article 'Iones' in *P.W.*, though his paper is quoted on minor points.

[3] The Philistines are another example of a new people, formed in this welter of migrations (p. 75).

[4] For this, cf. the gathering described in the Homeric hymn to Apollo, quoted in Thuc. iii. 104.

there arises here a Lycian or a Carian or a Grecian state, and, if it is Greek, why Aeolic, Ionic or Doric' (p. 75). 'The national and dialectic units (Volks-und Sprach-individualitäten), Aeolic, Ionic, Doric, have arisen in Asia' (*ib.*).

(4) Hence the connection recorded by tradition with certain definite parts of Greece proper is merely literary combination. The name 'Achaean' has nothing to do with the district in the North of Peloponnese; but the identification was made because in Homer 'Achaeans' was the general name for all those whom the poet represents attacking Asia in the same way as the settlers themselves had done (p. 70), while in later times 'Achaean' was 'localized in one Greek race.' So, too, there is 'Keine Instanz dagegen dass diese Ionische Wanderung (out of Athens), die spätere Vulgata, ein Reflex des Attischen Reiches ist' (pp. 70-71); the Codrid oecists are later additions (pp. 63-4).

In these points there is some truth, but surely more exaggeration. Is it likely that the division of 'Ionian' and 'Dorian,' which helped to rend Greece asunder in the fifth century, was merely a reflex of divisions which had nothing at all to do with the main body of the Greeks in Europe?

And the criticisms of the two supposed literary combinations are of entirely different value. Homer was the accepted gospel of the Greeks, and his authority might well lead to the invention of an 'Achaean' origin for settlers in Asia, but it will be noted later that this combination was by no means universally accepted. The connection, however, of 'Ionian' and Attica is quite different; as has been said above, it was practically unchallenged in antiquity. And what reason can be given for its invention if it had no basis of fact? Before the time of Peisistratus, Athens was much less important than several other Ionic towns; in the latter half of the sixth century, all that can be said is that, as an art and literary centre, she had risen to the level of Miletus. It is not till the fifth century that Athens stands out, alike in political power and

in intellectual brilliance; but in this century Athens was only popular in Ionia for two generations at most (500-445). It is impossible to think of any other period of Greek History when Athens was so pre-eminent and so popular that a fiction giving her the claim to be metropolis of the Ionian cities would have been invented. Chronology, however, renders it impossible for the fiction to have gained universal acceptance in so short a time; by 450 B.C. it held the field undisputed. To suppose that a claim, without foundation in fact, and difficult to establish in any case, grew up in less than two generations, and that it was accepted universally, is, to speak frankly, absurd. We can see a reason for an adventurer like Aristagoras inventing it,[1] but none for its general acceptance.

The obvious conclusion is that it was accepted because it was based on fact, and the theory of 'the reflection of the Attic empire' is one more instance of modern inability to remember that Athens bulked much less large in the old Greek view than in that of modern historians.

Wilamowitz, as has been seen, rejects one part of the traditional view—the connection with Attica; E. Meyer[2] accepts this, but he agrees with his fellow Berlin professor, and rejects the traditional view, by maintaining that the Ionian race came into existence in Asia, as the result of the combination of many elements: 'before (the migration), in the only sense in which we understand the name, there were no Ionians.'[3] The answer to this view is that it runs

[1] Herodotus (v. 97) makes him speak of the Milesians as 'Athenian colonists'; but even liars tell the truth sometimes when it suits them. Töpffer (*Attische Genealogie*, p. 228) quotes this passage in support of his view that the Athenian version of the colonization was developed 500-450 B.C.

[2] *Forsch.* i. 132 and n.

[3] This is Meyer's explanation of the difficulty why the Athenians, who posed as the heads and champions of the Ionian race, never spoke of themselves as 'Ionians,' why in fact, as Herodotus (i. 143) says, they avoided the name and were ashamed of it. Meyer says this was not a fact, disputing thus a definite statement of Herodotus, which is fully supported by Thucydides; for the

counter to a well authenticated tradition, the general acceptance of which is unlikely unless it is based on some definite fact.

Bury suggests a compromise which may be accepted as possible, viz. that, though the main stream of immigrants came from Greece, and had a definite connection with Attica, they adopted the name 'Ionian' from a people already existing in Asia.[1] The name seems to be familiar in the East at a period before the Greek migrations are likely to have begun, and its wide acceptance in the East for all races of Hellenes[2] is evidence for its antiquity. This compromise lacks historical evidence, but is reconcilable with tradition, and seems to be supported by philology; the accentuation of the form Ἴωνες (*not* Ἰῶνες, as would be usual from Ἰαονες) is most naturally explained by its being borrowed from a non-Hellenic people.[3] It is obvious, however, that granting, as is probable, that the name 'Ionian' was known in the East before the Migration, the Easterns may easily have come across it elsewhere than in the later Ionia.

It seems then probable that tradition is right in bringing the Ionians into Asia Minor from European Greece, and in connecting them specially, but by no means entirely, with Attica. It remains to examine the two more detailed statements, viz. the general connection with Achaia, and the special connection of some of the oecist families with Pylos.

passages, cf. the note on the passage in H. and W. or Busolt i. 282, n., who bluntly says 'Die Voraussetzung E. Meyer's . . . ist irrig'; so too Lenschau, in *P.W.* ix. 1871, but it is hard to accept his view that the fifth century sneers at 'Ionians' were mere jests 'without special importance.' The explanation of the difficulty is simply that the Athenians, like other people, were inconsistent, and held and acted on inconsistent beliefs at different times.

[1] For Bury's view, cf. *E.H.R.* 1900, pp. 288 f.: he identifies, as others have done, the 'Yaunna,' the allies of the Hittites against Rameses II., with the Ionians.

[2] Cf. the use of 'Franks' in the Middle Ages.

[3] *Rev. des Ét. Grec.* xxxiv. 1921, pp. 156-7.

The story that connects the Ionians with Achaia is told most fully in Strabo (383 f.), who makes them originally Athenian, then settled as colonists in the Peloponnese, and finally expelled by the Achaeans and refounding their twelve cities in Asia ; this is a development of the account of Herodotus.

But the explanation of the name ' Achaean ' given above from Wilamowitz is very probable, and its acceptance was aided by the supposed identity of number in the Achaean and the Ionian cities (12 in each district), and by the derivation of the Ionic god, Poseidon Helikonios, (Herodotus i. 148) from Ἑλίκη in Achaia. Homer certainly connects Poseidon with Helike and Aegae,[1] but it was disputed in antiquity whether the Peloponnesian Helike was the one referred to,[2] and Aristarchus (on *Il.* xx. 404) pointed out that Poseidon of Helike would be called Ἑλικήιος not Ἑλικώνιος ; he therefore connected the epithet with Mt. Helicon in Boeotia.[3]

The Achaean part of the Herodotean tradition then may be given up. It can be plausibly explained as an invention, it was, indirectly indeed, attacked in antiquity, and it lacks outside evidence in its support.

It is quite otherwise, however, with the Pylian tradition. This is closely connected with some of the great families of Ionia, and it was unquestioned in antiquity. Its invention would have been most unlikely ; in spite of the importance of the Pylian Nestor in Homer, Pylos is too remote and out of the way to have been arbitrarily selected. The connection with Pylos is in fact generally accepted, but the account of it, accepted by Herodotus, which brings the Pylian families to Asia by way of Athens, is thought by many to be a later invention. The objections to it are :

(1) The forms in which it is told mark it as being late ; the legends are not ancient and do not correspond with the facts they claim to explain.

[1] *Il.* viii. 203, xiii. 21 and *Odys.* v. 381.

[2] Strabo 384. 386.

[3] For the importance of this derivation for possible Ionian origins in Central Greece, cf. Farnell *Greek Cults* iv. 29 f.

(2) It is also urged[1] that Athens, the pretended metropolis of the Ionian cities, plays little part in the Homeric poems, while Nestor and Pylos are most prominent.

These objections must be developed a little further and briefly examined. It is argued :—

(*a*) that there is no γένος either of Codridae or of Neileidae at Athens. But as the story said they migrated thence to Ionia, this is surely only natural.

(*b*) The sons of Nestor, who are given as ancestors to the Alcmaeonidae and Paionidae, viz. Antilochus and Thrasymedes (Paus. ii. 18. 8), do not give their names to Attic γένη. But it must be said at once that there is no reason why they should : the Attic γένη take their name not from Nestor's sons, but from the younger generations who are said to have come to Attica.

(*c*) Codrus, the son of Melanthus and the father of Neileus, the oecist of Miletus, is admittedly a figure which has no place[2] in the Attic genealogies. But since these represented him as an ἐπηλυς they are perfectly consistent.[3]

All these objections, then, can in fact be met out of the

[1] Töpffer *u.s.* 1889, p. 237; by him the whole argument from the Attic families has been carefully worked out, pp. 225 f.

[2] Meyer (*G. des A.* i. p. 241) is wrong in quoting Lycurgus in Leoc. 86 and Paus. i. 19.5 for his 'tomb' in Attica; no 'tomb' is mentioned in either passage.

[3] The various forms of the story of Codrus are a good instance of the development of myths : in Herodotus (v. 76) he is a king at the time of the Dorian conquest of Megara; in Strabo (393) the same point is recorded, with the addition that the Dorians were 'defeated in battle.' But the familiar story grew up in the fifth century (Pherecydes fr. 110 *F.H.G.*, i. p. 98) that Codrus had saved Athens by sacrificing himself; this is clearly modelled on the death of Leonidas (vii. 220); but Aristotle (*Pol.* 1310 *b*) was ignorant of, or rejected it, since he only records that Codrus had saved his country from slavery, and so won the kingship. Finally there is the absurd story in Justin ii. 7 that the Athenians deprived the sons of Codrus of the title of 'King' because of their father's pre-eminent merit.

legends themselves, which represent the Pylian oecists as having only a temporary connection with Attica.

But the other objection to the story of the connection of the Pylian oecists of Ionia with Athens, is a more serious one. We have the definite statement of Mimnermus, the seventh century poet of Colophon (Bergk, *P.L.G.* ii. fr. 9; Strabo 634), that his countrymen

> ἡμεῖς δηῦτε Πύλον Νηλήιον ἄστυ λιπόντες
> ἱμερτὴν Ἀσίην νήυσιν ἀφικόμεθα
> ἐς δ' ἐρατὴν Κολοφῶνα βίην ὑπέροπλον ἔχοντες
> ἐξόμεθ' ἀργαλέης ὕβριος ἡγεμόνες.

This is taken to mean that they came straight (*νήυσιν*) from Pylos to Asia. If this interpretation be right and necessary, the question is settled: Mimnermus is at once the oldest of our authorities and gives the local tradition. But does the poet mean any more than that their original home was at Pylos, and that they had now a home on the other side of the sea? An obvious parallel presents itself. If a modern versifier wrote of the Pilgrim Fathers:—

> "We left our friends, we left old England's shores,
> And in frail bark we crossed the ocean foam
> To find, where loud the stormy Atlantic roars,
> For Freedom and for Truth a lasting home,"

we might well criticize his style and metre, but no one would accuse him of historical ignorance; yet the Pilgrim Fathers really sailed from Holland, where they had had a home for years, not from England. Mimnermus may fairly be interpreted to mean, as his own countrymen later undoubtedly interpreted him, that the people of

Töpffer (p. 233) well notes that the importance of Codrus in Attic legend is due to the Athenian connection with Ionia; this is the point emphasized in the inscription (C.I.A. iii. 943):

> Κόδρου τοῦτο πέσημα Μελανθείδαο ἄνακτος
> ξεῖνε, τὸ καὶ μεγάλην Ἀσὶδα τειχίσατο
> σῶμα δ' ὑπ' Ἀκροπολῆι φὲρων τάρχυνεν Ἀθήνης.
> Λαὸς

Colophon claimed to be connected with Pylos as a home across the seas, but to say nothing as to the stage or stages by which the new home was reached. That this is the right interpretation is made clear by two considerations; in the first place, as has been said, this is the sense in which the Greeks understood the tradition; and secondly it has all probability in its favour. That Peloponnesian exiles should retire to Attica is not improbable; Thucydides (i. 2. 6) speaks of Attica as a haven of refuge for the expelled; but it is most improbable that they should lead a great expedition of conquest and colonization round the stormy Cape Malea, and across that part of the Aegean where they would have least shelter from islands.

However, this last is the view which is adopted by the critical historians;[1] it may be briefly summarized as follows.

The Pylian invasion is placed about 850 B.C., the date being fixed as subsequent to the Elean invasion of the Western Peloponnese (*circ.* 900), while the appearance of geometric decoration on the pottery does not allow a date later than 800. It might fairly be assumed, even without Mimnermus' express statement, that the colonization was a conquest; the further inference that it was a conquest of earlier Greek settlers is made because he uses the words ὕβρις, which he would not have done had the conquered been barbarians.[2] Colophon and Ephesus were the centres of the new conquest, and this may be the real reason why they did not celebrate the Ionic Apaturia (i. 148). The Pylian conquest extended to all the Ionic states except Chios, Samos and Phocaea; as to these, tradition says that Phocaea was admitted to the League when it accepted

[1] Cf. Töpffer, p. 235 and Busolt i. 287, who says 'the Peloponnesian emigrants will naturally have gone direct by sea and not made the circuit by Attica'—a somewhat surprising statement. The fullest account of this 'Pylian conquest' is that of Lenschau in *P.W. s.v.* '*Iones*' ix. 1869 f.; the summary of the whole Ionian story there given is admirable, though the Pylian part, epitomized above, seems most unlikely.

[2] This argument seems very far-fetched.

Pylian rulers (Paus. vii. 3. 10). Hence the foundation of the League by the nine other cities of the Ionic Dodecapolis may be connected with the Pylian conquest.[1] The earliest exploit of the League is the conquest of the Greek state Melia;[2] the shrine of the conquered state, *i.e.* that of Poseidon at Mycale, was adopted as the national shrine, for the Pylian hero, Neleus, was the son of Poseidon; this explains why Apollo, the natural god of the Ionians proper, was not the central deity of the Ionic League. Gradually, however, the old element absorbed the new, the Pylians became Ionians, and under the influence of the power of Peisistratus, the tradition of Athenian origin was extended to the Pylians, and the legends were formed which we have in Herodotus, Strabo and Pausanias.

[1] Lenschau conjectures that it contained originally only nine cities, and that this fact is connected with the number 9 in the Pylian sacrifice to Poseidon in *Odyssey* iii. 6-7. This point is surely very forced.

[2] For the early history of the League, cf. Professor Cary (Caspari) in *J.H.S.* xxxv. (1915), pp. 171 f. and much more fully Wilamowitz Möllendorf (*S.B.K.P.A.* vi. pp. 38 f.). The war against Melia is recorded in the very late authority, Vitruvius (iv. 1), who says that it was reduced by the Ionian towns 'communi consilio.' This is generally said to be confirmed by a very fragmentary inscription of Priene (No. 37 Hiller von Gärtringen, *Inscrip. von Priene*) as to land in dispute between Samos and Priene, which certainly mentions the Melian Land, and in which the Ἰώνων κοινόν is inserted (in two places) by conjecture. This land settlement (whoever made it) is dated as before 650 B.C. by another inscription as to the same land, a decree of King Lysimachus (Boeckh ii. 2254) now in the Ashmolean Museum; as in this inscription there is a reference to Lygdamis—undoubtedly the Cimmerian leader of about 650 B.C.—the settlement must be anterior to that date.

Both Wilamowitz and Caspari claim that the League was political rather than religious; the reason given by the former is that Thales and Bias proposed to change its locality (*u.s.* p. 47), that by Caspari is that it was held in connection with a shrine of such little importance (p. 176). Neither of these reasons seems very convincing, and it is better to suppose that it conformed to the usual rule, by which the religious League usually precedes in date the secular

This is a goodly superstructure to raise on four lines of Mimnermus and on a few casual references, all of which can be fitted into the ordinary tradition. It is much safer to accept this tradition, which certainly has the weight of evidence in its favour, especially since archaeological research has in the last half-century confirmed so many Greek traditions which were once despised. As Hogarth says[1]: 'Greek tradition of origins has been rather signally vindicated in these latter days.'

A further point may be briefly mentioned, though it lies outside the question of origins. Wilamowitz (*u.s.* pp. 77-78) rightly suggests that the original settlers were of the nature of a warlike aristocracy, living on the produce of lands tilled by barbarian serfs. This would account for the easy overthrow of Colophon, when its cavalry was crushed by the Lydians. Traces of this arrangement, corresponding to the organization of the σωσσίτια at Sparta, may perhaps be found at Miletus, where the men are said to have had their meals apart.[2] No doubt many of the noble citizens wished to preserve this state of things; so we have the saying of Thales, Γαῖα πιστόν, θάλασσα ἄπιστον;[3] but circumstances were too strong for the conservatives; the development of sheep farming[4] made it necessary to seek outlets for population overseas, and Miletus claimed to have become the 'metropolis' of eighty colonies.

It remains to consider one more difference between Herodotus and modern critical historians, *i.e.* the date of the Ionic settlements, or rather whether they are to be connected with the Dorian invasion of Greece proper, *i.e.* with the overthrow of Mycenaean civilization by the coming of Northern peoples.

[1] *Ionia and the East*, p. 37.

[2] At Miletus the serfs were called Gergithae; for the bitterness of the peasant revolt there, cf. Athenaeus 524; Herodotus i. 146 gives a different explanation of the separation of sexes.

[3] We have a trace of the same idea in Herodotus's story of the Parian arbitration (v. 29); cf. also Phocylides fr. 7.

[4] For the Milesian wool trade, cf. vi. 21 with note in H. and W.

As has been said above, the settlement of Ionia was a gradual process, and there can be little doubt that there were Mycenaean settlements in Asia Minor, *e.g.* at Assarlik. But this is quite consistent with the data given by Herodotus, from whom it can further be inferred (cf. p. 3) that, while the migrations were spread over a long period, the chief impulse for them was trouble in Greece proper. In this the modern critics disagree with him; Meyer, as long ago as 1889, threw out the suggestion that 'the settlement of the West Coast of Asia Minor is not a result of the invasions of the Northern peoples,' and 'has nothing to do with the Dorian migration.'[1] Lenschau (*u.s.* ix. 1875) says that this view has received general recognition.

But surely, quite apart from tradition, all probability is in favour of the view that the creation of a new world in Greece proper would lead to a similar development on the other side of the sea, and Hogarth (*u.s.* pp. 47, 69) well draws attention to the significance of the scantiness of Mycenaean finds in Asia Minor. He suggests that the absence of early settlements may be due to the fact that there was 'some strong continental power[2] dominating all the west central coast of Asia Minor,' and that this power was the Hittite Empire, which by a long series of disastrous shocks was brought low as late as about the end of the second millenium B.C. Probability then and Archaeology alike favour the traditional view against modern critics.

[1] *Forsch.* i. 150. It is a little odd that he says this connection was unknown in antiquity. It may, as has been said above, be inferred from Herodotus, and it is distinctly stated in Thucydides i. 2 *ad fin.*

[2] It may possibly have extended to the islands; Hall (*J.H.S.* xxix. 19 f. 1910), cf. the Lesbian names, 'Myrsilus' and 'Mytilene,' with the names of Hittite Kings, Mursil and Mutallu.

II.

Who was Gyges?

(*This Paper was read almost in its present form to the Oxford Philological Society in October*, 1915.)

OF the importance of the part played by Gyges in history there is no doubt; it is with him that Herodotus begins his story of the conflict between the Greeks and the Barbarians. And of his historical reality there is equally no doubt; he is mentioned in the contemporary poem of Archilochus (fr. 25), and in the Assyrian inscription of the great Assurbanipal.[1] At the same time it is equally certain that the larger part of what Greek literature relates as to him is fiction. It is necessary to sum up briefly what may be accepted as facts in the ordinary story, though it is the purpose of this paper to discuss only one point in it.

What then is fairly certain is:—

(1) that Gyges founds a new dynasty in Lydia.

(2) that Lydia henceforth becomes a power dangerous to the Greeks, but at the same time one that has some friendly relations with them, especially with the oracle of Delphi.

(3) that Gyges enters into relations with the great Assyrian power, to which he pays homage, but that later on he intrigues against it in league with the newly established Saite king in Egypt.

(4) that he fights the Cimmerians, and meets his death[2] in the struggle.

So far we are on solid ground. But all this leaves quite

[1] Col. iii. deciphered by G. Smith and published by him in *Records of Past* I., and *Assyrian Discoveries* 1875, pp. 331 f. A later version by Lehmann-Haupt in *P.W.* vii. 1956 f.

[2] Lehmann-Haupt (*u.s.*) doubts this because Assurbanipal mentions it only as an answer to prayer; but he is singular in this doubt.

doubtful the answer to the question which heads this paper—Who was Gyges?

It is well known that there are three variant versions of his story. The oldest is the fifth century account of Herodotus (i. cc. 8-14), which makes him a member of the royal bodyguard, who is compelled by the folly of the king and by the natural anger of the queen, to become a traitor. To the next century belongs the well-known story of Plato (*Rep.* ii. p. 359), which makes him a shepherd, tempted by his 'ring of darkness' to make himself master of the virtue of the queen and the throne of the king. The third is the detailed account of Nicolaus Damascenus,[1] which represents Gyges as the head of a noble Lydian family, who, after many adventures, is carried away by his passion for the king's bride, and attempts to play the part of Lancelot; this conduct compels him to conspire and make himself king; that this last account, though some centuries later than the others, represents the version that was current under the name of Xanthus of Lydia is generally assumed. Were this true, it would be slightly older than that of Herodotus, and Lehmann-Haupt (*u.s.*) accepts its main points as 'historically established,' *e.g.* that Gyges is a member of an old Lydian family.

But it is hard to see why this third story should be treated as of more value than the other two. The genuineness of the works that passed under the name of Xanthus was already disputed[2] in the fourth century B.C. And the internal evidence against the story is still stronger; as told by Nicolaus, it forms part of a long romance about Lydian history, full of persons of more than doubtful reality and of romantic details. Its very fullness is suspicious; the principle of Ephorus[3] applies to it, who says, with an insight unusual in him, *περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς γεγενημένων τοὺς ἀκριβέστατα λέγοντας πιστοτάτους ἡγούμεθα, περὶ δὲ τῶν παλαιῶν τοὺς οὕτω διεξίοντας ἀπιθανωτάτους εἶναι νομίζομεν* 'for we consider it improbable

[1] Fr. 49 *F.H.G.* iii. 383 *seq.*
[2] Cf. Athenaeus xii. 515.
[3] Fr. 2 *F.H.G.* i. 234.

that all the acts or most of the speeches should be remembered at such length.' The most that can be said is that the narrative may, and probably does, contain details from an older story, but that, as a narrative of fact, it has been embroidered out of recognition. It stands indeed on the same footing as the other two versions; all three are romances about a real man. That the story of Nicolaus is more elaborate, and professedly more historical, than the others is due to its later composition and not to any real superiority in value.

If this be the case, then it is permissible (in default of adequate evidence) to form hypotheses as to the story of Gyges, though we can hardly expect to prove them completely; we can only claim that they should correspond to probability, that they should be adequate to explain all the known facts, and that they should include as far as possible the features which, being common to all or most of the romances, may be due to real tradition and not to invention.

It has often been pointed out that the three traditions have certain common points: they all lay stress on the relations of Gyges with the queen of his predecessor, and two of them (those of Herodotus and Xanthus) make him a soldier of the royal bodyguard. This last point is somewhat confirmed by the story in Plutarch,[1] which connects Gyges in a curious way with Carian mercenaries. Of course, it is possible that these coincidences are accidental, or that they may be due to quite other causes, *e.g.* it is usual to explain the presence of the queen in all three traditions as being due to the prominence of the female element in Anatolian mythology. Still, an hypothesis into which they would fit naturally, would gain a little confirmation.

So far I have only been epitomizing what I believe is generally accepted. But now I want to lay stress on another problem in Anatolian history. The traditions as to Gyges all explain the change of dynasty in Lydia, but

[1] *Quaes. Graec.*, c. 45. Plut. *Mor.*, p. 302.

they throw little or no light on another historical fact of much greater importance, the aggression of Lydia on the Greek colonies. Before the seventh century, Greek expansion on the Aegean seaboard had been comparatively unhindered; now 'the new dynasty entered on an aggressive foreign policy.'[1] This aggressive policy lasted only about a century; after 540 B.C. Lydia was once more a negligible factor from the point of view of danger to the Greeks.

This change in the national character was a great puzzle to ancient historians; to explain it Herodotus (i. 155) introduces one of his 'good stories,' putting it down to a definite introduction of a 'coddling policy' at the suggestion of Croesus. His story is transparently an aetiological myth; the real meaning of the change was hidden from the Greeks, because their historical experience was so limited; the modern historian finds an obvious explanation of the change in Lydian character in the rapid decadence of a warrior immigrant race under new surroundings and from its intermarriage with the conquered people. The history of India abounds with stories of states, formidable for three or four generations, and then sinking to the level of their neighbours.

These two problems, the origin of the dynasty and the cause of the change in Lydian policy, may surely be connected. It is to work out this suggested connection that this paper is written; if the hypothesis put forward rests on scanty evidence, it can at all events be confidently asserted that it does not attack any well-established facts; it only tries to meet difficulties which have had hitherto no certain solution.

Broadly speaking, the position I should wish to maintain is this, that Gyges was not a Lydian at all, but a Cimmerian invader; that he, or perhaps his father, was taken into

[1] Busolt i. 459; it should be added that he explains the fact quite otherwise than I wish to do; he argues that 'the aggrandizement of the kingdom was a measure well adapted to raise and secure its prestige' (*i.e.* of the new dynasty).

the service of the old Lydian monarchy, that the new-comers soon found that they preferred to possess, and not to defend, the land of their masters, and that the royal marriage, perhaps extorted by the conqueror, perhaps given to Gyges to secure his fidelity, was the base of the claim of the new dynasty to the throne; the succession went on in the female line;[1] hence the importance of the queen in all the legends. The parallels to such a change of dynasty are plentiful; an obvious one is the traditional story of the Saxons in Kent, and the marriage of their leader Hengist to the daughter of Vortigern.[2] An even closer parallel in some respects is the transference of the throne of Egypt, in the middle of the thirteenth century A.D., with the hand of the queen-mother, to Aibek, the captain of the Mameluke bands.[3] It will be seen at once that this hypothesis explains all the features which, as we saw, were common to the various traditions; it explains, too, the new vigour of the Lydian monarchy, and what is equally important, its rapid decadence.

For one century the Lydian cavalry were famous, as might be expected if they were an aristocracy of Cimmerian raiders, settled in a conquered country. But by the latter half of the sixth century, the warlike vigour had died out; henceforward nothing is heard of Lydian cavalry at any period. They are not among the races which furnish cavalry to Xerxes (vii. 84) only two generations after their conquest by the Persians, and the famous Anatolian heavy cavalry of the Byzantines came from quite a different part of Asia

[1] Cf. Frazer, *Early History of Kingship*, 242 f., for marriage of royal widow and succession in the female line. Mr. Genner of Jesus College makes the ingenious suggestion that Gyges, or his father, according to oriental custom, took over the harem of his predecessor (cf. Absalom's behaviour in II. Sam. 16. 21); this act, so unfamiliar to Greek ideas, has been transformed in the legends into an ordinary example of sexual passion and crime.

[2] Whether this be true or false does not matter to my argument; it shows at least what a mediaeval historian considered likely to happen.

[3] Cf. *Enc. Brit.*, *s.v.* Egypt ix., p. 99.

Minor. The two facts taken together of sudden rise and of complete decay surely need some explanation, and this hypothesis gives it.

But it may fairly be asked, is there any evidence at all for such a complete reversal of the usual belief? It will be obvious that no direct evidence could be expected from Lydian sources; the royal house of the Mermnadae would carefully conceal its origin, and its success is evidenced by the wide divergencies of the fictions which took the place of fact. Hence, apart from one piece of evidence from an unexpected quarter which will be discussed later, there are only a few facts which support the hypothesis, and those mainly indirectly. The first of these is the parallel case of the Scythian Bartatua,[1] to whom Esarhaddon gave an Assyrian princess for wife, and who assisted the Assyrians against the Medes. This fact is certain and contemporary, but it only shows that such an adoption, as is suggested above, of a prince of the raiders into the royal family of a settled kingdom, would not be impossible in Anatolian politics.

Again, a little direct evidence, such as it is, may be obtained from names. It cannot be accidental that the name of Gyges' father, Dascylus, is that also of the capital of the Hellespontine satrapy, Dascylium.[2] Why so unimportant a town was chosen as the capital of a satrapy would be a mystery, if regard is had only to known facts; but it becomes clearer if we suppose that Dascylium was once a capital of a semi-independent principality.

Further, the names of the royal house of the Mermnadae point to two different strains of race among its members; whatever else "Gyges" may be, it is not an ordinary Lydian name and stands in marked contrast to the regular

[1] The Protothyes of i. 103; see note in H. & W.

[2] Stephanus of Byzantium (*s.v.*) gives five towns of this name; we might suppose that the filial feeling of Gyges perpetuated his father's name, as that of the Seleucidae did those of Antiochus and Seleucus. For a discussion of the site of Dascylium, cf. Munro in *J.H.S.* xxxii. 1912; all three sites discussed are near the North coast.

Anatolian names of Sadyattes and Alyattes. What its relation may be to the Λίμνη Γυγαία of the *Iliad* (ii. 865), it is impossible to say; this latter name is certainly older than the beginning of the Mermnad dynasty.

A curious point[1] also in the story of Nicolaus fits exactly into my suggestion that Gyges was not a Lydian; he is represented as being born in the neighbourhood of the remote town of Sinope, a town surely somewhat far removed for a Lydian exile, but always prominent in traditions connected with the Cimmerians.

Finally a well-known feature in the Herodotean story, and one undoubtedly derived from Delphic tradition based on contemporary evidence, is the part taken by the oracle in the settlement of the succession question. The invocation of a foreign authority seems more probable if one of the parties was himself a foreigner.

But of course all this evidence, direct and indirect, if indeed it can be called evidence at all, is of the slightest. This, as was said above, is what was to be expected; Gyges had succeeded in getting himself made king of Lydia, and in his appeal to the Assyrian king for help, it is against the Cimmerians that he requires it. Were he ever so much a barbarian and originally an enemy, all Lydian records would suppress the fact.

But there is one piece of evidence from quite a different source, which, if it can be accepted, is really important, and may preserve a tradition of what has been elsewhere suppressed. Ezekiel, the Hebrew exile, writing in Babylon only about half a century after the death of Gyges, pictures in two well-known chapters (38, 39) the terrors of a barbarian invasion from the North. That his imagery is drawn from the invasions of the Northern peoples in the preceding century is certain,[2] even apart from the identification of Josephus.

But it is much disputed whence Ezekiel derived his name for their leader. Some have seen in 'Gog' a word

[1] *F.H.G.* iii. 383.

[2] Cf. the prominence of horsemen in the invasion (c. 38. 4, 15) and of bowmen (c. 39. 3).

for barbarians, found only in the Tell El Amarna tablets; others the name of an obscure prince known to us from the Assyrian monuments as dwelling to the North of Assyria. It would be idle for any but an Orientalist to discuss these etymologies, but the man of ordinary commonsense can reject the absurd theory of Winckler[1] that the chapters in Ezekiel are a late interpolation, referring to Alexander the Great; his so-called reasons are as trifling as his conclusion is impossible. There seems, however, no linguistic reason why the name 'Gog' should not be explained in the old way, as the familiar name of 'Gyges.'[2] This explanation has neither to go back the greater part of a millenium for a parallel, nor to lay stress on a quite unimportant princeling; it makes the prophet employ the name of a king who had played a big part in Assyrian international relations within the memory of living men, a king, too, whose romantic story clearly had struck Anatolian imagination.

Of course the identification of 'Gog' and Gyges may be accepted without going further and accepting my hypothesis; it has been plausibly maintained that the identification of the Cimmerian victim, who is an historical person, with the leader of the prophet's Northern hosts, is due only to the confusion in the memory of Ezekiel. But the confusion becomes more plausible if 'Gog' had been leader as well as victim of Northern hordes.

To sum up. It is of course clear that the theory suggested contradicts tradition; but then the tradition is admittedly bad. My theory explains why tradition is so bad, it gathers up the most probable elements in the old stories, it explains what they fail to explain, viz. the change in the foreign relations of Lydia, and it fits in at least as well as any other theory with the curious occurrence of the name 'Gog' in the slightly later record of Ezekiel. The theory of course is unprovable; but may it not be said that it has more in its favour than any other on the subject?

[1] *Alt. Orient., Forsch.* ii. (1898), pp. 160–171.

[2] This explanation is still adopted by some, *e.g.* by Sayce in *Hastings' Dict. of Bible, s.v.* Gog.

III.

Peloponnesian History to 550 B.C.

SO far as there is anything that can at all claim to be new in this paper, it falls within the period from 650 to 550 B.C.; but, in order to make clear my suggestions as to the problems of that period, it is necessary to summarize the course of events in the preceding centuries.[1] Beloch's destructive theory,[2] which denied any basis of historical truth to the Greek tradition of the Dorian Conquest, rightly never met with much acceptance, and has been crushingly refuted by Archaeology; but the details of that conquest are mainly inventions, and indeed it cannot be said that we have any completely trustworthy evidence as to the two next centuries (1000-800) B.C.

The following points, however, seem to stand out as probable :—

I. Argos, under its royal house, the Temenidae, claimed, and to some extent enjoyed, a superior position to the other states in the Peloponnese. This is implied not only in the traditional Argive claim to *προστασία*, but also in two facts :—

(*a*) The Temenidae were overlords of Mycenae and of the Argolid plain, which indisputably had been the centres of the 'Achaean' régime now overthrown, and

(*b*) all tradition assigned seniority to Temenus among the Heraclidae.

Perhaps it is not too much to conjecture that the Temenidae made vague claims to a suzerainty, at least

[1] I should like to acknowledge at once my obligations to the article on the 'Growth of Spartan Policy' by the late Mr. Guy Dickins, *J.H.S.* 32 (1912) and to that on the 'Growth of Sparta' by Professor Toynbee, *ib.* 33 (1913). But my own views were formed, and considerable parts of this essay were written, before the summer of 1912, when I read a paper on 'Early Peloponnesian History' to the Oxford Philological Society.

[2] *Rhein. Mus.* No. 45, 1890.

in the Northern half of Peloponnese, which may be compared with the wider but equally vague claims of the German Emperors over Western Europe in the early Middle Ages.

II. In the whole Peloponnese, except in Arcadia, there were two strata of population, the new-comers or conquerors (whether called 'Dorian,' 'Aetolian,' or what not) and the earlier inhabitants.

To compare again Mediaeval Europe, we have a similar state of things in the existence side by side of the Northern conquerors, Franks, Visigoths, etc., and of the Romanised population;[1] the two elements were by no means of necessity hostile either in ancient or in mediaeval times; 'we must not conclude there was a great gulf fixed between the races.'[2] It is important to remember that in historic times Greek was the universal language in the Peloponnese as much as in the rest of the modern Hellenic kingdom. Whether the conquerors imposed their language on the conquered, or whether they adopted their language, or whether again, as is most probable, the two races spoke kindred languages from the first, is immaterial here. What is important is the existence of two strata of population with different privileges.

III. But it is also clear that the relations of the two races varied materially from district to district. In the North-

[1] E. Meyer (*Ges. des A.* ii., p. 270) says 'Analogy can here be only a very uncertain guide.' It is a little difficult to see why; and it is also difficult to believe 'that the Dorian invaders must everywhere have formed the basis of the population.' Meyer attaches importance to the tradition as to Argos (Paus. ii. 19. 1) that the daughter of Temenus, Hyrnetho, married Deiphontes; she is, he points out, clearly the eponymous heroine of the fourth Argive tribe, the Hyrnathii, who were no doubt non-Dorian. But as the lady and her husband were both Heraclids, it is hard to see how this tradition shows intermixture of race; and it may be added that it bears every mark of being a late combination. Certainly the abolition of Argive royal power, which concludes the story in Pausanias, is a complete anachronism; royalty obviously lasted for centuries after the time of Hyrnetho.

[2] *Camb. Mediaeval History*, ii. p. 150.

coast region the original inhabitants were strong, though in an inferior position generally; no doubt, however, the 'Dorian' aristocracy had a more privileged position, *e.g.* at Corinth, than in the small Achaean towns. In the centre of Peloponnese (*i.e.*, in the mountain block of Arcadia) the original inhabitants were hardly affected at all by the invaders.

On the other hand, in Argolis, which probably bore the first brunt of the invasion,[1] the mass of the cultivators had become serfs.[2] The conquering new-comers seem to have established themselves in Argos proper. It is generally said that some of the original inhabitants were admitted to citizenship as members of a fourth Non-Dorian tribe, the Hyrnathii; this is probably true, but the evidence for this tribe is late. There is at any rate no clear trace[3] before the end of the sixth century of organized political relations between the central city and the various minor cities of Argolis, such as certainly existed between Sparta and the minor towns of Laconia.

It is of course possible that definite relations of suzer-

[1] Cf. the story of the Dorians at Solygius, near Corinth (Thuc. iv. 42), which there is no reason to doubt, as Niese (*Hist. Zeit.* 1890, 389) does. There is a similar story in Pausanias (ii. 38. 1) as to the Temenion at Argos.

[2] For the γυμνήσιοι, cf. Pollux iii. 83, and Stephanus Byz. *s.v.*, who compare them to the Helots in Laconia and the Κορυνήφοροι in Sicyon. Hdt. vi. 83 tells us how the δοῦλοι rose in rebellion after the defeat of the Argives by Cleomenes. There is no reason at all to accept Busolt's suggestion (i. 211, n.) that the γυμνήσιοι were citizens with inferior privileges, like the sixth century ἑκτήμοροι of Attica.

[3] The phrase of Hdt. viii. 73 about the Cynurians is significant: ἐκδεδωρίευνται ὑπό τε Ἀργείων ἀρχόμενοι καὶ τοῦ χρόνου. Aristotle (*Politics* 1303 a. 1) says that after their defeat by Cleomenes the Argives 'were compelled to receive (as citizens) some of their περίοικοι.' It is natural with Plutarch (*de Mul. Vir.* 4) to take περίοικοι in the ordinary sense; Newman (note *ad Arist. u.s.*) maintains that the word in Aristotle always means 'serfs,' but Seymour [*J.H.S.* 42 (1922), p. 29] gives good reasons against this; his article contains other ingenious suggestions as to the Argive περίοικοι.

ainty and dependence may have existed, though, from the scantiness of our evidence, they are unknown to us; but perhaps two reasons may be suggested for this lack of organization in Argolis:—

(*a*) Communication was easy between the coasts of Argolis on the one hand and Attica and the Aegean islands on the other; hence the original inhabitants could maintain themselves with help from outside.

(*b*) Tradition represents Argos as early engaging in wars with comparatively remote states in Peloponnese, *e.g.* Corinth, Sicyon, Elis. It is at least possible that Argos, seeking to make her suzerainty in the North of Peloponnese a reality, neglected to make secure and organize her leading position in the Argolid. Certainly the main bonds of union that we can trace there are not political, but the old religious ones, connected with shrines, *e.g.* of Apollo Pythaeus in Argos itself,[1] and that of Hera near Argos.

In the West of Peloponnese, the two races, conquerors and original inhabitants, existed side by side. The plain of 'Hollow Elis' was in the possession of the new-comers, while the higher region behind them to the East and South-East was occupied by dependent states.[2] These remained περίοικοι even after the 'Synoecism' of 471 B.C.,[3] and are spoken of by the Eleans early in the fourth century as 'states taken in war.'[4] In contrast to these, farther to the East, in the mountainous region (Mt. Pholoe), was originally the independent state of the Pisatans, but this was conquered by Elis in 572, and Pisa was destroyed.

IV. Finally, in the South of the Peloponnese, there were two great divisions of the Dorian conquerors, which seem to have been organized in quite different ways. In the

[1] Cf. Thuc. v. 53, 77, for the importance of this connection as late as 419 B.C., with Busolt's notes (i. 222) and Meyer, *u.s.* ii. p. 268. For the Heraeum as a shrine common to Argos and Mycenae, cf. Strabo, p. 372 *ad init.*

[2] περίοικοι, cf. Thuc. ii. 25 for Κοιλὴ Ἦλις and ἡ περιοικὶς Ἠλείων.

[3] Diod. xi. 54. Str. 337. [4] ἐπιλήδας (Xen., *Hell.* iii. 2. 23).

South-West, *i.e.*, in what was afterwards known as Messenia, conquerors and conquered seem to have amalgamated easily. Pausanias[1] tells us that King Glaucus, son of Aepytus (the name, of course, is of no importance) honoured the non-Dorian shrine of Zeus on Ithome and the native heroine Messene. This, however, may well be a late invention, and the early arrangements of Messene are as unimportant as they are obscure; but it is significant that there was no early city called Messene.[2]

The organization and history of Laconia are, on the other hand, of the first importance; on them Peloponnesian history depends. Perhaps the following points as to Laconia may be taken as probable:—

(i.) The stories of the early extension of Lacedaemonian power, told in Pausanias iii. 2, cannot be accepted; they are improbable in themselves, for it is most unlikely that the Lacedaemonians would conquer Cynuria and Aegys, when Amyclae, which is only about an hour distant on the South from Sparta, was unsubdued; and the story of this early conquest of Cynuria contradicts the narrative of Herodotus i. 82, which seems to imply that this district was a new Lacedaemonian conquest as late as 550 B.C.

(ii.) An exception must be made as to the statements about Amyclae and Helos. As to Amyclae the traditions seem to have some historical value,[3] and the date assigned for its conquest (about 800 B.C.) agrees with what we seem to know of the development of Laconian power. Is it forced to see an analogy between the relations of Amyclae and Sparta in the two centuries after the Dorian Conquest, and those of Veii and Rome in the first century of the

[1] Paus. iv. 3. 9. [2] Paus. iv. 1. 3.

[3] (i.) The story of the traitor Philonomus, who betrayed the Achaean cause to the Heracleidae (Strabo 364) is very definite, and the fact that Amyclae became a proverb for a long struggle is surely significant.

(ii.) Still more important is the monument commemorating the final victory of Sparta, which Pausanias seems to have seen (iii. 2. 6) though he does not expressly say so.

Republic? Till the city, which is within twenty miles, is reduced, wider expansion is not only unlikely, but almost impossible.

As to Helos, the connection between its name and the serf class in Laconia may well be a fact; this tradition is given by Strabo[1] and by Pausanias;[2] the statement of Antiochus that the Spartan shirkers in the Messenian Wars 'were adjudged to be slaves and were called Helot' need not be taken as contradictory. The position of Helos on the sea coast would concentrate all the most obstinate of the non-Dorian population, and encourage resistance to the last.

(iii.) But this is comparatively unimportant. What is more important is that we find clear traces of definite organization in Laconia, such as we do not find in other parts of the Peloponnese. Laconia is made a political unity, not merely a geographical one.

(*a*) It is not possible to go into the vexed theories of the development of the Spartan constitution, but on one outstanding feature of it stress must be laid, the double kingship. By far the most probable, and also the most widely accepted, explanation of this is that it represents the amalgamation of two distinct tribes; further, if G. Gilbert's[3] theory is accepted, that there was a third royal family, the Aegidae, the synoecism was still wider and still more important. The sharing of royal power involves combination of the peoples whom the kings represent, and a synoecized state is by its very nature less exclusive than one homogeneous in origin.

(*b*) How far the original inhabitants were admitted into this synoecized state, it is impossible to say; but the analogy of the Plebeians at Rome would

[1] viii. p. 365, quoting Ephorus.
[2] iii. 20. 6. E. Meyer (*G. des A.* ii. 437-439) accepts it.
[3] *Hand. der Gr. Staats-Alt*, pp. 4-7 (1881), accepted by Toynbee, *J.H.S.* (*u.s.*)

certainly suggest that some at least of the δῆμος, though Spartan citizens, were non-Dorian in blood.

(iv.) It is certain, however, that a large part of the population of Laconia were not Spartan citizens. Details as to their position do not concern us here, but what is certain is that—

(*a*) There were graduations of privilege; the inhabitants of the smaller towns, περίοικοι, were in a superior position to those of the country districts.

(*b*) They all served in the army; for this important fact we have not only the evidence of the custom of later centuries, but the definite statement of Tyrtaeus (fr. ii. l. 35) as to the Helots in the war against the Messenians.

(*c*) From this it surely follows, almost as a certainty, that the relations between the various classes[1] at Sparta, before the sixth century at any rate, were much less bitter than at later periods. The conquest of Messenia would have been impossible had the hostility of the Helots to the Spartans in the eighth and seventh centuries been what it was in the fifth century and later. In fact, the exclusiveness recorded by Herodotus in ix. 35 seems to have been developed in the sixth century.

(*d*) The material prosperity of Laconia at this period may be inferred from the archaeological remains. Sparta 'reached her artistic zenith in the seventh century B.C.'[2] This implies a long period of previous development.

[1] Aristotle's phrase (*Pol.* ii. 9. 2, 1268 a) about the Helots, that they were ὥσπερ ἐφεδρεύοντες τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι of the Lacedaemonians, is as true as it is striking; but is there any evidence that it applies to periods before the fifth century B.C.? It is a great merit of the late Mr. Dickins' paper (*u.s.*) that it brings out the point that the danger from the Helots is not a marked feature in early Spartan history. I remember well talking it over with him in 1911, when I had written the first draft of this paper for the Oxford Philological Society. It had long been my own view.

[2] Tod in *B.S.A.* xxv., p. 614.

In view of this sketch of primitive arrangements in the Peloponnese, the few events that are fairly certain in the two centuries preceding 550 B.C., can be fitted into what seems a probable order.

The first figure is the almost mythical one of Pheidon; he represents, in the middle of the eighth century,[1] the last definite attempt of Argos to make its superiority in Peloponnese a reality, and also the last attempt of the Argive kings to assert their authority at home against the encroachments of their nobles; both attempts failed, the failure in the second being no doubt the result of the failure in the first; concentration at home was sacrificed to ambitious schemes abroad. Again the parallel to the mediaeval German Empire seems obvious.

In the century that follows (750-650 B.C.)[2] comes the long struggle between Laconia and Messenia. General probability would make it likely, even if we had not the definite testimony of Tyrtaeus, that Spartan aggression was the result of land hunger. It would be easy to gather from the narrative of Pausanias evidence for the theory that the victory was won by steady persistence and discipline[3] against superior courage and better fighting material; in fact, to trace an analogy between the Messenian Wars and Rome's wars with the Samnites; but Pausanias' statements may well be only the patriotic exaggerations of the vanquished, with little basis in genuine tradition. It may be inferred with some confidence, however, from the prominence in the narrative of Ithome and Eira, that the Lacedaemonians had as a rule the superiority in the open field, and that the Messenian resistance was largely of the nature of guerilla warfare, based upon strong natural fastnesses.

What is more important to discuss is the evidence that the struggles were in some degree international and not local. Pausanias' statement[4] that in the First War Corinth helped the Lacedaemonians, while the Messenians

[1] See Appendix I. to this chapter.
[2] For the date see Appendix II. to this chapter.
[3] Cf. Paus. iv. 6. 6; 8. 3.
[4] iv. 11. 1.

had help from Arcadia, Argos, and Sicyon, is unsupported elsewhere, and it is not probable in itself. But for the Second War the evidence is quite different. We have in the first place Strabo's distinct statement that Argives, Arcadians, and Pisatans supported the Messenians; as this comes between two direct quotations from Tyrtaeus, it is at least possible that it rests on this contemporary authority. It is supported by the statements of Pausanias,[1] which seem to have been derived, at any rate in part,[2] from the inscription as to Aristocrates the Arcadian, recording his treachery. Finally Herodotus[3] definitely tells us that the Samians assisted the Lacedaemonians.

The grouping can easily be explained. Argos was eager to revenge her defeat under Pheidon, and to curb a probable rival, becoming more formidable with every generation; Arcadia felt that Spartan land-hunger would in due course devour the plain of Tegea and Mantinea to the North, when the Western neighbour had been absorbed; Pisa naturally sided against the ally of Elis. On the other side, Corinth in the seventh century, as throughout most of her history, found in the Lacedaemonians an ally near enough to protect, not near enough to threaten; Argos was the natural enemy of Corinth,[4] and had attacked her

[1] Paus. iv. 15. 7; 17. 2; 22. 7. It is curious that in the first of these the 'Eleans' are given as allies of Messene, and 'Eleans,' not 'Arcadians' is the reading in Strabo, p. 362, though it is generally corrected.

[2] Cf. c. 22. 7.

[3] iii. 47. In view of Herodotus' familiarity with Samos, it is uncritical to reject his definite testimony on a priori grounds. To suggest, as Busolt does (i. 607, n.), that it refers to help given at the time of the Helot rising in 464 is to make the ancient historian as foolish as his critic. Thucydides (i. 15), it is true, seems to deny international struggles at so early a period; but this is only one of several instances of the attitude of superiority towards all pre-Periclean periods, which is characteristic of the great Athenian.

[4] Corinth is geographically part of Argolis, as Pausanias says (ii. 1), and there are clear traces, both in tradition and in history, that Argos tried to establish her suzerainty over the Isthmus.

in the past. Elis saw in Laconia not only her helper against Pheidon, but also the natural champion of the ruling races in the Peloponnese against the earlier races, which were now beginning to assert themselves once more against their conquerors.

This 'anti-Dorian reaction,' to call it by a convenient name, seems to be the dominating feature of the century following the Messenian Wars, and preceding 500 B.C. We have definite evidence of it at Sicyon,[1] and at Corinth in the power of the Cypselidae; it is also the natural explanation of the successful rising of Pisa against Elis, which must be now discussed. But first it may be well to suggest causes for such a reaction. They seem to be :—

(1) The gradual development of international relations among the Greek states, seen at once in the growing importance of the Olympic games as a Pan-Hellenic event, and in the spread of the Pheidonian measures throughout the Peloponnese and Attica.

(2) As an important part of this, the development of maritime, especially colonial, enterprise. Such movements would naturally tend to unsettle old relations, and to make the non-privileged races and classes assert themselves.

(3) And the opportunity was given by the exhaustion of the conquering races in their internecine struggles. The Lacedaemonians' victory in Messenia had apparently been followed by their defeat at the hands of the Argives at Hysiae (669 B.C.).[2] Another defeat followed within ten years, when they attempted to penetrate North from Messenia, and conquer Phigalia[3] (659 B.C.).

[1] Hdt. v. 67-8.

[2] Pausanias (ii. 24. 7) dates this battle by the Olympic Register; he may have got his evidence in connection with the Argive graves at Cenchreae, which he seems to have seen. The defeat is generally accepted as a fact, probably rightly, and the date also as approximately correct; the exact date is, of course, much more uncertain than the fact of the defeat. For the Olympic Register, see note on p. 73.

[3] Pausanias (viii. 39. 3), again dating by the Olympic Register; the story of the defeat is told in detail.

An 'anti-Dorian reaction,' then, is not improbable on general grounds. We must now estimate the evidence for it in Western Peloponnese. As late as the fourth century we find alliances[1] in this region determined by the race distinction between Elean and Arcadian; how far this had asserted itself as a political motive in early times, we have no direct evidence; but for nearly a century (660-572) there is good reason to believe that the Eleans were displaced from their presidency in the Olympic Games, which were held instead by the Pisatans. This displacement of Elean authority rests on the direct statement of Strabo, who says:

μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἕκτην καὶ εἰκοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα οἱ Πισᾶται τὴν οἰκείαν ἀπολαβόντες αὐτοὶ συνετέλουν τὸν ἀγῶνα ὁρῶντες εὐδοκιμοῦντα.[2]

So definite a statement cannot be set aside lightly. The objections against it are first, that Pausanias[3] seems to speak as if the Pisatan celebration of the 34th Olympiad was an isolated usurpation—one of the only *three* interruptions of Elean presidency. His narrative, however, has a marked Elean colouring, and there would clearly be a great likelihood that at Elis the tradition as to the loss of control at Olympia would be as far as possible suppressed. And the statement of Pausanias seems to have a particular application. The three Olympiads he speaks of—viz. the 8th, 34th and 104th—were clearly marked in tradition, and probably in actual record for the two later, by some grave irregularity, which made them *ἀνολυμπιάδες*; this irregularity, however, was the violation of the Olympic truce by armed violence,[4] not a change in the presidency.[5]

[1] Xen. (*Hell.* vii. 1. 26). Cf. Strabo, 357, for the connection of Pisatis and Arcadia.

[2] (viii. p. 355). This agrees roughly with the statement of Julius Africanus (*Euseb.* i. 198 Schoene) that the Pisatans held the 30th Olympiad and the twenty-two following. [3] vi. 22. 2, 3.

[4] This is Unger's explanation (*Philologus* xxviii. (1869)). He argues convincingly against the proposed change in the text of Pausanias (vi. 22. 2) of *η* to *κη*, *i.e.* '8th' to '28th,' which was made in order to bring 'Pheidon' into the seventh century.

[5] Hence Strabo (*u.s.*) says the Eleans 'presided' for the first 26 Olympiads.

A further objection to the Pisatan control of the games from 660 to 572 B.C. has been found[1] in the archaic inscription which speaks of an Elean law as to the enforcement of penalties by *one* Ἑλλανοδίκης; further, as Pausanias[2] says that *two* of these officers were appointed in 580 B.C., it has been inferred that the Eleans were in control before that date. But there are two weak points in this argument :—

(1) The text of Pausanias in this section is admittedly corrupt.[3]

(2) There is no reason why the inscription should not be a record of an early law, made originally before Pisatan control began in 660.

The balance of evidence, then, is strongly in favour of the view that, in the century preceding 570 B.C., the presidency of the Olympic Games lay with the older race, not with the Eleans, who had shared in the Dorian ascendancy. In the end the Eleans reasserted their authority ; but it is significant that from about this time[4] they increased the number of Presidents (Ἑλλανοδίκαι) to two, *i.e.*, one was probably taken from the Pisatan territory, though of course he was called an Elean.

This limitation of Elean authority, if, as seems probable, it is a fact, clearly involves a set-back to Lacedaemonian power, for the settled policy of the Lacedaemonians at this time was to strengthen the power of Elis, though in the latter part of the fifth and in the fourth century it was just the reverse.[5]

[1] *Inscript. Graecae Antiq.* 112. [2] v. 9. 4.

[3] Cf. Frazer i. 584 and iii. 489.

[4] 580 B.C. is the date in Pausanias (*v.s.*).

[5] Elis, from the synoecism of 471 B.C. onwards, was a doubtfu ally of the Lacedaemonians ; hence the attempts to weaken her at Lepreum and elsewhere. A similar change in Lacedaemonian policy is seen in the contrast between the treatment of Plataea in 427 B.C. and in the fourth century ; while Thebes was a faithful ally, the Lacedaemonians did all they could to strengthen her hegemony in Boeotia. As soon as Thebes, no longer fearing Athens, began to take an independent line, the Lacedaemonians did all they could to weaken that hegemony.

Is there any further evidence of such a set-back? We have at any rate no record of any Lacedaemonian advance between the reduction of Messenia and the conquest of Tegea (about 550 B.C.); and the passage of Herodotus[1] which introduces the latter event, confused though it is, certainly agrees best with the supposition that the Lacedaemonians had been unsuccessful for some time. The positive mention of defeat is far more important than the vague 'success in the other wars.' What 'other wars'? it may well be asked. Spartan patriotism seems to have been compelled to admit the fact of defeat, but it balanced it with imaginary (and therefore nameless) victories; this is a feature familiar in Roman historians, *e.g.* in Livy's account of the early years of the Second[2] Punic War,[3] and it is not uncommon in modern times, when the newspapers of a country that is being beaten, are full of 'victories,' vague in time and place.

And here Archaeology supplies us with an entirely new set of facts. It shows us that Sparta, till the end of the seventh century B.C.,[3] had pursued the ordinary course of Greek development, and had been a flourishing centre of art and trade, but that in the sixth century the change had begun which, by the end of that century, had made Sparta a barrack, and her citizens an exclusive band of trained warriors. The excavations begun by the British School in 1906, and continued in the years following, revealed an unexpected wealth of remains, and showed that Laconia had in early times its natural place in the development of Greek civilization. The change is an undoubted fact, and its beginning seems to belong to the period when, as it has been tried to show, Spartan conquest had received a severe

[1] Hdt. i. 65. Croesus learned (about 550 B.C.) that the Lacedaemonians had escaped from great evils, and were now superior in war to the Tegeans; 'For in the reigns of Leon and Hegesicles at Sparta, the Lacedaemonians, though successful in all their other wars, met disaster against the Tegeans only.'

[2] So in xxi. 52 and xxii. 24 the Roman defeats in 218 and 216 B.C. are preceded by considerable (but vague) successes.

[3] M. N. Tod in *Encyc. Britan.* xxv. 614.

though temporary check. An attempt will be made later to show causal connection between these two sets of facts.

To sum up the points made, or attempted to be made, so far, they are :—

(1) That about 650 the period of rapid Lacedaemonian conquest ends, and is followed by a period of at least two generations as to which we know almost nothing.

(2) That after the middle of this period, *i.e.* soon after 600 B.C., a marked change in the internal condition of Sparta begins.

(3) That there is good evidence that during the same period the newer and conquering races in the Peloponnese, whether called Dorian or (as in Elis) Aetolian, lost part of their power.

The absence of evidence as to events in the South of Peloponnese during the two generations after 650 B.C. is all the more curious because it is about the middle of the seventh century B.C. that Greek history may be said to make a beginning. Before that date we can trace tendencies, and we can dimly discern shadowy figures, that may be real or may be inventions. But after 650 B.C., Gyges and Psammetichus, Archilochus and Callinus, Cypselus and Periander, Cylon and Dracon,[1] are historic persons, however scanty our knowledge of them may be, and however mixed with fable.

With the conquest of Messenia by the Lacedaemonians and the unification of Attica under Athens, the map of Greece had assumed the shape which it was henceforth to bear without any very material alteration ; while the rise of the great tyrants at Corinth, at Sicyon, and elsewhere, marked the passing away of the old order of things in internal affairs. The struggle between King and Nobles,

[1] Beloch's recent attempt (*Gr. Gesch.* I² 258) to turn Draco into a snake god is on a par with his explanations of Greek myths by solar phenomena (I¹, 146 f.). We used to hear much of this theory in Oxford lectures forty years ago, but it is now largely exploded. It is a pity a scholar who has done good work elsewhere, should be so uncritical and out-of-date.

which we see beginning in the *Odyssey*, is over ; the struggle between 'the Few' and 'the Many,' which henceforth is to dominate Greek History in varying forms of baleful influence, is entering on its first stage. The century following 650 B.C. is the century of struggle, which was to decide whether the condition of things that had been reached was to be on the whole permanent, or whether further changes, external and internal, were to take place.

It is surely natural to conclude that all these points are connected, and that the changes on which stress has been laid in Southern and Western Peloponnese find their explanation in the rise of tyranny in Northern Peloponnese.

The period of Lacedaemonian depression here conjectured, corresponds almost exactly with the period of the rule of the Cypselidae at Corinth, 655-585. It is not necessary to sketch the extent of their power ; it is sufficient to quote Meyer's undisputed statement[1] : 'About the turn of the seventh century, Periander was the most powerful man in Europe.' And it is equally undisputed that they represented the non-Dorian population of Corinth against the old aristocracy of the conquerors.[2] In view of the statements of Thucydides and Aristotle[3] that the Lacedaemonian policy was against tyrants, it may be taken as highly probable a priori that there was hostility, and possibly prolonged hostility, between the predominant powers in the North and in the South of the Peloponnese. It must be admitted that we have only one reference in our authorities to such hostility, and this reference is a much-disputed one ; it will be discussed in a moment. But the silence of our authorities is easily accounted for ; Corinth after 580 B.C. had turned her back on empire, and confined herself to economic expansion ; the Lace-

[1] *Ges. des Alt.* ii. p. 625.

[2] It is hard to see any reason for objecting to the local tradition recorded by Pausanias of the origin of Cypselus (ii. 4. 4) ; he states that the tyrant was descended from one of the original conquerors, but of non-Dorian race (see further Appendix on Cypselidae).

[3] Thuc. i. 18. 1 ; Arist. *Pol.* viii. 10. 30, p. 1312 b.

daemonians were certainly not likely to desert their traditional 'secrecy'[1] in order to record a struggle in which they for some time seem certainly to have had the worse.

But it may be suggested with some confidence that this conspiracy of silence has not been altogether successful. The definite piece of evidence to the contrary is the statement of 'Plutarch'[2] when, attacking Herodotus for attributing unworthy motives to the Lacedaemonians, he asks, 'what was the kind of corslet or what the kind of bowl that induced them to expel the Cypselidae from Corinth and Ambracia?', and then follows a string of other tyrants expelled. The statement in this passage has generally been rejected since the time of Grote, who argued that it was inconsistent with the account of the Cypselidae given by Herodotus.[3] The Corinthian ambassador, arguing at Sparta against the imposition of a tyrant at Athens, could hardly, it would seem, have failed to clinch his own argument by a reference to the fact that the Lacedaemonians had delivered his countrymen from the very monster they were now proposing to install elsewhere. The 'argumentum ex silentio' seems for once convincing. But a probable explanation of this 'silence' can be found; Herodotus is writing of Athenian affairs, and almost certainly from an Athenian 'source.'[4] It would surely be natural for an Athenian to suppress the good deeds of the Lacedaemonians, just as Dr. Johnson would not let 'those dogs the Whigs' have 'the best of the argument' in the speeches he wrote for them.

It is, then, at any rate not improbable that one of the tyrannies put down by the Lacedaemonians, was that of the Cypselidae.

There are also two other facts in this obscure period which may well be connected with the rivalry between the

[1] Thuc. v. 68. [2] *De Malig., Hdt.* c. 21. [3] v. 92.

[4] See further p. 51 n. and Appendix on Cypselidae, p. 70 f. It is characteristic of Herodotus to mention the occasions or actions, but not the underlying policy.

Lacedaemonians and the Corinthian tyrants. The first is in the passage where Herodotus[1] makes Demaratus, when urging Xerxes to use his fleet for attacking the Lacedaemonians in the rear, quote the ephor Chilon, a well-known opponent of tyranny,[2] as saying that the island of Cythera was a favourable basis for such an attack. It is extremely probable that we have here a reference to an attempt on the part of Periander to use his sea-power, which had bases on both sides of Greece, to harass his enemies. This is surely more likely than the explanation sometimes given that Herodotus is making Demaratus anticipate the Athenian attack on Cythera in 424 B.C.[3] Such a suggestion is quite inconsistent with Herodotus's character as a serious historian.

The other point is much less obvious. It is the curious coincidence of two diplomatic approaches to the Athenians in the first decade of the sixth century; Plutarch tells us that the Lacedaemonians, acting as 'arbiters,'[4] gave Salamis to Athens, instead of to Megara; Herodotus tells us that in the time of Alcaeus the poet (whose *floruit* is about 600 B.C.), Periander awarded Sigeum to Athens as against Mytilene.[5] It looks as if the rival Peloponnesian powers were each trying to make interest with the rising power of Athens. But this, of course, is only a possible explanation.

Leaving this uncertain conjecture, we can only say that the ambitions of the Lacedaemonians, now as always, lay Northward; they may have met a serious obstacle in the connection of the house of Cypselus with Arcadia.[6]

The hostility here suggested between the Lacedaemonians and Corinth under the tyrants is fully sufficient to explain the set-back to the Dorian powers and their allies presupposed above, and so to furnish a motive for internal

[1] vii. 235. [2] Hdt. i. 59. [3] Thuc. iv. 53-4.

[4] διαλλακτάι, *Sol.* c. 10. As the mention of this arbitration precedes the accounts of the Sacred War and of Solon's legislation, it probably may be dated about 600 B.C.

[5] Hdt. v. 95.

[6] The name 'Cypselus' is Arcadian. Paus viii. 5. 6.

changes in Sparta itself. These internal changes may naturally be connected with the name and work of 'Lycurgus.'

Almost all tradition ascribed the Spartan ἀγωγή to him, however much the accounts given differed in other respects. It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether there be any evidence for placing the work of 'Lycurgus' about the beginning of the sixth century and, further, how he can be introduced into the history of that period. An endeavour will be made to show that there is some evidence for such a date, and that the scantiness of this evidence can be well explained by the method of so drastic a revolution, and by the motives which we may suppose prompted it. But first it may be well very briefly to review the ordinary views as to 'Lycurgus,' if only to show that, whatever be the truth about him, the ordinary views quite fail to agree with the evidence, such as it is.

Plutarch begins his life of the Spartan lawgiver as follows: 'As to Lycurgus the lawgiver, there is absolutely nothing to say which is free from dispute, for his birth, his travels, his death, and, above all, everything that concerns his laws and his constitution, have been told in different ways.' This is as true now as it was 1,800 years ago, when Plutarch wrote. It obviously is unnecessary to go over all the old evidence again, to point out its inconsistencies and its lack of value; the various conclusions, however, that have been based upon it, may be divided, to speak briefly, into two classes.

On the one hand, there is the view of those who hold that 'Lycurgus' is not a real person at all, whether he is to be considered, with Gilbert, as an Apollo who has become a hero, or, with E. Meyer,[1] as the Arcadian 'Wolf Zeus,' who was looked upon as the founder of the institutions of Sparta, being borrowed from the pre-Dorian population. This view, which denies any real existence to 'Lycurgus,' is the one usually, but not universally, held in Germany, and it has found considerable acceptance in England; *e.g.* it is adopted by Bury in his Greek History.

[1] *Forsch.* i. 281-2.

The objection, which seems unanswerable, to this view is that, in whatever form it is held, it does not account for the facts. In Sparta we find a state of government and of society forming a marked contrast to that of the rest of Greece, and we naturally seek for a definite explanation. It is no answer to be referred to a vague development, for which there is no evidence. And Meyer's explanation especially seems contrary to one of the main features of the problem; since he wrote (1892) Archaeology has given us evidence which seems to prove decisively that Early Sparta was not 'Lycurgean' at all, but that it presented the same features as the rest of Greece, and only began to take on its special form at some period about the end of the seventh century B.C.

On the other hand there is the view, still extensively held in England, and recently restated by Niese[1] in Germany, that 'Lycurgus' is an historical person. Two forms of this may be quoted: Niese maintains that he belongs to the seventh century B.C., and that he was a leading Spartan, not of royal blood, whose work, perhaps, was to end the divisions of the Spartan state; Dickins[2] argues that 'Lycurgus' is probably connected with the famous ῥήτρα, that this must be dated about 720-700 B.C., and that it was a treaty between kings and people at Sparta.

The objection to this view, in either form, is the total absence of historical tradition about 'Lycurgus.' If he were real, and a statesman of such importance, how are we to account for the complete divergence of views as to his date, his birth, his activity?

Before suggesting a compromise between these views, which, while denying historical reality to 'Lycurgus,' seeks to connect him with certain definite facts, and even with a real person, it may be well to state the points which would be agreed on by almost all. First, it seems clear that 'Lycurgus' must be placed not earlier than the second half of the seventh century B.C. There is no reference to him

[1] *Hermes*, 1907, pp. 446-9.
[2] *J.H.S.* xxxii. (1912), p. 11.

in the fragments of Tyrtaeus, and the argument 'ex silentio,' if it be ever valid, is especially strong in this instance. It is impossible that Tyrtaeus would have failed to mention the lawgiver, had he really lived and worked before the time of the Second Messenian War; and it is equally impossible that, if Tyrtaeus had mentioned him, no reference should have survived in Plutarch or elsewhere to a poem dealing with a person so interesting and so much discussed.

This point may be carried further. The recently discovered fragments of Tyrtaeus[1] seem clearly to shew that the old arrangement of the fighting forces by tribes (cf. l. 12 χωρίς)—Pamphyli, Hylleis, Dymanes—still continued. But if anything be certain as to 'Lycurgus,' it is that he revolutionized Spartan military organization; this is not only definitely stated by Herodotus,[2] but is also in accordance with all probability. Probably the new organization was one of 5 λόχοι of 1,000 Spartans each, bearing the names of the local divisions.[3] Hence the new fragments, if they are by Tyrtaeus, as is usually accepted, describe a pre-Lycurgean army.[4]

The second point is that, as has been said already, archaeology proves that a great change came over Sparta during the sixth century B.C. Before 600 B.C. she had been an important art centre: 'her decline had already begun in the sixth century.'[5]

[1] Published by U. Von Wilamowitz in 1918 (*S.B.K.P.A.*, pp. 728 f.) and in *Hermes*, 1921, p. 347.

[2] i. 65 at end; this in itself, of course, is worth little, but it is the official Spartan account.

[3] *E.g.* the λόχος Πιτανήτης of Hdt. ix. 53.

[4] It is not necessary to accept the further inferences of A. Gercke (*Hermes*, *u.s.*) that the fragments describe a 'defensive war' (cf. μονίη l. 15; also l. 9). Apart from the uncertain state of the text, it is obvious that an inspiring elegy is not to be interpreted as if it were a military dispatch.

[5] M. N. Tod, *s.v.* Sparta, *E.B.* xxv., p. 614. Others put the change a little later; 'with the middle of the sixth century began the decay of the Laconian style' (*B.S.A.* xiv., p. 40). Exact dating is impossible, and also immaterial; all would admit

There are similar changes in the political sphere. Sparta in the seventh century had had her troubles between the 'Many' and the 'Few,' which are referred to in the well-known exhortations of Tyrtaeus to *Εὐνομία*.[1] After 550 B.C. these disappear for a century and a half.

I have stated my objections to the ordinary solutions of the 'Lycurgus' problem; I will now, having in view the two accepted points stated above, give my own theory. It is simply that the legislation of 'Lycurgus,' whatever it was, and by whomsoever it was carried out, represents a definite act (or set of acts) which was done at the end of the seventh or early in the sixth century, but which its author chose to attribute to a fictitious person in order to give religious sanction to his work. I will state briefly the grounds which may be urged in support of this.

(1) It explains the change so often referred to in the character of Sparta. That state had pursued a normal development down to 600 B.C.; as not infrequently happens, the period of foreign war had been a period of artistic development. This is checked suddenly, and dies away so completely that its very existence is forgotten. So curious a fact may well have an unusual explanation.

(2) In the second place, it renders intelligible the narrative of Herodotus.[2] As that stands, the story of 'Lycurgus' is an irrelevant digression; and, whatever may be the faults of Herodotus as an historian, absolute irrelevance is not one of them. The connection of thought in this narrative seems clear; after the mention

that artistically Sparta in 600 B.C. was a very different place from what it had become in 500 B.C.

[1] Fr. 1, Aris. *Pol.* v. 7. 3; 1306. b.

[2] The inexplicable arrangement in Hdt. i. 65 does not seem to have struck critics; at least, so far as I know, it has not been discussed. Nor, when I first read a paper to the Philological Society on this subject, in 1911, did any member suggest that my point had been made before. Since then I have found that my friend and colleague, Mr. Wade Gery, has come independently to the same conclusion on this matter as myself.

of the Lacedaemonian failures against Tegea, he goes on 'but even before this, they had almost the worst laws of all the Greeks,' and then, after the story of 'Lycurgus' had been told, he says, 'As they dwelt in a fair land, and in numbers were not a few, they at once increased and began to prosper,' and so attacked the Arcadians. It is obviously implied that 'Lycurgus' had something to do with the wars and their successful termination. I do not for a moment suggest that Herodotus definitely thought that the legislation of 'Lycurgus' belonged to the beginning of the sixth century; he probably had never considered the date at all; in any case, he has accepted without question the official date for it, *i.e.*, the time of Leobotes, 350 years before the Tegean War. But if the date here suggested could be maintained, Herodotus's order becomes natural. The Spartan government, with characteristic secrecy,[1] had suppressed the real history of their constitution, but they had not yet been able to suppress the tradition that connected it somehow, first with the failures, and then with the successes, against Arcadia.

(3) The next point I would refer to is that the period 650-580 is the traditional period of the great lawgivers; to it may be said belong Zaleucus, Epimenides, and Solon; I am not concerned to discuss the dates of these, or even to vindicate the reality of all of them; I am aware that I may be charged with explaining *ignotum per ignotiores*. My point is simply that Greek historical tradition looked on this period as the one in which Greek constitutions took shape.

(4) If my suggestion could be accepted, it meets the most serious objections to the view of those who accept the work of 'Lycurgus' as being a definite fact or set of facts—I admit being itself open to grave difficulties. The uncertainty as to his date and parentage was inevitable, if the ascription of the work to him was an elaborate fiction, which had been deliberately

[1] Cf. Thuc. v. 68.

imposed on the Spartans; the validity of this fiction depended on its origin being as soon as possible shrouded in mystery. And the often-quoted silence of Tyrtaeus as to 'Lycurgus' was inevitable, if the 'Lycurgus' constitution dates, at earliest, from the generation after Tyrtaeus. Finally, the objection that the constitution of 'Lycurgus' bears such a stamp of individuality that it must be the work of one mind, an objection which has always seemed to me a very strong one against the merely destructive theories which are so commonly held, is met by the suggestion that it was really the work of one mind, only that its author definitely elected to hide his personality by giving a fictitious origin to his constitutional and social arrangements.

A suggestion will be made later as to who the lawgiver really was. But first the question must be discussed how an elaborate fiction like this could have been palmed off on the Spartans and on the rest of Greece? The answer to this can only be given tentatively. We know, as has been said above, that there was grave dissension at Sparta at the time of the Second Messenian War, and it seems that, though the war ended victoriously, the Lacedaemonian power in Peloponnese was severely shaken; it may well have been also engaged in a life and death struggle with the Cypselidae. If so, something had to be done to secure the safety of the Spartan state; I should suggest that some leading Spartan was chosen *νομοθέτης*, as Solon was certainly chosen at Athens in a similar crisis a little later; that he made appeal to the Pythia,[1] as Solon

[1] The tradition that 'Lycurgus' derived his constitution from Delphi was the usual one, although the Lacedaemonians denied it (Hdt. i. 65). A curious parallel as to the way in which a far-reaching constitutional change might be worked by oracles is furnished by Plutarch's story (*Lysander*, cc. 25, 26) of the designs of Lysander. If the ablest statesman in Greece at the beginning of the fourth century thought that he could revolutionise his state by sham oracles, is it not quite possible that some unknown statesman or statesmen could have succeeded in actually doing this some two centuries earlier? The parallel between what Lysander

did;[1] that by the hard necessity of state preservation, the old customs of a conquering race were revived, codified, erected into the system of the famous Ἀγωγή. The social question at Sparta was solved not, as at Athens, by political changes and by economic re-arrangements, but by putting the whole state under military discipline.

It was an essential element in the change that it should be looked upon, not as what it really was, but as something which had existed from time immemorial. If the belief that it was traditional and national was to be established, the author of the belief must efface himself. It is probable that the name 'Lycurgus' is typical of the religious sanction it was sought to give to the new order of things; E. Meyer's view may well be right on this point, that 'Lycurgus' is a heroised god, who is turned into a mythical lawgiver, and whose name is connected with the worship of the Arcadian Zeus Λυκαῖος; Arcadian influences were bulking large at Sparta at this period. But this suggestion only gives part of the machinery by which the work may have been done; it does not attempt to explain how it was done.

There is one more point I would urge in favour of the suggestion I have made. It postulates an atmosphere of religious influence on politics which is very different from our usual conception of Greek politics; it postulates a fraud in Greek history which might fairly be compared for its importance and its success to the great frauds of mediaeval history, such as the False Decretals or the Donation of Constantine. But this seems to me to be just the atmosphere which we do get here in Herodotus, our oldest

attempted about 400 B.C., and my suggestion of what an unknown lawgiver accomplished two hundred years before, is without doubt strangely close.

A word more may be said as to the suggested Delphic origin. The attribution of the constitution to 'Lycurgus' may be compared to the method by which Cleisthenes a century later obtained sanction for his eponymous tribal heroes at Athens (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21 *ad fin.*).

[1] Plut. *Sol.* 14.

authority; the whole story of the finding of the bones of Orestes,[1] which follows at once on the story of 'Lycurgus,' reads like a mediaeval legend of the discovery of the relics of a saint, while it is full of oracular influences. May we not go further, and say that the fiction which I have supposed to be palmed off on the Spartan people is a mild one compared with the fiction which Herodotus says was actually palmed off on the Athenian people a generation or so later? It was easier to invent a mythical lawgiver for a constitution than to make men believe in a visible goddess restoring a tyrant. But this Athenian story is well authenticated; Herodotus may probably have heard it from the sons of men who saw Phya restoring Peisistratus.[2] It is surely dangerous to reject well-authenticated stories because they do not tally with our methods of belief. Mr. Warde Fowler well says the 'instinct of the Romans' which 'attributed' one side of their constitution to 'a priest king . . . was probably a right one.' I simply postulate a similar legislator at Sparta, but one who for state reasons veils his personality.

A suggestion must now be made as to the real author of these changes at Sparta. There is some evidence, at all events, that the Ephor Chilon was a prominent statesman at this period, and his warning as to Cythera has been already connected with the probable hostility of the great tyrant of Corinth. The only other mention in Herodotus[3] of Chilon introduces him as a tyrant-hater, and this view of his policy receives some confirmation from a Rylands Papyrus,[4] which couples him with King Anaxandridas as one of those who 'put down tyrannies.' So far as home

[1] Hdt. i. 66-8.

[2] It need hardly be said that the story of Phya is rejected by many as a legend (*e.g.* by Beloch, *Rhein Mus.* 1890, pp. 469 f., and by E. Meyer, *Forsch.* ii. 248; for an answer to their arguments cf. Niese in *Hermes* Vol. xlii., p. 464, or my own note on Hdt. i. 60).

[3] i. 59; the warning to Hippocrates, the father of Peisistratus.

[4] No. 18; the chronology is confused, but the passage may contain a genuine tradition of Lacedaemonian policy (cf. p. 42).

affairs were concerned, he is said by Diogenes Laertius[1] to have proposed ἐφόρους τοῖς βασιλεῦσι παραξενγνύναι; as the ephors were especially connected with the Ἀγωγή, the mention of Chilon in connection with them is significant. That he was important at this period of Spartan history is certain; that his importance took the form suggested here is, of course, impossible to prove. What may be claimed is that the connection of the Lycurgean Ἀγωγή with this definite period of Peloponnesian history is in accordance with, and explains certain known facts, and that the absence of direct evidence for such a connection is easily explicable, not only from the scantiness of our records as to the sixth century, but also from the fact that the success of the change depended very largely on its origin being forgotten as soon as possible.

Such legislative activity as is suggested is fully in accord with Greek ideas, which put no limits to what might be accomplished by a single man and a definite set of acts;[2] Aristotle assumes that it is only knowledge that a legislator wants; if he have this, so as to be able to choose 'the best according to the circumstances,' the work can be done. And in the small states of antiquity such constitutional revolutions were certainly possible, and seem to have been actually effected. The analogy of the large states of modern times does not help us here, although the change in Modern Germany between 1870 and 1914, under the influence of Bismarckian ideas,[3] may seem something of a parallel.

[1] *Diog. Laert.* i. 68, perhaps quoting Sosicrates. The chronologers appear to place his ephorate in 560, 556 or 554. This is in contradiction to his being contemporary with the father of Peisistratus (p. 51 n.), and may be an inference (note the variety of the dates) from the supposed date of the Lacedaemonian victory over Tegea. If, however, the authority of the chronologers be preferred to that of Herodotus, his connection with the Ἀγωγή might be that he secured its definite triumph, after it had been introduced a generation before.

[2] Cf. especially Arist. *Pol.* iv. 1; 1288 b.

[3] Bismarck, of course, was only the statesman who gave active expression to the theories of a whole series of German writers and

At all events the Spartan state was transformed in the sixth century B.C., by whomsoever the work was done.

The result was not only the establishment of Hegemony in the Peloponnese, purchased by a complete change in the lives of the citizens. From this time also (probably) dates the rigid policy of exclusiveness[1] which closed the ranks of Spartan citizens. From this time, too, is discontinued the policy of over-sea enterprise which seems to have marked the Lacedaemonians before 600; disregarding their claim to the foundation of Tarentum, though it may well be a fact, as Aristotle[2] accepted it, we may confidently assert that archaeological evidence[3] tends to confirm the connection of Sparta with North Africa, which Herodotus so elaborately states in Book IV. His actual story of the foundation of Cyrene, however, is really less significant than such casual hints as the unfulfilled oracle[4] that there were to be 100 Greek cities round L. Tritonis. This has a meaning if it be an echo of long-distant projects of expansion, discontinued in Herodotus's day; it is difficult to account for it if it were a mere invention of the fifth century.

teachers, and in justice to him it ought to be added that, had his policy been continued on his own lines, the success of Germany would have been secured. Holm quotes as a parallel to the work of 'Lycurgus' the changes brought about at Venice by the Doge Gradenigo (History of Greece, Eng. Trans. i. p. 188, where 'schliessung' ['closing'] is wrongly translated 'dissolution'). Rousseau (*Cont. Soc.* c. i. c. 7) may well have been more accurate than he usually is in his Ancient History, when he says:—'Celui qui ose entreprendre d'instituer an peuple doit se sentir en état de changer pour ainsi dire la nature humaine:' 'Lycurgus' is a very favourite example with Rousseau.

[1] Hdt. ix. 35. So in Italy, in the second century B.C., the victory of Rome over Carthage led to an abandonment of the old policy of expansion; but Rome corrected her mistake, Sparta never did.

[2] *Politics* v. 7. 2. 1306 b.

[3] Intercourse with Egypt had begun as early as the eighth century (*B.S.A.* xiii. 75, 77), and a regular type of pottery, long considered to be 'Cyrenaic,' developed at Sparta from the beginning of the eighth century onwards (*B.S.A.* xiv., pp. 30 f., 44-5.).

[4] Hdt. iv. 179.

The diminution of Lacedaemonian trade would to some extent have prejudiced the prosperity of the Perioeci, had not the rigid discipline of the Spartans removed all possibility of competition in this sphere from the side of the full citizens; certainly the closing of the ranks of citizenship prejudiced their position politically. Yet we hear little or nothing of discontent on the part of the Perioeci[1] till the end of the fifth century. But with the Helots things were very different; the change in Spartan arrangements increased their burdens, and diminished their chances of improving their position. The revolution of the early sixth century, whether we call it 'Chilonian' or not, saved Dorian ascendancy for the time being, but at the expense of future and ever-increasing weakness. Rome made her name (and may we not say her power?) immortal by solving the problems of expansion; Sparta purchased immediate success at the price of complete ultimate failure.

Appendix I.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF PHEIDON

PHEIDON, King of Argos, is, if the greater part of the evidence as to his date be accepted, the first real person in Greek History.[2] As to his reality most historians are agreed,[3] but as to his date the most divergent views are held. He is placed by various ancient authorities of very various value, in the 9th, in the 8th, in the 7th, and in the 6th century.

Broadly speaking, the first of these dates was generally accepted until it was crushingly refuted by Clinton.[4] It rests upon the authority of the Chronologers;[5] but it is

[1] The two Perioecic towns that revolted in 464 B.C. were Messenian. (Thuc. i. 101.)

[2] So E. Meyer, *Ges. des A.* ii., p. 544.

[3] An exception is Abel, *Makedon vor Kön. Phil.* 1847, p. 100.

[4] *Fast. Hell.* i., pp. 247 f.

[5] The Parian marble 30 makes him 11th from Hercules, and so makes his date 895; Syncellus (262 A) makes him '7th from Temenus.'

clearly inconsistent with the earlier and better authorities, and Trieber[1] has ingeniously shown that it was invented in the time of Macedonian greatness, and is an attempt to give dignity to the ancestors of Philip and Alexander by a fictitious antiquity. This early date then may certainly be rejected.

It is best to consider next the latest date. This at first sight seems to rest on the best authority, for Herodotus (vi. 127) makes Lacedes, the son of Pheidon, a suitor for the hand of Agariste, daughter of Clisthenes of Sicyon; as her wedding by general agreement took place about 570 B.C., the earliest possible date for Pheidon's accession would be in the last quarter of the 7th century, and he would naturally be placed at the beginning of the 6th. Trieber[2] actually adopts this date, and puts Pheidon's *floruit* between 600 and 588 (*Ol.* 45-48). But apart from the fact that the Φειδώνια μέτρα were already established in Athens by 594 B.C.,[3] so late a date is quite inconsistent with what we are told of Pheidon; he comes at the beginning of the period of the tyrants, not at the end; and it is inconceivable that if he really belonged to the century before Herodotus, tradition about him would be so scanty and uncertain. And against the argument that the late date is that of Herodotus, our earliest authority, two points seem decisive:—

(1) The date occurs in what is clearly a legend, embellished, if not invented, to glorify the house of the Alcmaeonidae;

[1] Trieber, *Pheidon von Argos* 1886, pp. 9-13. Syncellus quotes Theopompus fr. 30 (*F.H.G.* i. 283) for this genealogy; but Caranus, brother of Pheidon, with whom that historian begins his Macedonian history, is unknown to Herodotus (viii. 137), who makes Macedonian history begin with Perdiccas, from whom Alexander, contemporary with Xerxes, is 7th in descent; and Thucydides (ii. 100) confirms Herodotus, making Archelaus, grandson of Alexander, to be 'the ninth king.' Theopompus (*u.s.*) had to fill out his list in order to make the Macedonian royal house succeed the Assyrian—cf. Diodorus in Eusebius, 'cessante Assyriorum dynastia Macedonicorum tempus succedit.' [2] *U.s.* p. 16.

[3] Arist. Αθ. Πολ 10; if this date be accepted, their introduction by Pheidon must be at least half a century earlier.

the wedding of Agariste is an important fact, but her 'twelve suitors' are about as historical as the suitors of Helen.

(2) The relations of Argos and Sicyon under Clisthenes, presupposed by the story, are quite inconsistent with earlier accounts in Herodotus of those relations; in v. 67 he makes the Sicyonian tyrant and Argos bitterly hostile.

Hence the date given by Herodotus is almost universally rejected. It is, however, argued by those who support a 7th century date against an 8th century date, that Herodotus was much more likely[1] to make a mistake of one century than of two. It remains then to consider the two intermediate dates.

It will be generally admitted that the ancient evidence, such as it is, is overwhelmingly in favour of the earlier of these. There are three main pieces of evidence :—

(1) Ephorus[2] gives a long account of Elis, from the time of the settlement of the Eleans there; at the end of this he mentions the aggression of Pheidon 'the 10th from Temenus.' There are other details in the passage, which must be mentioned later; but the most striking point in it is the stress laid on the 'Elean Truce.' The whole passage is written from an Elean standpoint, and gives the impression strongly of being derived from an Elean source.

(2) The second passage is that in Pausanias describing the various Olympic festivals that were 'not Olympiads'; the '8th' is the first of the three mentioned, which was celebrated by Pheidon at the invitation of the Pisatans. This passage again seems to be Elean in source. But it will be noticed that its chronological note is of a different kind; Ephorus' date is given by reference to royal genealogy, that of Pausanias (or his source) is based on the Olympic catalogue.[3]

[1] Beloch, *Gr. Ges.* I.[2] 196.

[2] *F.H.G.* i. 236. Fr. 15 quoted by Strabo 357 in *Oratio Obliqua.*

[3] Plaus. vi. 22. 2. Whether this have any historic value for the early period, however, is very doubtful. Cf. Mahaffy in *J.H.S.* ii. pp. 164 f. (See further note on p. 73.)

(3) The third passage comes from Plutarch (Vol. ii., p. 772), which relates how the brutality of Archias, the founder of Syracuse, caused the death of the boy Actaeon, whose grandfather Habron had saved Corinth from Pheidon; the story requires that Pheidon should have been on the throne of Argos at least as early as 765 B.C., and probably a decade or more earlier. The exact date can only be guessed, and it is in fact immaterial.[1]

This story, in one of its forms at any rate, is derived from Timaeus.

All these three passages make Pheidon an eighth century king, and it may fairly be argued that they seem to come from quite different kinds of sources; one of these as all events, the royal genealogy of Argos, which Ephorut appears to quote,[2] may well have historical value. It is objected, however, that all these versions are derived from Ephorus[3] and that Ephorus simply made up his story from the passage in Herodotus.[4] There is no

[1] The story is told in a different form in the *Schol. to Apoll Rhod.* iv. 1212; here the offender is Chersicrates, the founder of Corcyra, and the victim is the son of Melissus, the opponent of Pheidon.

[2] The genealogy of the Spartan Kings is used by E. Meyer, *Forsch.* i. 170 f., who is disposed to put down the calculation, based on the Spartan royal genealogy, to Hecataeus; this may be so, but the attribution is a mere conjecture. Ridgway, *Early Age of Greece*, i. 129, well compares the apparent accuracy of African tradition in Uganda in preserving rightly names for some thirty generations of Kings.

[3] Busolt, *Gr. Ges.* i. 615-6, *n.* 619 *n.* His reasons are: (1) that other authorities make the Eleans hold the Olympic festival undisturbed till the 26th Olympiad; this statement has been already discussed (p. 37); (2) that the date 748 is a mere calculation; the arguments are: (*a*) early Spartan chronology is arranged in 50-year periods (*u.s.* pp. 596-7, 619); (*b*) his defeat at Olympia ended his reign. Both these are mere assumptions.

[4] Busolt (*Gr. Ges.* i. 613) says 'Einzelne Ausdrucke lassen noch deutlich Herodotus Angaben als Vorlage hindurch-schimmern'; Trieber, p. 10, says the same; but the only words common to Herodotus and to Ephorus are μέτρα and ἀγῶνα ἐθῆκε; it is difficult to see how these could have been avoided. As a matter of fact, Ephorus not only adds much that Herodotus does not give, but he omits

evidence for this, and it is at least as probable that here we have two or three independent traditions. The balance of written evidence then is very strongly in favour of an eighth century date for Pheidon.

But it is maintained on general grounds that so early a date is impossible. It is these grounds which make the question historically interesting; certainly it may be admitted at once that writers of the fourth century or later are not in themselves sufficient evidence for a date in the eighth century.

Before giving the general grounds on which the eighth century date is rejected, it will be well to mention the reference to Pheidon in the *Politics* of Aristotle: he writes,[1] speaking of the rise of tyranny in early days, *αἱ δὲ* (*i.e.* *τυραννίδες*) *πρὸ τούτων* (*i.e.*, before the rise of demagogue tyrants) *ἐκ τῶν βασιλέων παρεκβαινόντων τὰ πάτρια καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας ἀρχῆς ὀρεγομένων.* This was easily done *διὰ τὸ δύναμιν προυπάρχειν τοῖς μὲν βασιλικῆς ἀρχῆς,* 'as Pheidon in Argos and other tyrants established themselves, having already royal power.' The points to be noticed here are that Aristotle makes two very definite statements about Pheidon: (1) he is earlier than the period of the 'popular' (*ἐκ δημαγωγῶν*) tyrants; (2) he belongs to a period when royal power was still a reality and not a mere form; hence he is put in a different class from Cypselus and Phalaris. This character of Pheidon's 'tyranny' will be referred to again later: for the moment it must be stated that Aristotle's authority is clear for the eighth century date.

To come now to Pheidon's position in Peloponnesian history. The great argument against his being placed in the eighth century is that his proceedings at Olympia imply that the festival was already more than a local one, and

important points which his supposed original does give, and he uses different words for the same fact. There *may* have been copying; but there is no internal evidence at all events to establish Busolt's statement.

[1] *Pol.* v. 10, 5-6; p. 1310 *b*.

that it did not attain this position till after 700 B.C.[1] This argument is only valid against the form in which the tradition has come down to us; Pheidon may well have interfered with a local festival, and this act may then have been exaggerated, in the tradition followed by Herodotus, into an interference with an international festival. But it is at least possible that the Olympic festival already in the eighth century had a more than local importance; this was the definite Greek tradition, and it is dangerous to reject it on mere a priori grounds.

A second objection to the eighth century date of Pheidon is that Ephorus attributes to him the coining of money, and that this certainly was not invented before the seventh century. This date for the first coining is undoubtedly correct; but our oldest authority, Herodotus, knows nothing of the coining; it is not unnatural to suppose that this is an expansion of Ephorus, who inferred the coins from the Φειδώνια μέτρα, which are an undoubted fact.[2]

Professor Bury has a third argument, based on his ingenious suggestion that Pheidon's interference with the Olympic games was connected with the development of relations with Sicily and the West; 'the choice of Olympia was plainly the choice of a man whose eyes were turned to the West rather than to the East' (p. 260). He goes on to argue that the opening up of Sicily has been antedated by Thucydides, and really belongs to the seventh century and not to the eighth. It will be obvious that this argument may recoil upon Professor Bury's own position about Pheidon; if Thucydides be preferred as an authority on

[1] E. Meyer, *Ges. des A.* ii. p. 544. The argument is elaborated by Bury, *Pindar Nemean Odes*, pp. 256 f.

[2] Bury, *u.s.* p. 255 argues that it is unreasonable to accept the authority of Ephorus for a date, while we reject it for another of his statements. But the date may probably be based on an existing genealogy (*v.s.*), and stands on quite a different footing from the statement as to coins. At all events Professor Gardner, whose authority as a numismatist none will dispute, is disposed, while rejecting the statement as to coining, to accept the early date for Pheidon (*Hist. of Coin.* pp. 111-13).

Sicilian chronology to his modern critics,[1] then the Western enterprize of Pheidon falls naturally into the eighth century, where the chronologers place him.

The objections then to the eighth century date of Pheidon are largely hypothetical, and the hypotheses on which they are based are not in themselves probable. On the other hand this date agrees well with other traditions. It is important to notice that, in all that we are told about Pheidon, he is never brought into connection either with the Messenian Wars or with the rise of tyranny as a democratic movement. The dates of the Messenian Wars are themselves uncertain, but, roughly speaking, they belong to the century preceding the rise of tyranny (750-650). The traditions as to them are very various and of very little value; but surely it is significant that though Argos is brought into them, Pheidon is never mentioned.[2]

And, again, if, as is generally agreed, the tyranny of the Cypselids at Corinth begins in 655, and that of the Ortha-

[1] It is of course impossible here to discuss fully the Thucydidean dates; they may well be those of Antiochus (for reasons for this view, cf. Busolt, *Gr. Ges.* i. 366, *n.*); but Busolt is wrong in inferring from the words of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Arch.* i. 12) ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων λόγων, that Antiochus used only 'unwritten tradition'; λόγων can certainly imply the written as well as the spoken word. But in any case it is most improbable that the inhabitants of Syracuse in the fifth century did not know for how many generations their fathers had been at Syracuse; to be the descendant of a 'founder' was a claim to prestige and (at one time) to privilege. The figures given by Thucydides are attacked on the ground that they are artificial, being multiples of 5 or 10. Probably they are so, *i.e.* calculations based on genuine pedigrees. A great historian like Freeman (*History of Sicily*, i. 313) makes no difficulty in accepting them; he points out with reason that the authenticity of the dates is slightly confirmed by the fact that they are not given as to all the colonies, *e.g.* Zancle and Himera are not dated.

[2] E. Meyer (*u.s.*), p. 544, drags him in. 'It is very probable that he belongs to the time when Pisa and Messene fought against Elis and Sparta. He will have been the soul of the great coalition against the two robber states.' This is mere guessing and quite inconsistent with the traditions.

goridæ at Sicyon a little earlier, where does Pheidon come in? He is described as plotting against the independence of Corinth (*Plut Am., Narr.* ii. p. 772), and as meeting his death in an attack on Corinth,[1] but the Cypselids are not in the story. The obvious explanation, as has already been said, is that Pheidon, as Aristotle saw, belonged to a period before democracy found its own leaders; the fact that he carefully distinguishes Pheidon from the Cypselidae as a different kind of 'tyrant' is only one more proof of his wonderful insight. Remote as real kingship in Greece was from the circumstances of his own time, his political intuition made him able to understand how it must have acted; the Greek king, like the mediaeval, found his power encroached on by his nobles; what is more likely than that an enterprising man sought to save his own privileges by taking up the defence of the unprivileged? All analogy is in favour of this view, and it may be claimed with certainty that it was that of Aristotle, although his evidence was too scanty for him to be able to work it out in detail.[2]

To sum up, it may fairly be maintained:—

(1) That the evidence for an eighth century date for Pheidon, though late, is overwhelmingly stronger than that for any other date.

(2) That this evidence comes probably from quite independent sources; royal genealogies and Olympic tradition alike contribute to it. To assert that it is all derived by inference from one comparatively late source is a mere hypothesis.

[1] Nic. Dam. fr. 41, *F.H.G.* iii. 378.

[2] It is probable that Pheidon's failure marks the end of kingship as an effective power at Argos, though it survived as a mere form for centuries (Hdt. vii. 149). Strabo (p. 358) says his power was broken by the Lacedaemonians; but this is probably a mere conjecture (perhaps that of Ephorus), due to the tendency to antedate their greatness; at all events, Strabo's account contains two statements which are clearly inaccurate, that Pheidon was the first to coin money, and that Pisa at this time was reduced to subjection by Elis.

(3) The traditions as to Pheidon fit in well with the political events of the eighth century, so far as we know them. Argos is still the strongest power in the Peloponnese, though her power is threatened.

(4) The tradition also as to his constitutional position favours an early date. His acts fit into a period when kingship was still a real power; the struggle is still between king and nobles; in the seventh century, on the other hand, kingship has become a mere shadow and the struggle is between nobles and people.

Appendix II.

THE DATE OF THE MESSENIAN WARS

FOR the date of the Messenian Wars there is one piece of valuable evidence, the well-known lines of Tyrtaeus (fr. 5).

Ἡμετέρῳ βασιλῆι, θεοῖσι φίλῳ Θεοπόμπῳ,
ὃν διὰ Μεσσήνην εἵλομεν εὐρύχορον,
Μεσσήνην ἀγαθὴν μὲν ἀροῦν, ἀγαθὴν δὲ φυτεύειν.
ἀμφ' αὐτὴν ἐμάχοντ' ἐννεακαίδεκ' ἔτη
νωλεμέως αἰεί, ταλασίφρονα θυμὸν ἔχοντες,
αἰχμηταὶ πατέρων ἡμετέρων πατέρες·
εἰκοστῷ δ' οἱ μὲν κατὰ πίονα ἔργα λιπόντες
φεῦγον Ἰθωμαίων ἐκ μεγάλων ὀρέων.

Unfortunately there are at least two uncertain points in the interpretation of this:—

(1) What is the date of Theopompus?

(2) What is the interval implied in πατέρων πατέρες?

As to (1), the only important piece of evidence is the pedigree of the Spartan kings;[1] Leotychides, who came to

[1] Hdt. viii. 131. Beloch (*Gr. Ges.* I² 1913, p. 173) says: 'The figures for the royal reigns before Alcamenes (785-754 B.C.) have no value historically.' The fact that the Olympic Era (776 B.C.) begins in the 10th year both of Alcamenes and of Theopompus proves clearly, as he says, that the figures are artificial. But Kubitschek (in *P.W.* xi.1, pp. 1021-2 *s.v.* Königs-verzeichnisse) thinks it worth while to give the lists of the early Spartan kings

the throne about 491 B.C., is eighth in descent from Theopompus; that king, therefore, may probably be placed in the eighth century. This may well be a correct date, but to what part of the century he belongs is uncertain. The ancient chronologers placed him variously, and their estimates are, no doubt, merely based on calculation.[1]

The eight-century date for the First War is slightly confirmed by the list of Olympic victors; in this a Messenian occurs for the last time in 736 (two of the ten previous victors had been Messenians). Unfortunately the list in its present form probably dates from the fifth century, and it is at any rate doubtful how far there was any real[2] evidence for the early events.

With regard to the second point, it is usual to explain the words of Tyrtaeus, *πατέρων πατέρες*, as implying an interval of sixty to seventy years.[3] But surely this is an impossible interval. The two wars are too much of a

in full, with the varying figures as to their reigns. Beloch is certainly too absolute when he says that 'there could never have been, at least in earlier times, an official royal list in Sparta' because the 'reckoning was by the eponymous ephors'; it is most unlikely that this was the method of reckoning in early times. Two points must be kept clearly distinct in calculating from these early lists. The first is that the list may well be accurate, or approximately accurate; (cf. for this Ridgway's argument quoted on p. 57 in n. 2; neither Beloch nor Kubitschek seems ever to have heard of this argument). Secondly, such lists can only be made the basis of rough calculations; at best they give the number of generations, for which a rough average of three to a century can be taken.

[1] For the various dates, and for speculations as to how they were arrived at, cf. Busolt's long note (I. 589). Neither the evidence nor the arguments based on it carry conviction; the most probable suggestion is that the date—724 B.C.—for the death of Theopompus and the end of the War, given by Pausanias (iv. 13. 7), is a calculation from the fact that Leotychides, who came to the throne in 491, was eighth in descent from Theopompus; 7 generations ($33\frac{1}{3} \times 7$) = 233 years; and 491 + 233 = 724. However, while the exact dates are worthless, there is a strong probability that they are approximations.

[2] See note on p. 73.

[3] Busolt i. 571; Grote ii. 436.

piece to be so far apart, and Spartan oppression would probably have brought about a revolt within half a century at the most.[1] The words of Tyrtaeus are quite capable of this explanation; Henry V. fought Agincourt only 38 years after the death of his great-grandfather, and only 69 after his victory at Cressy. There must have been thousands in both the French and the German armies in 1914 whose grandfathers fought in 1870. All that Tyrtaeus means—or at any rate need mean—is that a second generation was concerned in the struggle.

Before, however, an attempt is made to show that the Second Messenian War probably belongs to the first half of the seventh century (*i.e.*, falls between 700 and 660), one or two other groups of evidence may be briefly discussed.

On the one hand, there is a tendency to antedate the Messenian Wars. Isocrates[2] makes the Lacedaemonians possess Messenia for more than 400 years, *i.e.*, the conquest is placed before 770; this figure is partly due to the fondness of mankind for round numbers, partly to the natural tendency of conquerors to claim as long possession as possible of the lands they have annexed.

On the other hand, the wars are post-dated by Messenian sources. Anaxilas claimed to be fourth in descent from one of the exiles after the first Messenian War (Paus. iv. 23. 6), and Epaminondas (Plut. *Apoph. Reg.* 194 b.) seems to assert that the Messenians had been in exile only 230 years when he restored them in 370 after Leuctra.

As the definite evidence is so contradictory and so untrustworthy, except for the statements of Tyrtaeus discussed above, it is only possible to date the Messenian Wars by general probability.

The first point to be considered is the clear absence of definite tradition. This is easily explicable if the wars fall before 650 B.C.; it is about this point that Herodotean

[1] Paus. iv. 14; 15. 3 (whose authority is worth very little) puts the revolt in the second generation, and attributes it to οἱ νεώτεροι, who had never seen war.

[2] *Archi.* 27. Other orators give the same date, cf. Busolt 590 ii.

history in the real sense begins. As to Lydia, Egypt, Media, Corinth, in the latter half of the seventh century, he has definite information, much of which is accurate, though it is mixed with many legends; before this period he has only vague outlines and misplaced names. And the same is also true of other authorities, especially of Aristotle. It is mainly as to colonial foundations that we get definite information, in a few instances only, for earlier periods, an exception which is easily explicable by local and family pride. Surely the admitted uncertainty of all facts in the Messenian Wars is strong evidence for their early date; and had they been waged after the middle of the seventh century, it is hard to believe that the references[1] to them in Herodotus would be so scanty.

A more definite argument is the change in the atmosphere of Greek History which begins about the middle of the seventh century. A new phenomenon, the popular tyrant, championing the unprivileged classes against their masters, appears. At Sicyon, at Corinth, at Megara, to mention only the most familiar instances, the rule of the Dorian aristocracies was overthrown shortly before or after 650 B.C. The tyrants, their mutual relations, their enterprises, the attempts to overthrow them, fill the century from about 660 onwards. Of all this there is not a word in the traditions as to the Messenian Wars; on the contrary, certain well-authenticated features in the tradition are completely inconsistent with what we know of the policy and activity of the tyrants. Corinth[2] is represented as supporting the

[1] iii. 47 (*vid.* p. 35 n.) is the only definite reference; v. 49 is quite vague.

[2] For Corinthian interference, cf. Paus. iv. 11. 1 for the First War, and iv. 15. 8 for the Second. Strabo, p. 362, does not mention the Corinthians, but gives Argives, Arcadians, and Pisatans as Messenian allies. (For a discussion of the international character of the War, cf. p. 34 f.). Curtius (i. 195 and notes 44 & 46) is certainly wrong when he places the end of the Messenian Wars after 650 B.C., but accepts the tradition of Corinthian aid to Sparta. E. Meyer's idea (*Ges. des A.* ii. 544) that Pheidon was the centre of the anti-Lacedaemonian confederacy in the Second Messenian War is absolutely unsupported by evidence.

Lacedaemonians in both Wars, especially the Second; but if anything is certain as to this early period, it is that the policy of the Cypselids was anti-Dorian.

Direct evidence, then, and probability alike point to the Messenian Wars as belonging to the period from 750 to 650 B.C.[1] It is objected that the elegiac poems of Tyrtaeus seem to belong rather to the age of Solon than to the first half of the seventh century. But are they not comparable to the long fragment[2] of Callinus, which is usually dated well before 650?

APPENDIX III.

THE SETTLEMENT OF THERA

HERODOTUS' account of the colonization of Thera from Sparta at the time of the Dorian Invasion is usually treated as a later invention.[3] Hiller von Gärtringen, in his splendid work on Thera, based on the excavations carried on there 1896-8, 1900-2, connects the story with the attempt of Dorieus on Kinyps. L. Malten, in his later study on Cyrene, makes it the invention of the 'noble family' of the Aegidae, who migrated from Sparta to Thera in the sixth century.[4]

[1] The evidence of Pausanias is, as has been said, almost worthless; but it may be mentioned that he makes the Second War last fourteen years (iv. 17. 2 and iv. 20. 1), beginning in the archonship of Tlesias, 681 B.C. (iv. 15. 1); but in the last passage he also makes it begin in 685 (calculating by Olympiads).

[2] Fr. 1.

[3] Cf. Macan, Herodotus (1895, ii. p. 264-5) and Toynbee, *J.H.S.*, xxxiii. (1913) 252-3; Toynbee argues that the story in Herodotus is a late combination, based upon the names θῆραι, a place on Mt. Taygetus, and Thera (the island). Of course the notion that Sparta could send out an overseas 'colony' several centuries before she had even conquered Amyclae is an absurdity.

[4] *Kyrene* (1911), pp. 179, 184; Malten says with reason that there is no ground for connecting Dorieus with Thera, except Herodotus' statement (v. 42) that the island furnished guides to the Spartan adventurer. But it need hardly be said that his own sixth-century immigrants from Sparta to Thera are equally without historic evidence.

This rejection of the Herodotean version may well be right; it is obvious that a tradition which professes to cover a gap of at least five hundred years may be an invention. But it must be urged that the rejection seems primarily based on a priori reasoning, which, if examined, will be found not to apply. Hiller von Gärtringen writes: 'Für die in Mythen angenommene alte Zeit hält die Spartanische Kolonie vor der Kritik nicht stand. Sparta war erst spät in der Lage, Kolonien auszuführen; erst musste der Boden des eigenen Landes gewonnen und gesichert werden.'[1] This is obvious, and no one would maintain for a moment that the Herodotean tradition is historical in its details; the age of colonization was much later; quite apart from the special circumstances of Sparta (about 1000 B.C.), a formal colony thence at that period is an anachronism. But the essence of the Spartan tradition remains untouched; it may be summed up thus:

(1) The same movement of tribes that brought the Northerners into Peloponnese carried some of them farther into the islands.[2]

(2) In this movement tribes of different races took part; with the newest comers, whom we may call 'Dorians' for convenience, were remnants of the earlier inhabitants of the Peloponnese, whom we may call 'Minyae.'

(3) Perhaps the leader of the movement belonged to the noble house of the Aegidae.

Against these positions, the a priori argument goes for nothing. But they have been attacked on other grounds.[3] It is pointed out:—

(1) That the cult connections are with Argolis, Sicyon, and Crete;

(2) That there are also Ionian influences;

(3) And that the alphabet shows complete independence of Sparta.[4]

[1] *Thera* i. 142. Cf. also Toynbee in note above.

[2] For the invasion being by sea, cf. the well-authenticated tradition as to Solygeius. (Thuc. iv. 42.)

[3] Hiller von Gärt., *Thera* i., p. 144. [4] *Ib.*, p. 156.

These facts may be admitted, although there are points on the other side. The importance of the cult of the Carnean Apollo[1] at Thera might be urged as supporting the view that it was connected with Sparta, and the use of the title ἀρχαγέτας for 'King' points in the same direction.[2]

The balance of detailed evidence, however, is against the early connection of Sparta and Thera; but it may fairly be asked whether this is at all decisive against the tradition. The relations of a colony with its metropolis were often of the weakest in historic times; there is no reason to think they would be otherwise in an early and unorganized settlement. The dialect and the alphabet of a colony, and to some extent its cults, would be determined rather by its geographical position than by its history.

In favour of the Herodotean tradition it may be urged that Thucydides accepts the same tradition[3] for Melos, and that the facts, which it is suggested lie at the base of it, are such as would be preserved in family genealogies. The importance of these for early Greek History[4] is universally admitted. Perhaps in an out-of-the-way island like Thera they were especially maintained.[5] At all events, we know from Pindar's Fourth Pythian Ode how familiar and how widely accepted was the tradition which connected (by the family traditions of the Euphemidae) Cyrene, Thera, and the Peloponnese.

[1] *Ib.*, 151 f.

[2] *Ins. Graec.* iii. 762; there are, however, doubts whether it be a title (*Ib.* Thera iii. 60). For use of ἀρχαγέτας, 'King' at Sparta, cf. Plut. *Lyc.* to the famous ῥήτρα.

[3] V. 112. But this may be merely dramatic.

[4] A late inscription (*I.G.* iii. 868) makes the hereditary priest of the Carnean Apollo boast of his descent 'from Lacedaemonian Kings,' *i.e.*, from Theras. Of course this is no proof for the existence of such genealogies before the time of Herodotus, and the claim here put forward may well be the result of Herodotus' narrative. But a priori it is probable that genealogical trees existed in the time of the historian, reaching back to comparatively remote periods.

[5] Cf. J. T. Bent, *Cyclades*, p. 147, for similar conservatism.

Stress must be laid on this point. In Herodotus we have a tradition as to the period of the great migrations, which is obviously based largely on local evidence; he heard it in Thera,[1] and accepted it. It serves to explain the connection which admittedly existed from the sixth century onwards between Laconia, Thera, and North Africa. If it be necessary to reject it, it is better to give up any attempt to reconstruct the history of these early times; if it be accepted, it can only be accepted tentatively as possibly based on genuine tradition. It has the value of showing in an individual instance how widely spread and how firmly established was the general tradition as to 'the Dorian Migration,' which underlies the ancient history of Herodotus and of Thucydides.

The danger of reconstructing the early history of Greece on traditional evidence, while rejecting the tradition itself, is shown in Studniczka's well-known monograph on Cyrene (1889), which made the earliest colonization of Thera come from Thessaly, and denied any Dorian connection till after the first Messenian War.[2] As Malten well points out, the excavations have shattered completely his fine-spun conjectures. 'Out of the general ruin (Trümmerfeld) a single fragment, the word "Minyae," was taken to support a new combination; but this fragment was used in a sense completely different from the ancient evidence. A new picture took the place of the traditional one.'[3]

It is a pity that Malten's able and destructive criticism of his predecessor did not make him more distrustful of his own reconstruction. In order to account for certain features of the traditional story, he postulates and endeavours to prove a connection between the Pre-Dorian

[1] Malten (p. 99) says 'there is no evidence in Herodotus' work that he ever was in Thera.' He overlooks the local knowledge shown in iv. 153 (the seven χῶροι there), and in iv. 149. 2 the shrine of the Erinyes (cf. *Ins. Graec.* iii. 367, and *Thera* i. 150, iii. 61-2) found near the temple of the Carnean Apollo.

[2] F. Studniczka, *Kyrene eine altgriechische Göttin*, 1889, p. 66.

[3] L. Malten, *Kyrene* (1911), p. 164.

elements in the Peloponnese and in North Africa, which took place when they were driven out by the Dorian invasion.[1] That there are curious elements of resemblance[2] between the earlier traditions of the Peloponnese and N. Africa in the Herodotean narrative is clear; that they are to be accounted for in this way is unprovable, if not improbable. The violent interpretations of the genealogical myths which are found in Pindar's Fourth Pythian Ode and elsewhere, do not command confidence.

To sum up. Herodotus' story may be true, and has some slight (probably very slight) evidence in its favour; modern reconstructions are mutually destructive, and rest on the most uncertain combinations and interpretations.

Appendix IV.

SOME NOTES ON THE CYPSELIDAE

EVEN to sketch the importance in Greek History of the Tyrants of Corinth would require a long appendix in itself. But it may be worth while briefly to emphasise certain points in our authorities as to them, and in their history, which have perhaps not had sufficient attention. Apart from the narrative in Herodotus v. 92, our main source of information is Nicolaus Damascenus;[3] there are also interesting references in Aristotle,[4] and two passages in Pausanias as to the origin of the family. It will be obvious to any unprejudiced critic reading these accounts, that there are two

[1] *Kyrene*, pp. 112 f.

[2] The name 'Atlas' is probably Arcadian (*Apollodorus* iii. 10. 1) and also that of Tritonis (Paus. viii. 26. 6, cf. Hdt. iv. 180); so, too, Herodotus speaks of a Zeus (iv. 203. 2) at Cyrene, called Λυκαῖος, an Arcadian cult name.

[3] *Frs.* 58-60; Müller, *F.H.G.* iii. 391 f.

[4] *Politics* 1310*b*-1315; viii. 10. 6, the popular origin of the tyranny; viii. 10. 13, and 11. 4, 9, the methods of the tyrants; viii. 12. 3-4, duration of the tyranny and character of the tyrants.

independent traditions as to this tyrant house, one unfavourable, represented by Herodotus, the other, on the whole, favourable, and much fuller, from which Aristotle drew; this second source may well be the composite narrative of Ephorus (though this is a mere guess); but to say that it 'rests on the same foundation as the Herodotean narrative,' 'but that Ephorus has as usual rationalized the story of Herodotus'[1] is most improbable.

It was likely a priori that there would be two distinct traditions as to the Cypselidae, for on the one hand Corinth under them reached its greatest height of power, and founded its colonial empire, and on the other hand the ruling classes of Corinth, from 550 B.C. onwards, turned their backs on most of the Cypselid policy. This divergence of view is, as might have been expected, clearly marked in the traditions.

The first point on which stress must be laid is the origin of the tyrants from a semi-noble family; Pausanias[2] twice asserts that their ancestor was one of the original conquerors, but apparently not admitted to the same privileges as the ruling aristocracy; this agrees with the statement of Herodotus[3] that the father of Cypselus was of distinguished ancestry, and explains the statement of Nicolaus[4] that he was able to hold military office (Polemarch). Hence it is explicable how he was allowed to marry a lady of the ruling class; such a semi-mesalliance would in other respects also fit well into the story of Herodotus. But this is the merest conjecture; the only part of the genealogical evidence that is good is the names; family trees were easy to remember.

[1] Busolt i. 635. The evidence quoted for a common source for Aristotle and for Nicolaus is simply that both speak of the δημαγωγία of Cypselus; it is hard to see how any two narratives, however different in origin, could have avoided this.

[2] II. iv. 4; V. xviii. 8.

[3] v. 92. A Lapith. Pausanias says he came from 'Gonnus above Sicyon.' He would be a sort of parallel to the traitor Philonomus (p. 31) who helped the Dorians to conquer Laconia.

[4] Fr. 58.

The second point I wish to emphasize as to the Cypselidae is their close connection with Delphi. In spite of the efforts of the Corinthians, the honesty of Herodotus[1] preserves the story of the 'treasure' of Cypselus at Delphi, and his main account of the family, given later, positively[2] bristles with oracles. It is hard not to believe that the Sacred War of 595 B.C. was largely the work of Periander; his part in the matter has been suppressed, and the credit given to Solon[3] and Cleisthenes of Sicyon, who were clearly the dependent allies[4] of the Corinthian tyrant, and also to the Thessalians. But the position of Periander in Greece, and the interests of Corinth in the Corinthian Gulf, render it likely[5] that he took part in the destruction of Crissa.

So far all that has been said as to the Cypselidae is fairly familiar. I wish to add a suggestion which, I think, has not been made before, as to the source of Herodotus' narrative in v. 92. If it could be accepted, it would throw considerable light on the value of his testimony.

First, it should be noticed that there is no trace in the historian's works that he had ever resided at Corinth;[6] clearly his traditions as to it are derived from outside sources, probably in part Samian, and certainly Athenian.

Next, attention must be called to the curious ending of the long chapter about Periander; the grim story of the dead Melissa, with its treasure-seeking and its curious necromancy, is most inappropriate to the occasion on which it is supposed to have been told. But Herodotus, with his usual scrupulous care, no doubt reproduces the story

[1] i. 14. [2] v. 92. [3] Plutarch, *Sol.* 11.

[4] Another dependent ally was the tyrant of Epidaurus (iii. 50), the father-in-law of Periander. The revenge of the Corinthian tyrant broke his power (iii. 52). It was probably a result of this weakening of Epidaurus that Aegina obtained its freedom (Hdt. v. 83) and became ultimately a dangerous rival of Corinth.

[5] The supersession of 'Crisaean' by 'Corinthian,' as the name of the gulf, is significant.

[6] Is it accidental that Herodotus speaks of the 'trireme' and the statue dedicated after the Invasion of Xerxes as being 'at the Isthmus' and *not* 'at Corinth' (viii. 121, ix. 81)?

as he heard it. His informant was clearly an Athenian; the narrative comes in that part of Book V. where the history of Athens is almost continuous.

It seems to me not at all improbable that Herodotus's informant was Lampon, the son of Olympiodorus, the famous diviner of the Periclean circle. The points in favour of this identification are these :—

(1) Herodotus knew something of the history of Lampon's family; he describes the exploit at Plataea of Olympiodorus,[1] probably the father of Lampon.

(2) Herodotus and Lampon both took part in the colonization of Thurii.

(3) They seem to have been something of kindred spirits; Lampon's explanation of a prodigy[2] would certainly have appealed to Herodotus, and the references to the diviner in Aristophanes[3] are of a contemptuous character, which would well suit an informant who would blend important political facts with mysterious tales as to divination and ritual.

It must be admitted, however, that this suggestion of Lampon as the informant rests on very slender evidence; what is fairly certain is that Herodotus's informant in v. 92 was an Athenian.

It is interesting to compare Herodotus's account of the Cypselidae with that he gives of Peisistratus and his sons. Both alike show his dislike of tyranny; but of the Athenian tyrants Herodotus tells us so much that is favourable that we can correct from his own narrative his unfavourable estimate; of the Corinthian tyrants, on the other hand, he knows nothing but stories to their discredit.

NOTE ON CHAP. III.—I have used the evidence of the Olympic Register (pp. 36, 56, 63) because it may well contain old and valuable material, even if Mahaffy's view be accepted, that it was compiled by Hippias about 400 B.C. This view is restated and elaborated by Beloch (I^2 148 f.), but answered with some success by Brinkmann (*Rhein. Mus.* lxx., 1915), who lays stress on the accuracy of the names. It seems likely a priori that Greece kept athletic records with some care.

[1] ix. 21. [2] Plutarch, *Per.* 6.

[3] *Birds* 521, 988, and perhaps *Clouds* 332.

IV

Some Points as to the Chronology of the Reign of Cleomenes I.

[The paper on 'The Chronology of the Reign of Cleomenes' was read to the Oxford Philological Society in May 1904, and published in the *J.H.S.*, vol. xxv., 1905. I have added, as will be seen, several points, but I still think the general arguments sound. When printing the paper for the first time, I suppressed the part as to Telesilla as it did not bear on chronology, but I have always held the view I have tried to restate here. In this part of the paper my obligations to Dr. Macan will be obvious, though I had formed my own view before I saw his commentary.]

THE two dates which I wish briefly to discuss are those of the Argive Expedition and of the Athено-Plataean alliance: they are of cardinal importance for the history of Greek politics in an important but very obscure period. The two questions may be considered as independent, and it is possible to adopt the earlier date for one event and not for the other (as E. Meyer does), but it will be here argued that the two events are connected, and that the date assigned to the one carries with it the date of the other.

First then as to the date of the attack on Argos and the battle of Sepeia. Before the time of Grote this was generally[1] placed *circ.* 520 B.C. on the strength of the passage of Pausanias (iii. 4), 'when Cleomenes came to the throne, he at once invaded the Argolid'; his accession is usually placed about 520, and as this date is generally accepted, it is needless to give the reasons for it here. The date of Pausanias is in itself worth very little. It is true that he has information as to the Argive campaign (*e.g.* the Telesilla episode, which will be discussed later) which is not in Herodotus, and which may be derived from some local

[1] Clinton, however, placed the defeat of Argos in 510, and Thirlwall also (ii. 62) rejects the early date.

chronicler; this information is given in an earlier book (ii. 20), while in iii. 4 he is mainly following Herodotus. It may be noticed, moreover, that he certainly is supplementing Herodotus from some other source (*e.g.* the name of the grove of Eleusis, 'Orgas'),[1] and it is not unnatural to suppose that he had reason for giving a date for the expedition of Cleomenes, which differs from that which at first sight *seems* to be given by Herodotus; Wernicke[2] writes 'perverse eum (Cleomenem) initio regni sui id fecisse (Pausanias) dicit,' but the date may well have come from some chronological table (such as the Parian Chronicle).

Another explanation of the date in Pausanias that has been given is that we have here an instance of the well-known chronological rule which dates an event, known to have happened in a certain period, in the *first* year of that period, *e.g.* the invasion of England by the Saxons was put in 449 A.D., because that was supposed to be the first year of Marcianus.[3] It has also been suggested that Pausanias may have had a confused remembrance in his mind of the curious statement of Herodotus that 'Cleomenes reigned no very long time' (v. 48).

But it is needless to speculate further; were the statement of Pausanias the only reason for the earlier date, no one would think it worth while to discuss it; I only submit that, if the earlier date be found on the whole to suit better the narrative of Herodotus (vi. 76 *seq.*), the date of Pausanias adds some slight confirmation to our inference.

That Herodotus puts the invasion of Argos *near the end*, and not at the beginning, of the reign of Cleomenes, has

[1] Pausanias also puts the number of the slain at 5,000 (Hdt. vii. 148 gives 6,000), and his account of the treatment of Aegina differs materially from that in Hdt. vi. 50 *sq.* These, however, may be merely mistakes, due to Pausanias writing from memory.

[2] *De Pausaniae studiis Herodoti*, p. 13: this is a very unconvincing piece of Quellenkritik.

[3] Quorum tempore Angli a Brettonibus accersiti Britanniam adierunt, Bede v. 24 and Plummer's note ii. p. 27.

practically been agreed since the time of Grote (iv. p. 247).[1] Abbott leaves the question open in his Appendix (i. 448), and gives no date in his narrative. Curtius among modern authorities supports the earlier date, but even he in his notes seems to suppose there were *two* Argive campaigns, a compromise that will satisfy no one. Lenschau, however, adopts decidedly the earlier date.[2]

The passage of Herodotus usually quoted as decisive is vii. 148-9, in which the Argives plead that they cannot take part in the resistance to the Persians in 480, because 'they had lately (*νεωστί*) lost 6,000 citizens slain by Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians, and therefore must (cap. 149) have 'a thirty years' truce' in which 'their children may grow to man's estate.' This passage, however, proves nothing; it is obvious to every reader of Herodotus, it was obvious to Herodotus himself (though he was certainly not an enemy of Argos), that the Argives here were not giving the real reason for their inactivity. In fact Herodotus (ix. 12) records that in the very next year the Argives had 'undertaken to prevent the Spartan from going forth'[3] (to resist Mardonius.) This hardly looks

[1] It is sufficient to refer to Busolt (ii[2] 561), Beloch (i. 349), and E. Meyer (*G. des A.* iii. 319) in Germany, and to Macan, How (Herodotus *ad loc.*) and Bury (*Klio* ii. 14 f., 1902) among British scholars. Curtius (i. 368) accepts the earlier date; but see his note (157) on p. 669.

[2] In *P. W.* xi. p. 700, he argues that Argos must have been attacked early in order to 'isolate' the Athenian tyrants (cf. p. 87 inf. for the same argument). He does not discuss the 'double oracle,' and the whole article, though exceedingly clear and sensible, is somewhat thin, and is far from dealing with all the evidence. L.'s theory of the policy of Cleomenes is that he was aiming throughout at a 'defensive alliance' against Persia; hence, while he sought to bring Athens under Lacedaemonian leadership, he held aloof from the attempt to restore Hippias, the Persian partizan: this he infers from the fact that Cleomenes is not mentioned in Hdt. v. 91-3,—a rather dangerous use of the *argumentum a silentio*. Lenschau adopts also the earlier date for the Plataean intrigue.

[3] It is true they did nothing; but the secrecy of the Lacedaemonian march and the route taken to join the Athenians in

like a depopulated country; but we will take later the positive proofs from Herodotus that Argos between 490 and 470 was in the very reverse of a crushed condition.

A second passage quoted is Herodotus v. 49: Aristagoras urges the Spartan king to attack the Persians, and 'to put off fighting against the Messenians, his evenly matched foes, and Arcadians and Argives'; this, says Mr. Macan, 'would have been rather beside the mark' if the Argives had just been crushed. To me the passage seems to favour the other side, if it be worth anything; the Messenians had been undoubtedly crushed; the Arcadians had been reduced to a dependent condition; is it not natural to suppose that the Argives are in the same category? But such allusions of course really prove nothing, even if we could suppose—which of course we cannot—that Herodotus is accurately recording what Aristagoras said (and not writing from the point of view of his own day).

There remains the third—and to my mind only serious—argument from Herodotus against the early date, *i.e.* the oracle quoted in part in vi. 77, and in part in vi. 19, by which the fate of Miletus and the fate of Argos are joined together. Now I admit at once that if this passage stood alone, we should naturally consider that the two events referred to must have been about the same time, and that therefore the defeat of Argos falls in the first decade of the fifth century. But if sufficient evidence can be given for the earlier date from other parts of Herodotus, then the evidence of the oracle can hardly be thought in itself to outweigh probability and the balance of evidence.

For in the first place the whole attitude of scholars to this oracle is most uncertain; some (*e.g.* Busolt *ut supra*) consider it a prediction *post eventum*; others, like Bury (*ut supra*), build up on the strength of it elaborate theories, *e.g.* that Aristagoras had appealed to Argos (as well as to Athens and Sparta) for help, and that the treasures of Croesus were never given to Delphi at all, but had been

Central Greece, may probably be explained by fear of Argive action (cf. How on Hdt. ix. 10).

feloniously transferred from Branchidae to Delphi: to this latter theory he only refers without adopting it.[1] The former theory—that Aristagoras visited Argos, and that Delphi was consulted about the propriety of sending help—may be true, but the silence of Herodotus is a strong argument against it.

The most probable explanation of the oracle is to be found in the story of Telesilla; if this be true in the main (the arguments for this view will be given later), then the oracle is a riddling account *post eventum* of what had happened. If on the other hand the oracle be genuine (either as a whole or in part), and was really given to the Argives (Herodotus himself says the Milesians were not present), its general meaning is so obscure that it proves nothing. The oracle of Delphi might well, between 530 and 520 B.C., have vented its spite against Miletus[2] by interpolating into an Argive oracle a warning which the position of affairs in Ionia at the time rendered likely of fulfilment. And it is worth noticing that, in other oracles beside this, the attitude of the Delphic Oracle to Miletus was the reverse of friendly: that city and its Italian partner Sybaris are on other occasions assailed in tones of prophetic reviling. This fact would render easier the belief that the oracle so far forgot itself as to abuse a city unconcerned in the consultation of the moment. The *double* nature of the oracle, however, is a most suspicious circumstance; it would be hard, I think, to quote a real parallel to it.

The obscurity of the oracle is itself in some ways a slight argument for the earlier date of the Argive campaign; Herodotus knows nothing definite as to the occasion of its delivery, but as a rule he is far better informed about what happens in the fifth century than he is about the events

[1] This theory is C. Niebuhr's. For the arguments for it, I can only refer to Mr. Bury's pages: to me it seems not worth discussing; so far from 'such divination' serving 'to illustrate and accentuate a problem,' it only obscures it.

[2] Cf. Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire de la Divination*, iii. pp. 129-130.

of even the last quarter of the sixth century; it is sufficient to compare his account of the second and of the third Aeginetan Wars.

Let us now turn to the evidence in Herodotus which seems to show that the Argive defeat was early in the reign of Cleomenes V., not at the end of it.

The first passage, which is entirely neglected by Grote, is vi. 92; Herodotus describes how 1,000 volunteers went from Argos to help Aegina in the third Aeginetan War; it must be noted too that they went against the wish of the state, which had good cause to complain of Aegina for lending ships to Cleomenes. Now the date of this war is uncertain; but it cannot be later than 485, and may be earlier than 490. Can we suppose that a state depopulated of its warriors would in less than ten years, perhaps in five, be sending out 1,000 warriors in a quarrel that did not concern it?[1]

I have already referred to the position of Argos and its apparent strength in the Persian War; but what followed? At some period between 475 and 465, Argos was able once more to dispute the hegemony of the Lacedaemonians in the Peloponnese: I refer of course to the battle of Tegea (Hdt. ix. 35). This renewal of the age-long struggle between Argos and the Lacedaemonians is more probable after fifty years than after twenty-five. It may be objected that, according to my own theory, the struggle was renewed in the preceding century after only one generation, for the war 'of the 300' (Hdt. i. 82 *sq.*) was about 550, and the battle of Sepeia about 520. But the cases are not parallel: there is no evidence that the defeat of Argos in the middle of the sixth century was carried out with the awful thoroughness of the work of Cleomenes. And there is a further point to be considered. Herodotus tells us with considerable precision of the results of the Argive defeat at Sepeia (vi. 83); so depopulated was the city that the δοῦλοι became masters of it 'till the sons of the slain grew

[1] Mr. How (ii. p. 352) ingeniously argues that they were 'soldiers of fortune,' who, despairing of their own city, went to fight abroad.

up,' a period for which we must allow something like twenty years; then followed a war in which 'the slaves' were 'driven out' to Tiryns; then a period of reconciliation (ἁρθμια),[1] and then the final war which lasted 'a considerable time,' and in which the Argives 'with difficulty' conquered. If we place this victory and the capture of Tiryns (with Busolt) about 472-1, it would certainly seem that the twenty-four years between this and 495 are much too few for the recovery of Argos; I admit that on the other hand the fifty years since 520 seem a rather needlessly long time for recovery; but the difficulty of excess of time is only an apparent difficulty.[2]

There is another class of evidence bearing on the date of the recovery of Argos, which must be just referred to—I mean the evidence as to its school of sculpture. Hageladas the Argive was the most famous sculptor of his day in Greece, and in his school were trained Myron, Pheidias, and Polycleitus; the usual date for his *floruit* is from 500 to 460;[3] this seems required by the fact that

[1] The weakness of Argos in the fifth century has been inferred from the independence of Mycenae and Tiryns: that the two towns were independent, is shown by the fact that they took part in the Persian War on the patriotic side. It does not necessarily follow, however, that we must assume the later date (*circ.* 495) for the defeat of Sepeia. If this took place about 520, the first generation (520-490) would be occupied with the recovery of Argos; then follows this period of 'reconciliation' in which Argos, though herself strong enough to reassert her authority completely over her Perioikid states, dares not do so till an opportunity occurs when the Lacedaemonians cannot interfere. It is during this period that Mycenae and Tiryns seek to assert their independence by joining the Greeks against the common foe; to compare small things with great, their policy would be the same as that of Cavour joining the Allied Powers in the Crimean War, in order to bring Sardinia to the front.

[2] The results of Cleomenes' victory at Argos might well last a whole generation.

[3] This date is accepted without question by Professor Waldstein in his great book on the Argive Heraeum; Pausanias attributes to Hageladas works commemorating a Tarentine victory of about 468 (x. 10. 3), and a Messenian victory not earlier than 460 (iv. 33.

he is credited with trophies which must be subsequent to 468 and 460 respectively (Paus. x. 10. 3; iv. 33. 3). If this be correct, it seems to require us to assign Cleomenes' victory to the earliest possible date: a depopulated and distracted city could hardly be the home of a flourishing school of art.

To sum up then this part of my argument: the earlier date for Cleomenes' expedition is supported by the fact that Argos was strong again by 475, that she had abundance of warriors at least ten and perhaps fifteen years earlier, and that at least thirty years must be allowed for the terrible social changes which followed her defeat by Cleomenes.

I have still something more to say as to the probability of the earlier date, but it had better be said after I have discussed the reason for accepting or rejecting the date given by Thucydides for the Atheno-Plataean alliance. As everyone knows, he puts this (iii. 68) in the ninety-third year before the capture of Plataea, *i.e.* in 519; but since Grote's argument against this date, it has been usually given up, and one ten years later adopted; it is indeed quite easy to conjecture that the text[1] of Thucydides has become corrupt in its figures. Of the modern historians quoted above, Meyer (ii. 780) still prefers the old date, following the sound principle of 'when in doubt, trust Thucydides'; and Beloch (i. 340), without pronouncing definitely, rejects Grote's arguments; the majority, however, seems here also to reject the old date and accept the new one.

2); others (*e.g.* Busolt, ii. 2. 561) ante-date his '*floruit*' to 520-480, *i.e.* make it precede the defeat of Argos by Cleomenes. This earlier date is suggested by the dates of the three Olympic victories commemorated by Hageladas (which fall between 520 and 507); but the trophies for these may have been put up some time after the event. The whole question is discussed by Frazer (Paus. iii. 438-9), who inclines to decide for the earlier date on the ground of a recently discovered inscription; his argument does not seem very convincing. The new edition of *P.W.* (vii. 2189) adopts a middle position, making the life of Hageladas extend from (about) 540 to 460.

[1] Cf. Busolt ii. 399, n. 4, and Macan's note on Hdt. vi. 108.

What then were the grounds of the great English historian for leaving the authority of Thucydides, a thing which, as he says, he was very unwilling to do? They are four:

(1) We cannot explain the presence of King Cleomenes in the neighbourhood of Plataea in 519; in 509 it is easy, as he was then busy with the settlement of Athens.

(2) Had the alliance been made in 519, the name of Hippias must have occurred in the story; for he then was ruler of Athens.

(3) The narrative of Herodotus (vi. 108) represents the Plataean alliance as offered to Athens on the suggestion of Cleomenes, and further that this suggestion was due to a desire to embroil Athens and Thebes; yet Herodotus represents the Peisistratidae as friends of the Lacedaemonians (v. 63).

(4) Herodotus tells us (v. 78) that the Athenians under the tyrants were unenterprising and cowardly; how then can we credit them with courageously helping Plataea, and with the brilliant victory over Boeotia, described by Herodotus (vi. 108) as following the alliance?

Let us examine these arguments in detail.

(1) The first sounds plausible, but does it really prove anything? We do not know why Cleomenes should have been near Plataea in 519. But why should we? Do we know where he was in 518 or 517 or in any year down to 510?

One thing, however, we do know, which may enable us to *guess* why the Spartan king should have been in the North of the Peloponnese in 519, *i.e.* it seems to have been in this decade that the Peloponnesian Confederacy was being organized. This league certainly is fully developed about 509 (v. 91), and its development must have taken some time. Surely then we have some authority for supposing that Cleomenes may have been in the neighbourhood of Plataea at the time in question.

And I cannot help thinking that we may have a more definite trace still in Herodotus's own narrative elsewhere. In v. 68 he tells us that the anti-Dorian arrangements of

Cleisthenes at Sicyon lasted 'while Cleisthenes was tyrant and when he was dead also for sixty years.' Now Cleisthenes died about 560 (the date is uncertain), and this would give about 500 for the date of the revival of Dorian institutions at Sicyon; but this date does not fit in with our general knowledge of the period, and we may perhaps suppose that Herodotus's informants (whom he imperfectly understood) reckoned 'the sixty years' from the date of the establishment of the new tribal names; this must almost certainly have been in the decade following 585 and Cleisthenes' great triumph in the first Sacred War. In that case the Dorian reaction at Sicyon would be about or soon after 520, and would coincide with the victorious activity of Cleomenes. This point, however, cannot be pressed.[1]

So much for Grote's first argument.

His second argument involves, it must be said, an entire misconception of the nature of Herodotus's narrative. Without accepting all, or half, that has been written on 'Quellenkritik,' it yet remains true that a considerable advance has been made in our methods of studying Greek history since Grote's time, by a careful attention to the authorities which underlie the narrative of Herodotus. He was dependent for his facts on his informants; he checked them by his general principles of evidence; but he had not, for the sixth century at all events, a chronological scheme sufficiently fixed to enable him to co-ordinate his different traditions. Hence Herodotus writing the story of the Plataean alliance from the mouth of a patriotic Athenian would naturally hear nothing of Hippias in a story as to the events of the year 519, although Hippias was ruling Athens in that year; and it would never occur to Herodotus himself to add the name of the tyrant, although

[1] Some would attribute the restoration of Dorian tribes at Sicyon to Argos, arguing that city, having lost its power to use force, used its religious influence as controlling the shrine of Apollo Pythaeus (cf. Hdt. vi. 92 and Mac. v. 53 with Busolt's note (i. 222). But surely this attempt to use religious influence rather presupposes a restoration of Dorian traditions.

he had received (and recorded elsewhere) evidence to show that the diplomatic activity of the Peisistratidae was widely spread over Northern Greece and the Aegean.

The same argument disposes of Grote's fourth point. No one now would be likely to take literally Herodotus's words in v. 78; the Athenians of the Peisistratid time were not of the same heroic breed as the Μαραθωνομάχαι; —that was what Herodotus meant to say, and in that sense we understand him—but they were already a people with imperial instincts and quite ready to welcome an alliance which opened to them the passes of Cithaeron.

There remains Grote's third argument, which I believe is generally considered the most important, *i.e.* that the Peisistratidae were 'especially friendly' to the Lacedaemonians, and that therefore Lacedaemonian diplomacy was not likely to try to embroil them in Boeotia. Beloch (*ut supra*), although he tends to accept Thucydides' date, is contemptuous of Herodotus's argument, and talks about 'borrowings from the relations of the fifth century.' Neither Herodotus nor Beloch can give any absolutely certain information as to motives; but it seems safer to trust the inferences of the most widely travelled Greek of the fifth century B.C. rather than the theories of a professor in his study at the latter end of the nineteenth century A.D. But this is a question of taste.

Let us look at the facts. There is, I suppose, no doubt that the whole policy of Cleomenes was to extend the influence of his countrymen in the Peloponnese and in Central Greece: by this policy all his acts and his refusals to act (which are quite as significant) can be explained. There is also no doubt that the power of the Peisistratidae, based as it was on alliances[1] more or less formal with Argos, Eretria, Thebes, Thessaly, Macedon, and some of the Aegean islands, was a most serious, it might be said an insuperable, obstacle to his success. What more likely then than that the Lacedaemonians endeavoured diplo-

[1] For the foreign relations of Peisistratus and his sons, cf. How and Wells ii. pp. 344-5.

matically to undermine[1] their 'very dear friends,' the Peisistratidae, before they attacked them? More must be said in a moment as to the continuous policy that runs all through the reign of Cleomenes; but there are one or two further points which must be made here, which especially concern our special point, the date of 519 for the Atheno-Plataean alliance. A curious coincidence of language has been pointed out by Meyer (*ut supra*): Cleomenes (Hdt. v. 74), when invading Attica after his expulsion from Athens (about 508), found 'Oenoe and Hysiae' to be 'the border demes of Attica'; this is the very extension of frontier which Herodotus (in vi. 108) says was the result of the victorious issue of the war that followed the Atheno-Plataean alliance. But this coincidence, though interesting, is certainly not decisive; it may fairly be asked, however, which date suits better the adoption of Plataea as an ally—519, when Athens was apparently in the height of her power, or 509, when she had just passed through a revolution, was torn by faction at home, and when the Lacedaemonian party was in the ascendant? We know that at the later date, one party was prepared to purchase allies even at the price of degrading submission to the Great King (v. 73). Would the state then have deliberately gone out of her way to provoke an old ally? But in 519 the alienation of Thebes is not unnatural; the old tyrant had done his best to keep on good terms with all his neighbours; the young tyrant was for a spirited foreign policy and the extension of Athenian influence. The policy of Peisistratus would have been wiser than that of Hippias, but—even apart from probability—modern analogies might make us doubt whether young rulers are always wiser than their predecessors.[2]

[1] Their policy is an exact anticipation of their policy towards their Athenian allies at the time of the revolt of Thasos 50 years later.

[2] When I wrote this sentence, I had in my mind the desertion of the policy of Bismarck and the old Kaiser by the old Kaiser's grandson: the terrible results of this change of policy, seen in the Great War, were still in the future.

To sum up then the arguments for the early date, 519, for the Atheno-Plataean alliance:

(1) It rests on the express statements of Thucydides.

(2) It suits the condition of things in Athens much better than the later date.

(3) And the motives suggested by Herodotus for the Lacedaemonian part in it are in accordance with all the traditions of their policy, and I hope to show in accordance with their actions in this very decade.

For now we must turn to discuss the chronology of Cleomenes' acts from the positive side, and show how, if we adopt the earlier date 520 for the attack on Argos, and 519 for the Atheno-Plataean alliance, a more consistent scheme can be obtained for his character and actions than in any other way.

It is generally assumed, as has been said, that he ascended the throne about 520. Would he have been likely to take decisive action at once?

So far Lacedaemonian policy had moved forward from success to success; the century from 750 to 650 (to assume the traditional dates) had given her the mastery over the South of the Peloponnese; the century from 650 to 550 had, after serious defeats and a long struggle, culminated in making her suzerain in Arcadia. The close of this period had seen Argos decisively thrust back from the border region of Cynuria (most probably for the first time, but perhaps when trying to undo former defeats). The time was now ripe for another step in advance; were Argos out of the way, the Peloponnese could be formally united under Lacedaemonian *ἡγεμονία*. That this was so, the circumstances of the next ten years proved; it is probable that the young king saw it, and resolved to strike at once. And he had private reasons for doing so; his succession to the throne was not a popular one; if anything is clear from the narrative of Herodotus, it is that Dorieus[1] and Leonidas had a strong party in Sparta

[1] Niese, in *Hermes* xlii. (1907), pp. 419 f., has put forward some very interesting conjectures as to Dorieus, but to discuss them all here

(v. 42) from whom Herodotus derived much of his information. It is surely then in accordance with probability that Cleomenes should have wished to show at once that he was a genuine son of Anaxandrides, and to silence murmurers by a brilliant success.

Probability then—apart from other evidence—would lead us to put the Argive expedition early; and the sequel confirms this. It has been suggested, almost with certainty, that the decade from 520 to 510 saw the establishment of the Lacedaemonian Confederacy; but even apart from this probable extension of power, it seems to me impossible to reconcile the certain facts as to Cleomenes in the first half of his reign with the existence of a strong Argos. We know that in 510 and the following years, the Lacedaemonians interfered, or sought to interfere, five times in the affairs of Athens; is it possible that this could have been done so freely with an unbeaten Argos threatening their flank all the time? Argos was certainly friendly to the Peisistratidae (cf. Hdt. v. 94). Why were not some of her 6,000 warriors—if they were still in existence—engaged either in the defence of Attica (as the Thessalians were) or in making a diversion in the Peloponnese? But if we assume the date of 520 for the victory of Sepeia and the crushing of Argos, all becomes clear: Cleomenes has a free hand in the Peloponnese and uses it first to organize the Confederacy; meantime he prepares for the next move forward by sowing trouble for Athens at home. Modern diplomacy gives us good instances of how a policy of 'blood and iron' does not disdain to use intrigue to prepare its way, and to isolate its enemies.

So far then from thinking that the attempt at estranging Athens and Thebes in 519 needs explanation, I should have thought that the date justifies itself; the policy was a

would be to depart too far from our subject; the only one relevant is his contention that the colonizing attempts of Dorieus were not private adventures, as Herodotus seems to suggest, but state enterprises; Niese lays stress on the words αἰτήσας λέων (v. 42) and σύγκτισται (v. 46). His theory may be right, but is hardly proved.

preparing of the way for the direct attack on Athens which was to come in 510. But it will be objected at once that the attack of 510 is said by Herodotus to have been due only to the Delphic Oracle, corrupted it is true, by Alcmaeonid gold and marble, but none the less obeyed implicitly by Cleomenes and his people.

Now it is a good principle not to depart from definite statements of Herodotus, but it is necessary not to overlook several obvious points.

(1) The whole business happened more than thirty years before he was born, and he was therefore completely dependent on his informants.

(2) These informants were, certainly in this part of his narrative, Lacedaemonians and Delphians and perhaps the Alcmaeonids also.

(3) And what they told him was the truth, but not the whole truth. It was quite true that the ordinary Lacedaemonians heard with wearisome iteration 'Athens must be delivered'; but one detail may well have been omitted, viz., that this message was dictated as much by Lacedaemonian policy as by Alcmaeonid intrigue. What happened was surely this: the old policy of putting down tyrants and putting up oligarchies (ἐπιτήδειαι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις) (Thuc. i. 19) had pretty well attained completion in the Peloponnese; Cleomenes thought he saw an opportunity of carrying it out in Central Greece as well. But the ordinary Spartan did not see so far ahead as the king, and therefore a little religious pressure was applied to encourage him. It will hardly be said that we are doing Cleomenes an injustice in suggesting that he knew how to work an oracle; it is surely more probable that, where intrigue was concerned, he was one of the deceivers, not one of the deceived.

The story of Herodotus then would be three parts true, while the fourth part would be suppressed, because it was no one's interest to tell it, and many people's interest to suppress it. Cleomenes made a mistake, for he could not foresee that Athenian democracy was ready to come forth when the pressure of the τυραννίς was removed; he was

the ablest statesman in Greece, but a man of 'blood and iron' was constitutionally incapable of estimating the power of the Solonian ideas, which had been working for three quarters of a century in Athens. When he found that he had cast out tyranny only to let in a more formidable enemy to Lacedaemonian ἡγεμονία, he conveniently concealed his mistake. And it was not likely the Alcmaeonidae would reveal it; there were too many shady pages in the history of that great family for them to be eager to tell the world in the fifth century that their patriotic hostility to Cleomenes had begun in sharing with him a not very creditable intrigue.

If then this version of the facts can be trusted, we have for the first half of the reign of Cleomenes a brilliant success, followed by wide and permanent results in the Peloponnese, and a brilliant failure, which simply showed how easily the best-laid plans go astray.

The character of the rest of the reign of Cleomenes is very different. The failure at Athens and the quarrel with Demaratus, who constantly thwarted his plans, seem to have changed his character and certainly rendered him unpopular; this I think may fairly be assumed from Herodotus' accounts of his latter days; we shall hardly believe that he was suffering from the wrath of Demeter, as the Athenians said (vi. 75), or of Apollo, as the Greeks generally said (*ib.*), or of the hero Argus (*ib.*), as the Argives said. We shall be more inclined to believe that he suffered from intemperance, though it is likely that this was the cause of the story that the Scythians visited Sparta (vi. 84), not the result of that visit.[1] It seems difficult to think that Cleomenes would have been credited with madness and intemperance for nothing.

This unfavourable tradition is important, and must be accounted for: it is usual to do this by saying that Cleomenes' attempt to revive the power of the kingship failed

[1] Busolt (ii. 528, n.), however, is inclined to believe there is some truth in the story of the Scythian embassy to Cleomenes; he would put it at the time of the Ionic Revolt.

through the opposition of the party of the Ephors, and that it is the tradition of this party which Herodotus records. It is easy to accept this view if ten years of success were followed by twenty years of failure; it is difficult to reconcile it with the activity successfully maintained to the last, which is postulated by the late date for the Argive expedition. Perhaps even the strange statement of Herodotus in v. 48 may be partially explained in this connection. It is very odd to say of a king who reigned at least thirty years that he 'reigned no very long time'; as Macan has well pointed out (*ad loc.*), Herodotus may have been thinking for the moment only of the fact that the brother of Cleomenes succeeded him; the historian was never very strong in chronology; but Herodotus' mistake is the easier if the brilliant part of the reign of Cleomenes was concentrated in the first twelve years.

It may be said that I am neglecting the events of the very end of his reign, the deposition of Demaratus, the crushing of Aegina the exile, the flight to Thessaly, the intrigue in Arcadia; but these shows of vigour would confirm rather than refute the gloomy opinions held at Sparta of the latter part of the great king's reign. His feverish activity was disastrous to his country, or would have been called so in the next generation: he strengthened the hereditary foe by weakening Aegina, he was the cause of the first of that long succession of royal banishments which shed a gloom over Sparta in the fifth century, and he showed the weakness of Lacedaemonian hegemony by anticipating (vi. 74) the most serious blow which it was to suffer from the great Epaminondas more than a century later. 'Better,' a Spartan might well have said, 'any amount of sloth than such activity as that of Cleomenes in the last short period of his life.'

I have not attempted to discuss the chronology of these last years, because it seems to me the data are quite insufficient. It certainly appears that some of these final acts of Cleomenes must be subsequent to Marathon, and it is most natural to put his death about 488. But, as I

have said, there is no good evidence on the point; and in any case it matters little; Cleomenes' activity at the beginning of his reign had been the determining force in Greece; all agree that he was the final organizer of Lacedaemonian ἡγεμονία and the (involuntary) creator of the Athenian democracy. His later acts have no results; the old order of things had changed, and new problems had to be faced by new actors.

To sum up my points then; it seems:

(1) That the early dating of the successes of Cleomenes suits all the passages in Herodotus—except the mysterious oracle.

And it enables us to accept the direct statement of Thucydides.

(2) What is to my mind almost as important, it suits the whole tone of Herodotus' narrative as to Cleomenes.

(3) It is in accordance with all probability. Cleomenes is one of those meteor-like princes whose reign begins with success, and ends with gloom; he is like Francis I. of France or Charles XII. of Sweden. But I confess I am unable to find a parallel for him if he crowned the last years of his long reign with his most brilliant success, and yet, in spite of it, died under a cloud of obloquy.

THE STORY OF TELESILLA

THE end of Cleomenes' campaign against Argos is a matter of much dispute. The only points as to it that may be taken as agreed are:—

(1) That the ultimate success was not as great as might have been expected in view of the crushing nature of the Lacedaemonian victory.

(2) That Cleomenes was prosecuted on his return home for this partial failure, and was acquitted.

(3) That his defence was an appeal to superstition, viz. that he had been warned by a portent that he would not succeed, and so made no attempt to take the city (vi. 82). Herodotus affirms positively (ἔλεξε δ' ὧν φάμενος) that this

was his line of defence, and it is unreasonable to doubt his accuracy. He is probably right also that it was officially accepted by his countrymen (πιστὰ καὶ οἰκότα). But it is clear that Herodotus himself had great doubts of its truth, and no modern historian accepts it as sufficient. It may perhaps be noted in passing, that Herodotus' informants seem to be in doubt what form the fiction took; in Cap. 80 the religious obstacle to complete success is different, and occurs at a different time, from that which is the ground of the defence officially adopted.

Various explanations are conjectured as to the true reason, *e.g.* that Cleomenes was bribed (as his enemies actually asserted: c. 82), that he feared to attack a walled city, that he did not wish his success to be too complete.[1]

There is, however, outside Herodotus, an explanation which, if it could be accepted, would meet the difficulty completely. This is found in the tale of Telesilla, told by Pausanias (ii. 20) and repeated with variations by Plutarch.[2] According to this account Cleomenes did attack Argos, but was repulsed by the women, inspired by the poetess Telesilla, aided by the slaves and those too old or young for service.

There is nothing improbable in the story in itself; the Lacedaemonians were notoriously bad in attacking walls, and other warriors, more efficient than they were, have found,[3] in a city that seemed as good as taken, the desperate resistance of non-combatants, led by a woman, hard to overcome. The story of Pausanias was accepted by Thirlwall (ii. 263) and by Duncker as substantially true, but of modern scholars only Dr. Macan attaches any value

[1] These explanations are given by Mr. How *ad loc.*

[2] *De Mulier Virt.* c. 4, p. 245; he quotes as his authority Socrates of Argos, a writer of uncertain date, who wrote a περιήγησις of Argos; the other fragments quoted from him by Müller (*F.H.G.* iv. 497) do not raise our opinion of his value as an historical authority.

[3] *E.g.* the French at Saragossa, cf. Byron (*Childe Harold* i., stanzas 55-6) and Oman (*Peninsular War* i. 154).

to it. It is worth while to consider why a story which provides a satisfactory explanation for a difficulty in the narrative of Herodotus, and which is not in itself improbable, should be so generally rejected.

The main reason is the silence of Herodotus. 'Herodotus was the less likely to pass over in silence so unusually remarkable an exploit, as the report as to the trial of Cleomenes must have definitely compelled him to say something of the pretended attack on Argos' (Busolt ii. 564, n.). But surely this argument entirely ignores the fact that Herodotus was drawing his story from a Spartan source,[1] and that his informants had every reason to say nothing of a repulse so disgraceful.

The other arguments against the story are that it is based upon a confusion of ritual and fact, or that it is a mistaken inference from a statue. The ritual is that of the Festival of the Ὑβριστικά, in which men and women changed dress and character as far as possible; this, we are told by Socrates, was held on the day of the 'new moon,' which was the anniversary of Telesilla's victory.[2] The statue was that of a woman 'looking at a helmet and about to put it on her head.' This, we are told, may be the statue of the Armed Aphrodite (Frazer), and the origin of the legend. But it is obvious that the statue may equally be that of a real woman, and that though the festival and the story of the women's victory might be connected, there is no reason at all why they must be.

[1] It is argued by some that Herodotus had also Argive sources. *E.g.* in Cap. 83. But this chapter is very general in its character and, moreover, has all the appearance of being a later addition; διὰ ταῦτα in the first line of c. 84 refers back to c. 75.

[2] Plut. *u.s.*; but he expressly says that there was for the battle another and quite different date, which he puts first; it is not unnatural to suppose that the anniversary of the battle was transferred from its real date to the day of the festival owing to the fancied resemblance. The festival is of course a fact and one full of interest: for parallels to the interchange of sex, cf. Frazer, Paus. iii. 197, or How *ad loc.* It may be added that Plutarch notes how the number of slain in the story had been altered; this may have been done to make it fit the festival.

But there is one piece of evidence in Herodotus himself which goes strongly to confirm the truth of the Pausanias story :—the oracle in vi. 77.

> ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡ θήλεια τὸν ἄρσενα νικήσασα
> ἐξελάσῃ καὶ κῦδος ἐν Ἀργείοισι ἄρηται
> πολλὰς Ἀργείων ἀμφιδρυφέας τότε θήσει.
> ὡς ποτέ τις ἐρέει καὶ ἐπεσσομένων ἀνθρώπων
> δεινὸς ὄφις τριέλικτος ἀπώλετο δουρὶ δαμασθείς.

If the Telesilla tale be true, the oracle is fairly clear; it is a *post eventum* prediction, in which some Spartan grimly commemorates the fact that the Argive women may have won a victory, but that it was a Cadmeian one. In very truth 'the snake'—the badge of Argos[1]—was 'crushed' by the Spartan 'spear.' But if, as is generally held, the Telesilla story be a fiction and very probably one based in part on the first line of the mysterious oracle, the oracle becomes an insoluble riddle. It is most forced to explain the two first lines as referring to Cleomenes' rejection by Hera, given in c. 82. In fact we may sum up that the oracle can be explained by the tradition, but that if the tradition be removed, the oracle remains a mystery.

On the whole, then, the balance of probability is in favour of the story of Pausanias. It is apparently based on local tradition, connected with a monument which may well be contemporary, it fills an admitted gap in Herodotus' narrative, and explains an otherwise inexplicable riddle, and its omission by Herodotus can be easily accounted for. If the story be accepted, it is a good instance of the value of secondary authorities as supplementing our main authorities. It was one of Grote's great merits that he emphasized the supreme importance of the contemporary or nearly contemporary authorities; but modern critics rightly think that he carried this emphasis too far.

[1] Cf. Soph. *Antig.* 125 and How on vi. 77.

V.

The Persian Friends of Herodotus

FROM what sources did Herodotus draw the materials for his history? At what date or dates did he compose it? These inquiries have an endless fascination for the student of Herodotus, which is not lessened by the fact that they admit of no certain answer. The combinations which will be suggested in this paper have, so far as I know, not been suggested before; but if, as is extremely likely, they have already been made, there is always a certain interest in the fact that two inquirers, working independently, have come to the same conclusions.

It is not necessary to give evidence of the fact that Herodotus himself was highly satisfied with his own sources of information as to Persian history, and that he considered he could speak with authority upon it. (Cf. *e.g.* i. 95.) Nor is it necessary to give arguments for the view that Herodotus had on some points official or semi-official Persian information: *e.g.* in his account of the satrapies in Bk. III., of the Royal Road in Bk. V., and of the Persian army in Bk. VII.

These two points will be assumed, and also that Herodotus is a trustworthy witness, that he reports truly what he has heard, without exaggeration or suppression, and that he had some idea of the differing value of various witnesses. The problem then is to find a Persian source from which Herodotus could derive :—

(1) Information that seemed to him trustworthy as to the rise of the Achaemenid house, and its establishment on the throne.

(2) Official details as to the resources and organization of the Persian Empire in the fifth century.

(3) Definite information as to the inner court circle of Susa. The story, *e.g.* as to Amestris and the wife of Masistes (ix. 108 *sq.*), is told by Herodotus with as much fulness of detail and with as complete a confidence as the

story of the Philaidae in the Chersonese or that of Alexander of Macedon.

It is not suggested that these stories and others like them are to be accepted by us as accurate, but only that Herodotus considered he had full grounds for relating in detail events and motives which would be unknown to ordinary informants, outside of court circles.

Now it can hardly be supposed that Herodotus, when himself in the East, ever penetrated into the government offices, much less up the back-stairs of the court. Even apart from his ignorance of all languages but Greek, he was only in the position of an ordinary traveller, seeing the wonders of the Great King's realm on sufferance. No Persian grandee, still less one of the intimate court circle, would have unbosomed himself in his own land to an obscure Greek, travelling in the company of merchants, and not improbably engaged in business on his own account.

It may be maintained that Herodotus' informants were his own countrymen, who were either treading as exiles the antechambers of Susa or engaged there professionally, as was Democedes or Apollonides (Ctesias, 29, 42),[1] the immoral physician from Cos. This seems, however, less likely, having regard to two points :—

(1) The accuracy of Herodotus' information as to Persian names, and the fulness of his details on many matters which would be quite outside of the sphere of interest of an ordinary Greek. The information we get from Ctesias, the Greek court physician of the next generation, does not give us a high idea of the sources of information open to, or of the accuracy of, the Greek hangers-on of the Great King.

(2) Herodotus' own tone is always that of one who speaks with authority, and who considers he has sure

[1] The references to Ctesias are given to Bähr's edition, 1824; the text published with the history of Herodotus (Paris. F. Didot, 1844) seems the edition most generally used, but it is very inaccessible. Valueless as the works of Ctesias are, a critical edition in a cheap and handy form would be of great convenience to students of Graeco-Oriental history.

sources of information. Of course this second argument will be worthless to those who look on Herodotus as an inquirer prepared to accept any information, and prepared also to maintain it was the best information, simply because he had it.

The assumption that Herodotus had real and special sources of information as to Persian affairs, and the still more probable assumption that he did not find these when himself in the East, lead us to the conclusion that Herodotus must have met nearer home persons qualified to give him accurate and detailed information on Oriental matters, under circumstances which permitted him to question them carefully: such a source of information it is usually supposed that he found in Demaratus (cf. Matzat, *Hermes* vi. p. 479 *seq.*, and others), who may well have furnished Herodotus with many of his details as to Xerxes' invasion. The object of this paper is to suggest another and even more important source for his inner history of the Persian Court.

The passage in Herodotus, from which my argument starts, is of considerable importance; he ends Bk. III. (c. 160) with the words 'the son of this Megabyzus was Zopyrus, who went over to Athens as a deserter from the Persians.'

The date of this desertion and its significance will be considered later; here it is necessary to emphasize the fact that Zopyrus, if Herodotus really met him, is exactly the informant who satisfies the conditions of our inquiry, for he was one who was certainly able to give Herodotus the information desired, and one moreover who was likely to give it just in the form in which Herodotus reproduces it.

The reasons for holding this are obvious:—

(1) Zopyrus belonged to the inner circle of the Persian Court. He was the grandson of Amestris, the terrible wife of Xerxes, and the nephew of that monarch. Hence he would have known intimately the whole dark history of court intrigues, and his story as told us by Ctesias (especially 29. 42-3) corresponds exactly to the picture of cruelty and lust on which Herodotus just lifts the curtain.

(2) He was the son of Megabyzus, one of Xerxes' six generals in chief against Greece (vii. 82, 121). Hence he was in a position to know the full details of the Persian army list, which Herodotus gives us at such length in Bk. VII. Moreover this connexion would give him the detailed knowledge of the stages of the Royal Road which Herodotus reproduces from some Persian source in Bk. V. (cc. 52-3).

It may be added that the arrogant suggestion of an attack on Susa, which accompanies the account of the Royal Road (v. 49), is quite in keeping with the character of a Persian prince whose Hellenic sympathies have led him to desert his country. It is of course quite out of place in the mouth of the Ionian Aristagoras, who wanted only defence against the Great King.

(3) His grandfather (of the same name) had been governor of Babylon, and of the resources of this satrapy Herodotus had full information (i. 192, iii. 92); it must be added, however, that Herodotus gives these as they were under the satraps that succeeded the elder Zopyrus.

It will be seen then that Zopyrus had special facilities for giving official information on two of the points (*i.e.* the Army and the Royal Road) where Herodotus preserves it; and that on the third point, the organization of the Empire, he had also some special qualifications for giving information, though not to so marked an extent as on the two previous matters.

When we turn from Herodotus' information as to the present resources of Persia to his accounts of its past history, Zopyrus again fits in with the requirements of our inquiry. Herodotus of course had far too much information as to Persian history to have derived it exclusively from any one source. But on two important episodes at least Zopyrus was a particularly qualified witness.

(1) Herodotus' account of the conspiracy against the Pseudo-Smerdis is in marked contrast to that of Ctesias in the accuracy of its names, and (perhaps it may be added) in the general correctness of its outline.

Now the grandfather and the namesake of the deserting Zopyrus had been one of the Seven Conspirators; the story of that crisis in Persian history must have been a tradition in his family, and Herodotus may well have heard it from the grandson. This supposition throws considerable light on one of the most disputed passages in Herodotus. If we assume that the historian obtained from Zopyrus the famous account of the debate of the Seven as to possible forms of government, we have at once an explanation of the curious and surprising insistency with which the historian maintains the accuracy of his version (iii. 80, vi. 43), and also of its very un-Oriental character. Modern critics rightly agree with the sceptics of Herodotus' own day in doubting the authenticity of the speeches, said to have been then delivered. Full of interest as these speeches are, they are interesting as giving us Greek political ideas of the fifth century, and not as reproducing the sentiments of Persian grandees of the sixth century. But the colouring is not that of Herodotus himself: it is clearly derived from some informant, whom he considers of special value. If we attribute the whole version to an occidentalized Persian, who was yet the grandson of one of the conspirators, we have a full and sufficient explanation at once of Herodotus' mistaken confidence and of the curiously misplaced colouring which has offended critics from Herodotus' own day to our own.[1]

Again if we suppose that Zopyrus was Herodotus' infor-

[1] I submit that this explanation of the well-known difficulty as to these speeches is far more satisfactory than the view that sees in them an instance of the composite character of Herodotus' work. Maass, *e.g.* (*Hermes* xxii. 581 *seq.*), on the strength of a supposed parallel in Isocrates, argues that the historian has here introduced some of the 'negative arguments' (καταβάλλοντες λόγοι) of his contemporary Protagoras. His theory has not a scrap of evidence in its favour, and E. Meyer (*Forsch.* i. 201-2) well says 'Maass makes Herodotus a simpleton, if he imagines that he could impose on the public as historical facts inventions of his good friend Protagoras.' Moreover the theory ignores Herodotus' insistence on his own accuracy, which is surely a most important point.

mant as to the conspiracy, we get a reasonable explanation of the serious blunder with which Herodotus concludes his story. The historian is ignorant of the real claim of Darius to the throne, and makes his winning it the result of a trick (iii. 84 f.). This perversion is exactly what we should expect from a Persian whose father and himself had alike suffered at the hands of the Achaemenid family. Herodotus' informant about the conspiracy no doubt knew the facts as to Darius' accession, but did not choose to draw the attention of the Greek historian to them. If anything is clear as to the inner history of Persia at this time, it is that certain noble houses resented the predominance of one royal family, and that Megabyzus was conspicuous for this independence. I must return to this point later, but we may notice the same colouring in the remark with which Herodotus introduces his story of Cyrus: 'Following the report of some of the Persians, those I mean who do not desire to glorify the history of Cyrus, but to speak that which is really true' (i. 95). The story that follows corresponds to this introduction: Herodotus ignores the royal descent of Cyrus from Achaemenes, although in Bk. VII. 11 he has rightly recorded the names of the Achaemenid family.

The other episode of Persian history which here especially concerns us is the story of the second capture of Babylon in Bk. III. (cc. 153 *seq.*). It will be obvious to anyone that this account as a whole is just such as might be expected from the grandson of the man who is the hero of the story, and there are certain points in it which look like a special family tradition, *e.g.* the details as to the mule prodigy in c. 153, and as to the special honours to Zopyrus in c. 160—'no one of the Persians surpassed Zopyrus in good service, either of those who came after or of those who had gone before, excepting Cyrus alone.'

Of the historic value of the story about the capture of Babylon I shall speak later. So far I have tried to show that Zopyrus the deserter is exactly the informant from whom Herodotus might have derived important passages in his

work, and that certain features in the narrative are more easily explained, if we suppose he did so derive them, than on any other supposition.

There is one more passage in Herodotus which may well have come from Zopyrus, *i.e.* the account of the unsuccessful attempt of the Persian Sataspes to circumnavigate Africa (iv. 43). This account presents just the same features as some of those which have been already considered, *i.e.* there is an intimate knowledge of the relationships of the inner court circle of Susa, and of the cruelty and lust which prevailed there. The offence of Sataspes was committed against the daughter of Zopyrus the captor of Babylon, and may well have been one of the causes which stirred his grandson to hatred and jealousy of the Achaemenidae. Some suggest, however, that Herodotus' source here is revealed in his concluding words: he describes how the servant of Sataspes after his master's death escaped to Samos, and there was robbed by a Samian whose name Herodotus knew, though he considerately suppresses it. This part of the story must have been heard by Herodotus in Samos, but it is not unlikely that he adds it to his main narrative, as confirming from an independent Samian source what he had himself learned from one who was in the most intimate way concerned in the story.

But it is now necessary to consider if Herodotus were likely to have met the younger Zopyrus or indeed could have met him.

To answer this question we must consider the date of the Persian's desertion. All our information as to this is derived from Ctesias.[1] Now that author seems, speaking generally, about the most untrustworthy of our ancient authorities, and in his account of the events that now concern us, he is clearly wrong on some points, *e.g.* he contradicts Thucydides as to the name of the place where Inarus and the Greeks in Egypt offered their last resistance to the Persians; he calls it Byblus (29. 34), Thuc. (i. 109) calls it Prosopitis.

[1] Bähr's ed. (1824) secs. 33-43 (pp. 72-5).

But it is obvious that Ctesias had means of knowing the inner history of the Persian court, however badly he used those means at times; he was physician there in the generation after the events he is describing; and, as he had this department of his subject mainly to himself, he was not liable in his details as to court-scandals to be misled by the burning desire to contradict Herodotus, which was so misleading to him in his account of more important events. And his narrative as to Megabyzus and Zopyrus is consistent in its main outlines with what we know elsewhere, and is confirmed in one important point by an undesigned coincidence with Herodotus. Ctesias makes Megabyzus die at the age of 76 (*sec.* 41); this advanced age agrees with Herodotus' account of that veteran, that (vii. 82) he was one of the six commanders-in-chief of the army of Xerxes in 480 B.C.

Assuming then, as is generally done, that Ctesias may be depended on for these personal details, we have the following data for determining the chronology of the family of Zopyrus. Megabyzus reduced Egypt, and received the submission on terms of Inarus and the Greeks in 454, probably early in the summer of that year (so Busolt, iii. p. 330). The vengeance of Amestris was delayed for five years, but in the end the safe conduct was violated, Inarus was impaled, and the Greek prisoners were executed. This must have happened then about 450. Megabyzus, angry at the violation of the terms arranged by him, proceeded to revolt in his satrapy of Syria, and fought two campaigns against his royal master. It may well be that the renewed attack of the Greeks on Cyprus under Cimon (spring of 449) was connected with this civil war in the Persian Empire, and that the reconciliation of the rebel satrap with Artaxerxes, which followed in the year 448, was a part of the same negotiations which led to the agreement (whether definitely concluded or simply tacitly understood) loosely called the 'Peace of Callias,' or the 'Peace of Cimon.'

It is surely permissible to conjecture that the Greek victories had their natural effect at the Persian court and

led to division of opinion there; one section of its grandees would urge that Persian policy should be modified, and that the victorious Occidentals should be conciliated; another section would be confirmed by disaster in the old national traditions. If such a division took place, Megabyzus was clearly the head of the Hellenizing party in Persia; this is seen in his conciliatory attitude in Egypt, and agrees with the story of Ctesias (in itself improbable) that he had declined to attack Delphi when ordered by Xerxes (*sec.* 27) to do so after the Battle of Salamis. The *de facto* suspension of hostilities between Athens and the Great King marked the triumph of the policy of Megabyzus; but so far as he personally was concerned, the Great King was not disposed to overlook his independent spirit, and the too successful general, having once more offended Artaxerxes, by interference in his hunting, was banished for five years (*secs.* 40-41). This banishment may be conjectured to have taken place about the end of 448, in which case the final restoration of Megabyzus to favour would fall about 443.

Ctesias gives no hint how soon his death followed, but goes on to tell of the misconduct of his widow Amytis and of her lingering illness and death. We can only guess at the length of time required for these events, which were immediately followed by the desertion of Zopyrus, but they can easily be fitted into two years, and the desertion of Zopyrus will then fall about 440. This year is probable in itself, for it is obvious from Thucydides' (i. 115) account of the Samian revolt that the war party at the Persian court had the upper hand in that year. That there was a connection between the desertion of Zopyrus and the general relations of Athens and Persia is not generally recognized; but it is probable in itself, and it is confirmed by the parallel events of the next generation, when, if we may trust Andocides (*de Pace* 29; cf. Busolt, iii. 1354, 1417), hostilities with the Great King were precipitated by the Athenian alliance with the rebel Amorges in Caria (cf. Thuc. viii. 5). Perhaps the relation may be one of cause, and not of effect as has been suggested above, and the

desertion of Zopyrus may have led to the intrigues of Pissuthnes (Thuc. i. 115) against Athens, not been caused by them. In this case we should have to antedate the desertion by a year, *i.e.* place it about 441. The point cannot be settled, but either date, 441 or 440, can be fitted in with the narrative of Ctesias.

The sequel of that narrative confirms materially the political importance which has been assigned above to the conduct of Zopyrus. He went, we are told (*sec.* 43), with the Athenians against Caunus in Caria, and there met his death when endeavouring to negotiate the surrender of that town to the Athenians. This expedition most probably was connected with the troubles caused by the Samian revolt; Pericles (Thuc. i. 116) himself made a demonstration in the direction of Caunus in 440, and we know from the quota lists that there was something like a general revolt in the 'Carian quarter' of the Athenian Empire at this period (Busolt iii. 554). So far as concerns Zopyrus and Caunus, we know (if we may trust Ctesias) that Caunus remained for a short time under the authority of the Great King, for Amestris was able to impale the unlucky Caunian whose hands had cast the deadly stone against her traitorous grandson. But Caunus was again under Athenian authority in 436, when it figures at the head of the list of the 'Ionian Tribute' payers;[1] hence the death of Zopyrus must certainly fall before this year. Perhaps we may suggest that the cruelty of Amestris worked for Athens more effectually than the arms of Zopyrus; it was not likely to stimulate loyalty to the Great King, when his subjects were impaled for too successful a resistance to a traitor, because that traitor was of royal blood. It seems therefore that we may date the death of Zopyrus with fair confidence at the end of 440 or early in 439. It must come in before the reduction of Samos and the restitution of the status-quo with Persia. Pericles, then at the height of his influence, was not likely after this to provoke Persia by reckless expeditions against Caria (cf. Busolt, iii. 544-5).

[1] Hicks and Hill (1901) No. 48.

To sum up then this part of the argument. The desertion of Zopyrus was not a mere personal freak: it was the act of a Persian prince whose family had shown Hellenic prejudices before, and it was connected with political events of great importance; it probably took place in 441 or 440, and his death followed within a year.

Before discussing the bearing of these dates on the life of Herodotus, I must first refer to two other (and varying) dates which have been assigned for the desertion of Zopyrus.

Rawlinson (*ad loc.* iii, 160) says: 'this is probably the latest event mentioned by Herodotus. It is mentioned by Ctesias almost immediately before the death of Artaxerxes, *and so* belongs most likely to the year 426 or 425.' The 'and so' begs the whole question; there is no causal connection between what Ctesias says of Zopyrus and what he says of Artaxerxes, and it is most difficult to fit an Athenian expedition against Caria into the years 426 and 425. Moreover, had Herodotus known of the death of Zopyrus, he would almost certainly have mentioned it; and it seems that he must have known, had it happened after his return to Athens about 432: this point, however, will be dealt with later.

Kirchhoff refers incidentally to the desertion of Zopyrus in his famous paper 'Die Entstehungszeit des Herodotischen Geschichtwerks' (*Abh. K.P.A.*, 1878, p. 16), and calculates it, from the data given by Ctesias, as falling between 445 and 431 (which is obviously true), but much 'nearer the latter date than the former;' this latter statement is, I think I have shown, quite unproven. Kirchhoff uses the point simply to prove that Herodotus wrote the end of Bk. III. at a later period than the first two and a half books; the desertion, he argues, is one of the events of which Herodotus was not aware when he went to Thurii, and of which he heard on his return to Athens about 432. But Kirchhoff quite fails to consider the connection of the Zopyrus episode with the general course of events, and he omits also to notice what seems to be by far the most important point in which it bears on the question of the date when Herodotus composed his work.

It is this point omitted by Kirchhoff that must now be considered. Herodotus knows half the story told by Ctesias, but not the whole of it: he gives us the desertion of Zopyrus, but not his death in the Athenian service. Now this might well be thought to be a far more significant omission than any of the others in Herodotus' history on which Kirchhoff lays such great stress. I cannot think that if Herodotus had known, when he wrote Book III. 160, the tragic end of Zopyrus' chequered career, he would have omitted to chronicle it. It presents an exact parallel to the story of Sophanes at Plataea (ix. 75) or to that of the diviner Hegesistratus (ix. 37); after mentioning both of these, Herodotus tells the story of their deaths, though it has no bearing on the context in which he introduces them. Other instances could be given, but these are sufficient.

If, however, we suppose that Herodotus left Athens for the West in 440, it becomes much easier to understand why no record is given of the subsequent story of Zopyrus. Moreover a good and sufficient reason can be suggested why the historian should have started on his travels again just at this time.

If anything can be stated as certain as to the life and interests of Herodotus, it is that he had a close connection with Samos, and a great affection for that island and its inhabitants. Samos and the Samians play a larger part in his history than any other Greek city except Athens and perhaps Sparta, and the historian is invariably a 'little blind to their faults,' and 'very kind to their virtues.' Hence it is surely not carrying conjecture far to suppose that Herodotus was deeply grieved to see Athens and Samos at deadly enmity, and his own friend, the poet Sophocles, in command against his former Ionian home. We may therefore date with some confidence Herodotus' departure for Thurii as taking place in 440.

It is true that Strabo (p. 656) says that Herodotus 'took part in the colony to Thurii,' and that Suidas (*s.v.* Ἡρόδοτος) says he went ἐς τὸ Θούριον ἀποικιζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων—'when it was being colonized by the Athenians;'

but even if it were necessary to attach great importance to the exact words of these authorities—and in the case of Suidas at any rate, the notice of Herodotus is full of demonstrable inaccuracies—their words are quite consistent with the view that he joined the colony three or four years after it had been sent out. No one would hesitate to count John Harvard among the 'founders of New England,' although he did not sail with the Pilgrim Fathers in 1620.

The connection of Herodotus and Zopyrus then may be briefly conjectured to have been as follows; Zopyrus, arriving in Athens in 441 or 440, would naturally come into contact with one who like himself had been a Persian subject, and who knew far more about things oriental than any other Greek, resident in Athens at the time. We can imagine the historian eagerly drawing from this noble Persian full details as to official arrangements and as to court secrets, which he had failed to obtain when himself on his travels in the East. We need only suppose that they spent some months together at Athens; then Herodotus sailed for the West, to avoid seeing the end of a struggle between two cities, both of which he had reason to love, while Zopyrus again turned his face eastward to meet his death. When Herodotus returned again to Athens, events had taken quite a new turn, and we can well understand why Herodotus never completed his story of Zopyrus, even though we accept the conjecture that he owed to him much important and valuable information.

Before I end this paper, it may be worth while to consider the accuracy of one important section of the information which Herodotus, as we suppose, derived from Zopyrus, *i.e.* the episode of the capture of Babylon which ends Bk. III. It is unnecessary to recapitulate the well-known details in Herodotus as to the desperate resistance of Babylon, the hopeless position of Darius, and the self-devotion by which the elder Zopyrus saved his king from a most difficult situation. I propose only to consider the two great criticisms which are brought against Herodotus' narrative :—

(1) It is maintained by many that he has completely misunderstood his authorities, and that he ascribes to Darius a siege which really was carried out by Xerxes.

(2) The whole story of the self-devotion of Zopyrus is rejected as a fable.

These two criticisms must be discussed separately. The first criticism is practically that urged long ago by Ctesias; he, we are told, related of Megabyzus the story told by Herodotus of the elder Zopyrus. Sayce (*ad loc.*) seems to attach some weight to the evidence of Ctesias; but no one is likely, I think, to be seriously influenced by Ctesias as a witness against, or by Sayce as a critic of, Herodotus.

Other historians who ascribe the siege to Xerxes are Nöldeke (doubtfully in *E.B.* 9th ed., xviii. p. 572) and Lehmann-Haupt (*Woch. für Klass Phil.* 1900, p. 963). The reasons are:—

(1) It is impossible to fit a siege of 'twenty months' (the duration given by Herodotus iii. 153) into the narrative of the Behistun Inscription.

(2) Lehmann-Haupt tries to fit in Herodotus' 'twenty months' with the dates of Babylonian inscriptions of the time of Xerxes. But his attempt, though ingenious, will not convince anyone who does not wish beforehand to be convinced; there are at least two uncertain quantities in his equation. In fact the evidence from the Babylonian inscriptions is actually used by Maspero (*Hist. Anc.* iii. p. 677, n.) on the opposite side to Lehmann-Haupt, *i.e.* to support the date in Herodotus.

(3) The third argument is that the cruelty of the victor (Herodotus iii. 159) after taking Babylon is more in keeping with the character of Xerxes than with that of Darius.

It will be obvious that of these three arguments only the first is worth anything. If the Behistun Inscription contradicts Herodotus, no one will maintain his accuracy against it. But does it contradict Herodotus? Lehmann-Haupt (*ut sup.*) and E. Meyer (*G. des A.* i. 614) say that it does; Duncker and Maspero (*ut sup.*) say that it does not. I

will quote the words of the inscription (col. II. par. I.) 'says Darius the King. Then Nidintabelus with a few horsemen fled to Babylon. Then I went to Babylon. By the grace of Ormazd I both took Babylon and seized that Nidintabelus. Afterwards I slew that Nidintabelus at Babylon.'[1]

So far the narrative goes decidedly against Herodotus; taken by itself it would seem to imply a speedy capture of the rebel city. But the next paragraph points as decidedly the other way: 'While I was at Babylon, these are the countries which revolted against me: Persia, Susiana, Media, Assyria, Armenia, Parthia, Margiana, Sattagydia, Sacia.' Clearly the siege of Babylon was a long business. It is not necessary to accept Herodotus' 'twenty months,' though they may be accurate; but surely it is unreasonable to reject his whole story, and to suppose that he committed so gross a blunder and made such a foolish confusion about an important event that happened only some forty years before his birth.

On the whole then the evidence against Herodotus' accuracy on this point seems quite insufficient to outweigh the a priori probability that he knew what he was writing about.

With regard to the story of the self-mutilation of Zopyrus, I hope that I shall not be thought unduly credulous when I say that it seems to me, though no doubt exaggerated, to contain a solid basis of truth.

The arguments against it are:—

(1) It is not mentioned in the Behistun Inscription. If it had been ever so true, would it have been mentioned? It was much more creditable to Darius the king to take towns by the 'grace of Ormazd' than by the mutilation of Zopyrus.

(2) But it is urged, no mutilated man could have been set over the province of Babylon. We need not take Herodotus too literally in his details; Zopyrus probably

[1] Col. ii., par. i., Rawlinson *Herodotus* iii., 597.

made himself 'noseless' and 'earless' pretty much in the sense in which

'Earless on high stood unabashed Defoe.'

But I have no doubt he gave himself some permanent scars. Who would have been offended by these but the Babylonians, whose feelings Darius was not very likely to spare?

(3) But it will be urged the story is a well-known legend. Sir H. Rawlinson writes: 'The story told by Polyaenus (and Herodotus) is in its minutest features identical with a certain standard oriental tale told by the bards of Persia, India, and Cashmeer.' But all these stories are long subsequent to Herodotus, and may well be as much echoes from his narrative as is that of Livy about the self-mutilation of Sextus Tarquinius (i. 54).

Polyaenus[1] tells us that Zopyrus was copying the self-devotion of a Sacan Risaces, who had tried to destroy in this way the army of Darius. This story is quite independent of Herodotus, and may be held to confirm his narrative at least as much as to refute it.

For the story in its main outlines it may be urged:—

(1) That apart from Herodotus and Polyaenus, it is told by Frontinus (*Strat.* iii. 3, who puts it in the time of Cyrus) and by Justin (i. 10); Ctesias obviously told the same story, though in his violent antagonism to Herodotus he misdated it.

(2) That Zopyrus was made ruler of Babylon is an undoubted fact.

(3) If we can accept the story, it suits its context well. Darius was in a hopeless position, with an impregnable town to capture and an empire falling into greater revolt every day. The self-devotion of Zopyrus had an adequate motive and an adequate result.

The second and easy capture of Babylon by Intaphernes (Beh. Inscript. iii. 14) is easily explicable. The walls of the town had been breached in all directions, and it was about as indefensible as Liége in Scott's *Quentin Durward*.

[1] vii. 11, sec. 8.

I am conscious that in maintaining the accuracy of Herodotus as to the siege of Babylon, I am distracting attention from the main arguments of this paper. The two points are only partially connected. It is quite possible to accept the view that Herodotus derived important information from the younger Zopyrus, even if we also feel ourselves compelled to convict Herodotus of undue credulity in accepting the whole of his stories.

I am also conscious that the first part of my paper consists of a series of hypotheses. In the fragmentary state of our evidence, no other method of inquiry is possible. I hope, however, that some of them may be thought to throw light on a difficult and important subject.



VI.

Miltiades, Son of Cimon (till the time of Marathon)

THE 50 years of Athenian history before the battle of Marathon are a period of especial attraction; in them the foundations of Athenian greatness were laid, and we have enough good information to enable us to understand something of the development; but our information is so fragmentary that it leaves ample room for conjecture. The object of this paper is to try to put together what we know of one of the empire-builders, and to see if, by the conjunction, any new light can be thrown on the events of the time.

It is an accepted fact that Athens was beginning to be a commercial power in the early years of the sixth century. It is also certain that one of the factions at Athens was that of the Parali, the party of the merchants; the leadership of this party is assigned to Megacles the Alcmaeonid alike by Herodotus,[1] by 'Aristotle' and by Plutarch. The first suggestion I wish to make is that a leading position in this party must probably be assigned also to the head of the great house of the Philaidae, the rivals of the Alcmaeonidae; the head of the Philaidae in the middle of the sixth century would be Miltiades, the son of Cypselus. Herodotus, from whom all the other accounts derive, uses of him the word ἐδυνάστευε (vi. 35 *ad init.*), but says nothing of a connection with the party of the Parali; this silence, however, is what we should expect, for the historian's main source of information as to the Peisistratid period in Athens was clearly Alcmaeonid, and as such would be likely to make little of any prominent position taken by a member of the rival house.

The important part played by the Philaidae in the development of the Athenian empire renders the suggestion

[1] Hdt. i. 59, A. *P.* 13, Plut. *Solon*, c. 29.

likely; and it may be supported by the connection of the Philaid family with the great tyrant house at Corinth,[1] the Cypselidae, whose influence on the commercial development of Greece is not the least element in their greatness. Just as the rival Alcmaeonid house formed a marriage alliance in the middle of the sixth century with the tyrants of Sicyon, so a member of the Philaid house may well have married a daughter of the Corinthian house in the previous generation. The Philaidae, moreover, are like their great rivals in their connection with the wealthy monarch of Lydia.[2] This connection has no direct bearing on the suggested position of the family; as leaders of an important faction at Athens, they might have had relations with Asiatic rulers in many other ways beside trade and commerce; it is only quoted here as showing that Alcmaeonids and Philaids have more than one point of resemblance.

Is it too fanciful to refer here to the curious names of the family as possibly illustrating their commercial connections?[3] 'Miltiades' belongs to that class of Greek names which, like Myronides and Ampelidas, seem not to be derived from the name of a divinity, or from any physical or moral quality, but to be patronymics from an article of commerce; we may compare such familiar English names as Smithson and Wrightson. So, too, 'Cypselus' is unusual, connected as it is with an article of furniture.

If the conjecture that Miltiades was one of the leaders of the Parali be justified, it may furnish a plausible motive for the action of Peisistratus in sending on an important

[1] Apart from the fact that the name 'Cypselus' is common to both families, which itself is important evidence, there is their probable connection through Hippocleides, the archon of 566; Marcellinus (*Vita Thuc.* 3) is clearly wrong in making this man the father of Miltiades; but the family tree which he gives is probably a confused reproduction of a genuine tradition (cf. Macan on Hdt. vi. 128).

[2] Cf. Hdt. 6. 37 for Miltiades, 6. 125 for Alcmaeon.

[3] It may be urged against this point that the name 'Miltiades' had been in the family for a century before the son of Cypselus. Cf. the archons of 664 and 659 B.C. (Paus. iv. 23. 10; viii. 39. 3).

expedition a man who was avowedly hostile to his rule. (Hdt. 6. 35 *ad fin.*) The choice would not only have been prompted by a desire to use abroad an element that was dangerous at home;[1] it may also have been due to the fact that Miltiades had trading connections with the Chersonese, and so would be especially likely to succeed in his important and dangerous mission. It is no disrespect to Herodotus thus to add a political motive to the obviously ethical motives of his delightful narrative. Miltiades is by him rewarded for his ready and open-handed hospitality by the assured prospect of a tyrant's crown; but we may be confident that Peisistratus and the Delphic oracle had more tangible motives in selecting their oecist for the Chersonese.

The whole story of the setting up of an Athenian tyrant among a barbarian people is a very curious one, and illustrates a side of Greek life of which we hear too little, but which must have been of great importance in Greece generally, though it was hardly a common feature at Athens. The bold settler, the opener-up of barbarian lands, willing to intermarry with 'barbarian races,' may well have been a familiar figure in the age of Greek colonization, just as he has been in the development of the British Empire; Miltiades among the Dolonci in the Chersonese will remind Englishmen of Rajah Brooke among the Dyaks of Borneo; a still nearer parallel is furnished by the family of the other great Athenian empire-builder Themistocles, whose mother was certainly barbarian, though whether Thracian or Carian his biographers could not agree (Plut. *Them.* i).

If the especial connection of the Philaid house with the Chersonese rests, for the period before Miltiades the son of Cypselus, on conjecture only, it is remarkably constant afterwards. Apart from the continuous rule there of the

[1] This employment abroad of discontented or persecuted elements is a very familiar feature in history; the foundation of the United States furnishes parallels in the Pilgrim Fathers, in the Roman Catholics in Maryland, and in the Quakers in Pennsylvania.

oecist himself (Hdt. 6. 36-9) and of his nephews, Stesagoras and Miltiades, son of Cimon, we can place in the same connection the conquest of Lemnos, one of the keys of the Chersonese (Hdt. 6. 137-140), by the younger Miltiades, the activity of his son Cimon (Plut. *Cimon* c. 9) there about 470 B.C., an exploit to which Cimon himself attached, Plutarch tells us, the greatest importance, and also his capture of Scyros, another of the keys of the Hellespontine route. So, too, when Cimon was banished from Athens, he took up his abode in the Chersonese.[1]

There is, moreover, a piece of archaeological evidence which, though uncertain, may give some contemporary confirmation of the importance of the Philaidae in the Chersonese even earlier than the fifth century. The Chersonese was important, then as now, as the key to the Black Sea. Some of the Attic vases dated at the end of the Black Figure period, and also some of those of the Early Red period, show a new type, *i.e.* men in Scythian dress yet with unmistakably Greek faces. The most recent explanation of these is that of Plassart[2] that they represent young Athenians of birth and wealth, serving as *ὑπήρεται* (may we say as a sort of 'squire'?) to their elders; he himself attributes the Scythic dress with its high cap, its trousers marked with lozenges and zigzags, and the bow and arrows, to an imitation of the Ionian vases, on which the horsemen of the Steppes were a familiar ornament. He compares for Athenian cosmopolitanism the well-known passage of 'Xenophon' (*De Rep. Ath.* 2. 8) which says that at the end of the fifth century the Athenians *χρῶνται φωνῇ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ σχήματι . . κεκραμένῃ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων.* But there seems no particular reason why the Athenians at

[1] Andocides *de Pace* 3. This is part of the well-known passage which is reproduced, at times verbally, by Aeschines (*de Falsa Leg.* 183). It is full of mistakes, but, as it obviously represents the view of Athenian history held by one of the upper classes, it is good evidence as to the position and the possessions of the great leader of the aristocracy, Cimon.

[2] *Rev. des Études Grec.*, 1913, pp. 172 f.

this time should have borrowed this motive from Ionia. On the other hand if Athens, during the last generation of the sixth century, was beginning to open up direct relations with the Black Sea through the Chersonese, we at once get a reason for the Scythic dress on the vases.[1]

Thirty years ago Winter[2] suggested a connection between these vases and the Philaid rule in the Chersonese; but he supposed that the Athenians would have come across the Scythic dress in the peninsula itself, which is not likely. The new sphere of Athenian influence, however, may well have extended into the Black Sea, and in this modified form his theory may be looked on as probable. There is one vase especially—No. 310 in the Ashmolean—which may be quoted in this connection. It is an early red-figured Πίναξ, with the portrait of a handsome young rider in Scythian[3] dress, and has the inscription καλὸς Μιλτιάδης. Of course it is impossible to assert positively that the portrait is that of the younger Miltiades himself, but it may well be so; Wernicke sums up of these 'Lieblingsnamen' that, when they 'refer to actual persons, they are sometimes young aristocrats of whose beauty and pranks the whole town was gossiping';[4] this may well have been true of Miltiades, the son of Cimon, about 520 B.C. At any rate both Professor Gardner and Plassart take it to be not improbably a portrait of Miltiades. If this be so, then the relations of the Philaids with the Chersonese receive valuable illustration, and the younger Miltiades is brought into an interesting connection with Scythia, which may throw some light on the most important event in his early career. Of course I refer to the well-known scene at the Bridge over the Danube, described by Herodotus

[1] With the vases is always compared the fragmentary figure of a rider, discovered on the Acropolis and put together in 1887; this is usually dated after 490, but may well be earlier. (Plassart *u.s.* p. 183.)

[2] *Arch. Jahrb.* viii. 1893, pp. 135 f.

[3] Plate 13 in P. Gardner's *Greek vases in the Ashmolean Museum* (pp. 30-31); Gardner calls the dress 'Persian,' not 'Scythian.'

[4] Quoted in *J.H.S.* xi. 353, 1890.

(4. 137), when Miltiades is said to have proposed to complete the Scythian victory by the destruction of the Bridge.

I need not even summarise here a story which is so well known. The question is—has the scene any historical reality? If the argument in the previous pages have any value, it is clear that it contributes to the probability that the Herodotean account represents something which actually happened, and which is not a mere Philaid invention, derived from the pleadings of the advocates of Miltiades at his trial in 489 B.C. This suggested origin of the story, however, which denies it any historic value, has been widely accepted ever since Thirlwall[1] threw doubts on the account of Herodotus, and it must, I think, be called the accepted view at present.[2] I wish, therefore, briefly to discuss the credibility of Herodotus' narrative.

In the first place, it may be urged that it is dangerous to reject a story for which Herodotus certainly could have had the evidence of contemporaries, and which remained unquestioned in antiquity; and secondly the story concerns many others besides Miltiades; the whole career of Histiaeus[3] turns on it (v. 11) and to a less degree that of Coes of Mytilene. It is a strong measure to refuse to believe a narrative which has been accepted for 2,000 years. This is all the more dangerous when the story is to the credit of a party leader who failed himself, and whose party steadily lost ground in the century of Herodotus. Is it credible that Herodotus' Alcmaeonid friends would have let a story pass unquestioned which exalted the greatest man of the rival house? But Herodotus never even hints that the story was questioned.

Obst's attempt (*Klio. ix.* 413-5) to show by 'Quellen-Kritik' that Miltiades' name was not in the original list

[1] *Hist. of Greece*, ii. 393 *seq.*

[2] So Macan (1895) ii. p. 46; Bury and Meyer, *G. des A.* iii. 115. Busolt and Grote, however, accept the story of Herodotus.

[3] Thirlwall accepts the statements in the story about Histiaeus; this can be done without accepting the part as to Miltiades, but it is more natural to think the story stands or falls as a whole.

used by Herodotus for his narrative in iv. 138, but was inserted after 493, is based on mere assumptions and proves nothing at all.

But the story is considered to be completely inconsistent with its sequel in Herodotus' own narrative. Thirlwall says (ii. 394) 'we know from Herodotus that (Miltiades) remained for many years in quiet possession of his principality, neither molested by the Persians nor apparently dreading any attack from them.' If this be a fact, then the Bridge story must be given up, while Herodotus is convicted of a strange lack of intelligence in failing to see the inconsistency of his narrative. The 'fact,' however, is based only on the silence of Herodotus, who never mentions that Miltiades had fled from the wrath of the Great King, and on the interpretation of a much disputed chapter—vi. 40—where both the reading and the sense are uncertain.

This must now be discussed, and I think it can be fairly maintained that there is nothing in it inconsistent with the view that Miltiades left the Chersonese after the Scythian Expedition of Darius—a fact of which there is evidence elsewhere. As to the 'silence' of Herodotus a suggestion will also be made; but certainly it seems impossible to think that Herodotus meant in vi. 40 to imply that Miltiades was quietly enjoying his tyranny through the last decade of the sixth century, when in the very next chapter (vi. 41) he lays stress on the Persian king's well-founded grudge against him.

To deal now in detail with this much disputed chapter,[1] it may be admitted at once that it is a model of obscurity, very unlike the usual clear style of the historian; in fact, if the MSS. text be retained, τούτων in § i. is meaningless. It is a curious point that there is a similar abruptness and obscurity in v. 27. 2, where the fortunes of Miltiades after the Scythian Expedition might also not unnaturally have been described; here the sequence of events is so puzzling

[1] See Macan *ad loc.* for an elaborate analysis of the different views as to it.

that Hude marks a lacuna. Is it a mere coincidence that in both these passages, where Herodotus might have described for us the career of Miltiades during the ten or fifteen years following the Scythian Expedition of Darius, he is most unusually obscure? It surely may be suggested that he had intended to deal more fully with the matter in one of them, but had not decided in which. Hence the survival of the rough notes in all their obscurity.

However this may be, I wish to suggest the following points as to the interpretation of this puzzling chapter :—

(1) There is no reason to doubt the reading *καταλαβόντων*, which is given by the better MSS.; the *κατεχόντων* of the inferior MSS. clearly comes from the first line of the next chapter.

(2) Herodotus seems to wish to compare two disasters in the life of Miltiades, both of them (cf. vi. 41. 1) previous to his flight at the end of the Ionic Revolt. These two may naturally be explained as his flight from the Persians, say about 512 B.C., and his flight from the Scyths about 494 B.C. I do not claim for one moment that these must be the events referred to; I only say that such a reference seems to me the most natural, though the passage is confessedly obscure.

(3) A great but very unnecessary difficulty has been made of *χαλεπώτερα*. How, it is asked, could his flight from the Scyths be called 'more severe' than his flight from the Persians fifteen years before? The answer seems to be the following. Herodotus, strange as it may seem, has a great admiration for the Persians; though he from time to time records (cf. vi. 32; viii. 33) their excesses, they are to him humane and civilised conquerors (cf. vi. 42. 2), not 'beastly barbarians' like the Scyths. It may be fanciful, but this epithet always reminds me of a famous purple patch in Burke's speech on the 'Nabob of Arcot's Debts'[1]: 'Then ensued a scene of woe the like of which no eye had seen. . . . All scenes of horror before known of, were mercy to that new havoc.'

[1] iv. 260; ed. of 1808.

I submit that, especially in view of Herodotus' clear statement in the next chapter as to the wrath of Darius, the natural meaning of vi. 40 is that :—

(1) Miltiades had returned to the Chersonese 'shortly' before 493—we may conjecture at the beginning of the Ionic Revolt in 499.

(2) That he then had to flee from a Scyth raid, which was probably occasioned by the weakening of Persian frontier defence during the Ionic Revolt.

(3) That about 496[1] he was restored by his subjects. I admit that if Herodotus meant to say all of this, he failed to do so. In fact he failed to say anything clearly. But he seems more near to saying this than anything else, and at least the text has not been altered to suit any preconceived notion.

This at any rate was the sense in which Nepos understood Herodotus' narrative (*Vita Milt.* 3. 6), for he makes Miltiades retire at once to Athens on the return of Darius from Scythia. It may well be doubted whether he had here any evidence except the statements of Herodotus; if so, he must have invented 'Athens' as the place of Miltiades' retirement. As a matter of fact it would not have been a particularly safe place of refuge from Persian resentment; for just at this period Hippias was beginning to court the Great King, by his marriage alliance with the tyrant of Lampsacus (Thuc. vi. 59. 3).

On the whole then there seems no reason to doubt the story of the debate at the Ister Bridge; in spite of the silence of Herodotus, we may believe that Miltiades fled, as was natural, before Darius returned from Scythia.[2]

It is during this exile that the most romantic element in the life of Miltiades comes in; he married a Thracian

[1] *τρίτῳ ἔτει πρότερον τῶν τότε κατεχόντων.*

[2] Some have thought a partial solution of the difficulties may be sought in the words of Strabo (xiii. p. 591), who records that some of the cities on the Propontis, including Abydos, were 'burned by Darius on his return from Scythia' because he feared that they might give 'passage' to the 'nomad Scyths preparing to cross' to take vengeance on him. But this passage seems (in spite of

princess,[1] Hegesipyle, the daughter of King Olorus. Certainly this marriage accords well both with the past of Miltiades as it has been described, and with the character of the son born of the marriage. It has been shown that Miltiades may well have had, all through his earlier career, relations with the tribes of the North; and the son of Hegesipyle was Cimon, the most unGreek of all great Greeks; in him we see the love of fighting for fighting's sake, which Aristotle says was the mark of the Northerners (*Pol.* vii. 7. 2. 1327 *a*), and which certainly is not found in any other Greek of the first rank. Cimon's lack of culture (Plut. *Cim.* cc. 4. 15) too, and his want of accomplishments, fit in well with this admixture of the Thracian in him, not to mention his supposed addiction to wine and women (see p. 126).

The significance of these features in the character of Cimon has, so far as I know, never been dwelt upon; but they seem both to throw a considerable light on the great man's history, and also to confirm the traditional story of his birth, as given by Marcellinus: the added touch in that biographer's narrative that Miltiades married the Thracian princess ἐπιθυμῶν δυναστείας, is of course worth nothing; but it does not require much imagination to picture Miltiades as a sort of Greek *condottiere* in the decade before the Ionic Revolt.

As to his part in that movement there is no record except that of his seizure of Lemnos (Hdt. vi. 137-140). The importance of this as a key to the Hellespontine route has already been mentioned; the only point to which I wish to draw attention here is the mythological plea by which Miltiades justified his high-handed action. The story is part of the confused mass of evidence as to the Pelasgians; but it has been pointed out by E. Meyer[2]

Busolt ii. 528) to be in complete confusion; all evidence shows that Darius, when back across the Danube, was master of an unbroken army, not of a panic-stricken mob, and that the power of the Scyths stopped on their own bank of the Danube.

[1] Plut. *Cim.* 4, referring to contemporary poems: he had an Attic wife already (Marcellinus *Life of Thuc.* ii.).

[2] *Forsch.* i. 8 *seq.*

that there is good reason for thinking that it formed no part of genuine Attic tradition; 'personalities are of the very essences of a genuine tradition, in this Pelasgian tale we find not a single name.' Meyer's further speculation that Herodotus is merely correcting Hecataeus is not probable; it is only part of the Hecataeus obsession shared by so many modern scholars. But it surely is not accidental that the scene of the supposed Pelasgian outrage is the Attic deme of Brauron, with which Miltiades was traditionally connected by his Philaid origin (Plut. *Solon* c. 10). It was natural to connect the wrong that he professed to be avenging, with the traditional home of his ancestors.

There are three more pieces of evidence as to Miltiades before the time of Marathon, which have to be considered—his prosecution for tyranny on his return from the Chersonese about 493 (Hdt. vi. 104. 2), the statement of Plutarch (*Them.* 4) that he opposed the naval projects of Themistocles, and the statement of Pausanias (iii. 12. 7) that he caused the Persian herald to be killed. The opposition to Themistocles rests on the authority of Stesimbrotus, which is worth very little; but the story may well be true. The proposal of Themistocles came from the extreme democratic party at Athens, a party with which Miltiades had never been connected; and the same party was likely to look with suspicion on a returned tyrant, who had been sent out by tyrants, and whose family for forty years had been working with the Peisistratidae. The marriage of Miltiades, too, with a barbarian prince's daughter would also, we may be sure, be urged against him. At the same time we may be even more confident that the Alcmaeonidae were concerned in the prosecution; their feud with the Philaidae went on from generation to generation, and it was in the law courts that it was fought out.

Miltiades' triumph over his accusers was, as Herodotus says (vi. 104. 2), the preface to his triumph at Marathon. The words of Herodotus 'Escaping them also in this way, he was appointed general of the Athenians, being elected

by the people,' have been strangely misinterpreted (*e.g.* by Macan), as if Herodotus meant to imply something unusual in the election, *i.e.* that it was not the choice of one tribe only; clearly all that Herodotus means is to contrast ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου with the δικαστήριον that has just preceded. The sense is that the verdict of the people at the polls confirmed their verdict in the courts.

The execution of the herald, so unlike the usual Greek respect for international law, may well be connected with the previous career of Miltiades; he knew that he at least had mortally offended Darius, and that there was no possible mercy for the man who had proposed to abandon the Great King to the Scythians. The story may not be true at all; if it is true, Miltiades' brutality may have had other motives than the wish to commit his countrymen as deeply as he himself was already committed. A similar desperation is seen in the tradition, which, however, is not very probable, that Miltiades proposed at this same crisis the freeing of the Athenian slaves[1] (Paus. vii. 15. 7). What is certain, and much more important than these wild stories, is the Lacedaemonian policy of Miltiades; his strategy was based on an expectation of their help; in this policy he resembles his great son.

The problems of Marathon belong to a new chapter of his life, with which I do not propose to deal, the more so as I feel able to accept almost completely Mr. Munro's brilliant reconstruction of the Marathon campaign.[2] There is one aspect of the battle, however, to which I would briefly refer, because it fits in with my own conception of Miltiades' previous career, and because I think far too little importance has been attached to it.

It is clear that Miltiades won Marathon by his tactics; the whole voice of tradition attributed the victory to him.

[1] These two stories from Pausanias have hardly any evidential value; that as to freeing the slaves especially belongs in its colouring to the end of the fifth century, not to the beginning. They only serve to illustrate the later Greek conception of the character of Miltiades as a fierce semi-barbarian.

[2] *J.H.S.* xix., 1899.

It seems clear also that those tactics were not of the amateur type, which marked most Greek land operations in the fifth century; they were the tactics of a trained soldier, as we should expect from one whose whole life had been connected with the fighting barbarians of the North. What I think has not been sufficiently emphasized, although even in the unmilitary narrative of Herodotus the main idea seems clear, is his wonderful tactical originality; he crushed the Persian force on the wings by a sort of charge in column, taking full advantage of their unfavourable position with the 'little marsh' on their left rear.[1] In this way he partially anticipated the great idea of Epaminondas, which was to revolutionise Greek warfare in the next century. But he was a soldier too much before his time; it was only Pagondas at Delium who, in the long interval between 490 and 371 B.C., fully understood the military significance of the victory of Marathon.

[1] We know that the picture in the Stoa Poecile represented the Persians being driven into the marsh (Paus. i. 15. 3); we conjecture from Hdt. vi. 105 that Pan was supposed to have contributed to the Athenian victory. It seems probable that the 'panic' due to being caught with the marsh behind them, was the main cause for the Persian rout.

VII.

Cimon, the Son of Miltiades[1]

THE creation of the Athenian ἀρχή is in some respects the greatest event in Greek History before Alexander. Themistocles seems to have conceived the idea, and he certainly devised the instruments by which the work was carried out, *i.e.* the great Athenian navy and the fortified harbour of Piraeus; Aristeides furnished the moral force which was usually so lacking in Greek political conceptions, and his arrangements remained a strength to Athens for more than half a century;[2] Pericles organized what his predecessors had won, and justified his alteration in their work—it may equally be called his misappropriation of the revenues they had gained—by the splendid use to which he put these revenues. All this is true; but it is equally true that it was the military genius

[1] I am venturing to publish a few pages on Cimon, not because I have anything new to add to the familiar facts as to his life and work, but because the importance of those facts seems to me to be usually much underestimated, and their relation not always clearly put. I may be blamed for having partly ignored E. Meyer's elaborate study of the 'sources' in his *Forschungen* (Vol. ii. pp. 1-71, referred to as 'Meyer'). The reason is that I think his results, except as to the Battle of the Eurymedon and the Cyprus campaign of 449, are at best uncertain; as to these two great campaigns he is excellent and convincing, for he has good evidence to go on in the inscriptions, the genuineness of which he admirably vindicates. But the other evidence outside Plutarch is so bad that conclusions from it must be doubtful, as indeed they are shown to be by the different results arrived at by different scholars. And with regard to Plutarch, it is very hard to accept Meyer's conclusion that his quotations are mainly, if not entirely, second-hand (p. 24) and that he only wrote out, with great grace and spirit, the matter compiled by previous biographers. This is not a priori probable, and will hardly be accepted by those who have had an Oxford tutor's experience of the way in which men compile essays from very different sources.

[2] Thuc. v. 18. 5.

and the diplomacy of Cimon[1] which used the material and the moral forces provided by Themistocles and Aristeides, and which won the conquests which Pericles organized only too thoroughly.

The determining force in the character and career of Cimon was certainly his birth and bringing up. His father (cf. pp. 115, 121) had always had views and interests beyond the narrow range of Athenian politics and even beyond the Aegean, and had served as a *condottiere* among the fighting tribes of the North; his mother, like the mother of Alexander, who in the next century was to be like Cimon the 'hammer of the Persians,' was no Greek at all but a Thracian princess. In all probability Cimon was born during his father's self-imposed exile from Greek life, and brought up in the court of his maternal grandfather Olorus. Hence there is no reason to doubt the statement of Stesimbrotus (c. 4) that he had not had a 'liberal' education; his one accomplishment was music,[2] the art in which various degrees of civilization find it easiest to meet; he had not the 'ready tongue' or the 'cleverness' of the ordinary Athenian. Plutarch well sums up the evidence by a quotation from Euripides; Cimon like Heracles was Φαῦλον, ἄκομψον, τὰ μέγιστ' ἀγαθόν. It is probable also that scandal was right in making Cimon, like so many other great soldiers, loose in morals and originally, at all events, intemperate; such excesses would not have been considered vices in a Thracian court.[3]

But Cimon in his pre-Athenian days would have learned also a familiarity with warfare which made him the most

[1] Plut. c. 11; throughout this essay, references to Plutarch, unless otherwise stated, are to life of Cimon.

[2] The statement of Ion (c. 9) that he 'sang well' is in no way inconsistent with the lack of μουσική recorded by Stesimbrotus; it must be added, however, that Stesimbrotus is a notorious scandal monger, especially about all who had any share in founding the Athenian ἀρχή.

[3] For these faults cf. cc. 4 and 16 (*ad init.*). For these excesses in Thrace, cf. Hdt. v. 5-6, and Aristoph. *Achar.* 141 (drinking); for their prevalence among warlike races cf. Arist. *Pol.* ii. 9. 8.

successful captain of his time, and, we may add, seems to have imbibed a most un-Greek love of fighting for its own sake—if we may judge from almost the whole of his recorded career. In this, too, as in his birth and in his policy, he anticipates Alexander; both knew

'The stern joy which warriors feel
In foemen worthy of their steel,'

a feeling which to the ordinary Greek, as described by Aristotle, seemed irrational. Why should a man risk life, which was full of good things, unless his reason showed him a good reason for fighting? To seek danger for its own sake was worthy of a 'Celt,'[1] and was an excess as much to be condemned as the cowardice which shrank from danger altogether. Such a 'reasonable' attitude has fortunately never commended itself to the Northern races.

The first act of Cimon that we have mentioned is his payment of his father's fine after Miltiades had died in prison. With regard to this, scandal was very free; according to the usual account he raised the money by giving his sister Elpinice in marriage to the wealthy Callias; the version[2] that Cimon raised the money by marrying the daughter of a wealthy parvenu seems to be an obvious inversion of the above fact, for a fact the Elpinice marriage certainly is. And Cimon's own mercenary marriage seems inconsistent with his passionate affection for his wife, Isodice.[3]

But there is no reason to accept even the ordinary version of the scandal. Heavy as was the fine—50 talents—imposed on Miltiades, it would hardly have been crushing to the representative of one of the great houses of Athens, especially one who had wealthy foreign connections; the exaggeration is probably due to the tendency of the biographers[4] to paint in darker colours the fall of Miltiades

[1] *Ethics* iii. c. 7. [2] Diodorus x. frs. 30. 32.

[3] As shown in the verses of consolation addressed to him after her death, which are referred to by Plutarch (c. 4 *ad fin.*).

[4] Cf. Meyer, p. 26.

as a contrast to the glory of Marathon. And Elpinice's marriage to the wealthy and noble Callias needs no further explanation than her birth and her admitted charm.

The disgusting scandals about Cimon's relations (c. 4) with his sister are certainly based on contemporary evidence; there is a definite allusion to them in Plutarch's quotations from Eupolis (c. 15). But the evidence of a comic poet is worth very little, and this scandal, along with the other story as to her relations with the painter Polygnotus, is probably to be attributed to the part she played in politics. Athenian party feeling was prepared to use any report, however vile and improbable,[1] and the scandal, once started, was revived in the next century in the speech of Andocides against Alcibiades; the orator seeks to justify, by the precedent of Cimon, his proposal that Alcibiades should be ostracized; as the political careers of the two statesmen would bear no comparison, their moral weaknesses, real or supposed, are used to establish the parallel.[2]

Of Elpinice as of Aspasia it would be interesting if we knew more; she certainly did not conform to the Periclean rule of conduct[3] for Athenian ladies, and she may have been a pioneer in that 'Women's Rights' movement which seems to have been a feature of Athens in the fifth century. But this is mere speculation.[4]

The fact that we know nothing of Cimon during the nine years following his father's condemnation may well be due to the scantiness of our authorities; but such obscurity would have been quite in keeping with Cimon's previous education and character. It needed the great crisis of the Invasion of Xerxes to bring out his real ability.

[1] Cf. the stories as to Pericles, Pheidias, Aspasia, and the ladies of Athens. Plut. *Pericles*, cc. 13 and 32.

[2] Cf. Meyer, p. 35.

[3] Cf. Thuc., ii. 45.

[4] For an interesting discussion of the question whether the beautiful Pheidian female figure in the Ashmolean at Oxford be Aspasia or Elpinice, see *J.H.S.* xxxviii. 1 f., where Professor Gardner gives good reasons for identifying it with Pericles' morganatic wife. But the matter is by no means certain.

It brought about also another change in Athenian politics. The common danger went far to do away with the bitter rivalries which had hitherto distracted the Athenian upper classes, and with them the whole city. Aristeides, the friend of Cleisthenes, the moderate democrat, is recognised henceforward as the obvious leader of the upper classes, the hereditary leaders of Athens, and under his guidance the Athenian nobles frankly identified themselves with the national movement; now, and for more than the two next generations, Athens was to present to Greece the example of a city where all classes, however they might differ among themselves, were prepared to unite against outside enemies.[1] Cimon's act in hanging up his bridle[2] and taking in exchange his shield, was, as Plutarch sees (c. 5), symbolical; it meant, whether consciously or not, that the domination of the nobles was past, and that they were taking their places as the leaders of a hoplite democracy.

Of Cimon's part in the Plataean campaign we know nothing, but it may be presumed that he took part in it; for he is hardly likely to have served under Xanthippus, his father's old enemy, in the campaign of Mycale and the capture of Sestos. All we are told, however, is that he was chosen by Aristeides to be put forward as the rival of

[1] There are two exceptions, both unimportant in their extent and in their result; at Plataea a few of the 'noble and wealthy' (Plut. *Arist.* c. 13) conspired to betray the army to the Persians; before Tanagra (457 B.C., cf. Thuc. i. 107) a similar treachery on the part of a few occurred. But in both cases the real traitors were very few; the personal influence of Aristeides crushed the first conspiracy in the bud, and those who had taken part in it, in the very spirit of Cimon's friends at the time of Tanagra, found in the battle-field a 'great court of justice' wherein 'to clear themselves of the charges' (c. 17) of lack of patriotism. It was not till the bitter days at the end of the Pelopennesian War, when even at Athens the poison of στάσις, so marvellously described by Thucydides (iii. 82-3), was working in the ruined city, that the number of traitors was considerable. And the events of 411 and 404-3 had no repetition in Athens' later history.

[2] Cf. Arist. *Pol.* iv. 3. 3, 1289 *b*, for cavalry as the armed force of oligarchy.

Themistocles, presumably in the elections of στρατηγοί for 479-8 B.C.; at all events he shared with the 'just' Athenian the command of his city's contingent when the offensive was resumed early in 478. We are especially told that Cimon, by his courteous behaviour and by his 'fairness' (ἐπιείκεια), aided Aristeides in 'robbing' the Lacedaemonians of their hegemony,[1] 'not by weapons or by ships, but by his obliging nature and by statesmanship.' Aristeides formed the confederacy of Delos, and Cimon was from the first its general.

Now begins the important part in the life of Cimon. So far he had been only a subordinate; for the next thirteen years he is the inspiring force and the leader in the attack on Persia, and the builder up of the Athenian Empire.

It is important to notice the strategic skill with which the campaigns were planned. The previous captures of Sestos, of part of Cyprus, and of Byzantium, had been blows in the air, for it was hard, perhaps impossible, for the Greeks to maintain these conquests, when the Persians were in force both in Thrace and in Asia Minor, and when Athens had no supporting posts over the long stretch of sea from the South corner of Euboea to the Straits, with the exception of Lemnos and Imbros. Hence it is not surprising that the new allied confederacy not only acquiesced in the leaving of Byzantium in the hands of the traitor Pausanias, but also seems to have allowed Sestos[2] and the Chersonese to

[1] Plut. *Arist.* c. 23.

[2] It is hard to see why Meyer (p. 64) rejects the story of the capture of Sestos and Byzantium, told by Plutarch on the authority of Ion, Cimon's contemporary and friend. He has no difficulty in showing that it does not refer to the first captures of these towns, but he refuses to consider the possibility of their having to be won again (*vid. inf.*). His argument that there was nowhere for the wealthy Persian prisoners to come from need not be taken seriously. The story rests on good evidence, and is probable in itself. If it be accepted, it is clear that the captures cannot be those of 478 recorded in Hdt. ix. 118 (Sestos) and in Thuc. i. 94 (Byzantium). For (1) in neither of these was Cimon commander; (2) the story obviously belongs to a period when Athens was the head of a confederacy of allies, a position not gained till early in 477.

fall again under the power of the Persian. Cimon perhaps was the more ready to permit this as the conquest of Sestos had been the exploit of Xanthippus, the Alcmaeonid, the head of the family which had always been rivals of his own; but it was also sound strategy to make sure of communications before venturing on more distant enterprises.

The order then of Cimon's enterprises which are known to us seems to be:—

(1) The reduction of τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης, beginning with the capture of Eion.

(2) The capture of Scyros.

(3) The reduction of Carystus.

(4) The reconquest of the Chersonese and of Byzantium.

No doubt there were other enterprises, some probably of equal importance, but these are sufficient to show the principles on which Cimon worked.

The reduction of Eion was necessary as a defensive measure against a renewed Persian attack. If the bar-

Assuming, however, as is not improbable, that the two towns had to be recaptured, the date still remains to be discussed. To put the sieges before (so Bury i. 350, 363) the capture of Eion is both to contradict Thucydides as to the priority of the siege of Eion, and to convict Cimon of bad strategy. It may well be right to accept as a fact the '7 years' rule in Byzantium which Justin gives to Pausanias (ix. 1). Justin's compilation is a poor authority in itself, but it occasionally preserves facts of importance. The delay is surprising, but it may be accounted for partly by the prolonged resistance of the Persians in Thrace (cf. Hdt. vii. 106, 107) and partly by the need of having regard to Lacedaemonian susceptibilities. The final attack on Pausanias synchronized with the ostracism of Themistocles; the authorities at Sparta may have been willing to allow a Philo-Laconian leader at Athens to attack an ex-regent of Sparta—a thing which they would not have allowed to an ordinary Athenian. Certainly the narrative of Thucydides confirms this later date; he uses (c. 131) the same word (ἐκπολιορκέω) of the final expulsion of Pausanias from Byzantium that he uses of the capture in 478 B.C. (c. 94). Meyer (*G. des A.* iii. 519) accepts the '7 years' rule of Pausanias as a fact, though rejecting, as has been seen, the story of Ion.

barian was to have again the keys of Europe at Sestos and Byzantium, it was necessary to bar his further passage—and it could be done effectually—where Lake Kerkinites and the Strymon make a defensive line[1] almost equally effective with that of the Straits. And the capture of Eion was also necessary as opening up Athenian trade with the interior of Thrace, and as securing for Athens an opportunity for founding those 'Thraceward' settlements[2] which,

[1] The importance of the Struma valley was well seen in the recent war; but in the fifth century B.C. it was not the pestilential region which was fatal to so many of our men.

[2] Plutarch c. 8 suggests this as one reason for the unusual honour paid to this victory.

It is maintained by some (*e.g.* Busolt iii. 102-3) that the Athenians immediately attempted to send a cleruchy to Eion in 475 B.C. But, apart from the silence of Thucydides, it is improbable that Athens had men to spare so early for a hazardous and distant settlement. And the Scholiast to Aeschines (ed. of 1853, p. 48), who is the authority for the statement, is full of mistakes. He says that the Athenians 'having taken Eion' were cut off by the Thracians 'in the archonship of Phaedo' (476-5); he goes on: 'the cleruchs under Leagrus (were cut off) in the archonship of Lysicrates (453-2). Thus (1) he omits the disaster in 465 altogether, or (2) transfers it to 453, a most improbable date, (3) he says Amyntas was 'expelled' by the Thessalians, p. 46; as a fact he was restored by them.

If the disaster of 476-5, which he mentions, be a reality, it would naturally be an incident in the campaign of Cimon. The disaster of 465 B.C. is transferred by him to 453, because he has confused the names of the archons of 465 and 464, Lysanias and Lysitheus, with that of the archon of 453, Lysicrates. It may be added that the passage in Isocrates (*Phil.* v.) which is quoted in support of the Scholiast is quite general; it does not say that the Athenians suffered '4 or 5' disasters at Amphipolis, but 'it is necessary to avoid such colonies' (*i.e.* colonies like Amphipolis), 'which have 4 or 5 times destroyed those who became citizens in them.' Reiske's opinion of the Scholiast is worth quoting; 'si per me stetisset—in tenebris bibliothecarum diutius inveterascere sivissem (Pref. ix.)' But even if the Scholiast's authority were good, he says nothing of 'settlements' in 475; on the contrary the word κληροῦχοι in the next line seems to exclude the idea. The Scholiast's whole aim is to trace the connection of history with the mythical curse of Phyllis on her faithless Attic lover.

from the days of Peisistratus onward, had had such an attraction for Athenians. A third reason, and that not the least important, was that, by the capture of Eion, Cimon cut off the Persians from intriguing with the Macedonian Kings and (to some extent) with the Thracians of the interior.[1]

The capture of Eion opened the way for the reduction of the rest of the coast of Thrace; this we could assume with certainty, even if it were not implied by the statement of Herodotus (vii. 106) that Doriscus alone held out—the exception that proves the rule.

It has been already suggested that the final captures of Sestos and Byzantium happened about 471 B.C., and it is natural to place here the operations described in c. 14 (*ad init.*), which are inserted (by Plutarch) out of place, *i.e.* after his account of the Eurymedon. These operations completed the final expulsion of the Persians from Europe; it was now all important to secure communications with the N.-W. Aegean.

No doubt the conquest of Scyros was undertaken with this end, though the expedition was also part of the general policy of the Delian League; Athens could proudly boast that she justified her leadership of the Confederacy by suppressing Piracy in the Aegean, and the Dolopians of Scyros had offended most gravely in this matter, not only by violating the rights of hospitality and the sacredness of the shrine of Ζεὺς Κτήσιος, the guardian of property, but also by refusing to 'make reparations,' when ordered to do so by the Amphictyonic Council. Athens in punishing the offenders was able to secure for herself the one island which lay in the open sea between Euboea and the islands at the mouth of the Hellespont; Carystus, Scyros, Lemnos, Imbros, and the Chersonese were to the Athenian Naval Empire what Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus and the Suez canal are to

[1] For these as Persian allies in 476 B.C., cf. c. 7; cf. also c. 14, though the operation there described is misdated (cf. note at end of chapter).

England as an Imperial power. And it is significant that by his exploits Cimon was only completing the work of his father Miltiades, who had won Lemnos and perhaps Imbros for Athens.[1] This, the most important and the most lasting portion of the Athenian Naval Empire, was the gift to Athens of the two great Philaids.

The capture of Scyros is interesting as showing Cimon in a new light. He was more than a fighter of genius; he was a diplomat. Athens was poorly equipped for an imperial position by legendary greatness; the Homeric compliment that she sent to Troy in Menestheus the best 'organiser of troops'[2] was a poor set-off against the Spartan connection with Heracles or the Argive claims to inherit the rule of the Atreidae. With the growth of Athenian power under Peisistratus there had probably been connected an attempt to make Theseus a national hero.[3] In the second year of the Confederacy of Delos the Athenians appealed to the Delphic oracle to help them in confirming this connection, and in accordance with the oracle then

[1] For Lemnos cf. Hdt. vi. 137, for Imbros *ib.* vi. 41. In 387 B.C., even by the Peace of Antalcidas, Athens was allowed to keep Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros. It may be noted in passing that the capture of Scyros has been dated as in the archonship of Apsephion (c. 8 *ad fin.*), *i.e.* 469-8, for in that year Aeschylus was defeated in a dramatic conquest by the young Sophocles, and the verdict was that of the victorious Cimon and his colleagues. But the connection of this event with the restoration of the bones of Theseus is based on a mistranslation of Plutarch: after speaking of the popularity Cimon gained by the 'Translation' of the Theseus relics, he goes on ἔθεντο δὲ εἰς μνήμην αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν τῶν τραγῳδῶν κρίσιν ὀνομαστὴν γενομένην, *i.e.* they remembered to his credit how he had decided in favour of Sophocles against Aeschylus. Cimon's part in the defeat of the older poet by Sophocles is most interesting, but cannot be discussed here. The capture of Scyros has also been dated in the archonship of Phaedo (476-5) on the strength of Plutarch *Theseus* c. 36; but Plutarch there is giving the date of the oracle, not of its fulfilment.

[2] Cf. Hdt. vii. 161 and Plut. *Cim.* 7.

[3] Cf. Meyer, *G. des A.* ii. 775. For the oracle about Theseus, cf. note above.

given, the 'relics' were now duly found by Cimon, and brought with great pomp to Athens. The Athenian empire in the Aegean was thus consecrated, just as that of the Lacedaemonians in the Peloponnese had been a century before,[1] by the translation of the bones of Orestes.

The reduction of Carystus is placed by Thucydides after the capture of Scyros. The pretext was no doubt the behaviour of the Carystians during the invasion of Xerxes;[2] the real reason undoubtedly was that Athens needed a firm hold in Euboea, and especially on the South end of the island, as the first link in the chain of fortified posts which guarded her route to the Euxine, the 'corn route,' the safety of which was to be later essential to her very existence.

The state of the Aegean, however, called for other diplomacy besides the translation of relics. The fickle Greeks of Asia Minor and the Islands were already showing that dislike of continued effort which at Lade[3] had ruined

[1] Hdt. i. 67 f.; the stories both of Herodotus and of Plutarch are almost mediaeval in tone; we are reminded of the translation of St. Mark's relics from Alexandria to Venice, according to the tradition which was so firmly established in mediaeval Venice.

[2] Cf. Hdt. viii. 66. Their land was wasted after Salamis (*ib.* viii. 112. 121); for further fighting between Athens and Carystus after Plataea, cf. ix. 105.

How useless it is to attempt to construct an exact chronology of the period from 477 to 457 may be seen from the varying results which are arrived at by different historians. The Battle of the Eurymedon *e.g.* is placed in every year from 469 to 466, and in other years as well (see Busolt iii. 143 f.). It cannot be too much insisted on that we have only one certain date for this period, that given by Thucydides (iv. 102) for the Athenian disaster at Datum (cf. Hdt. ix. 75 with How's note *ad locum*). It may further be safely inferred that the Battle of the Eurymedon preceded this event, and that the revolt of Thasos followed it very shortly.

[3] Hdt. vi. 12: there is not the least reason to question Herodotus' statements, as being due to Dorian or to Athenian prejudice (as is done by Macan, *ad loc.*, and others); but of course his statement is only part of the truth. It is hard to see why Meyer (*u.s.* p. 43) attaches no importance to Plutarch's statement (c. 11); he says quite rightly that 'no ally furnished χρήματα καὶ ναῦς κενάς'; but

the Ionic Revolt. They were unwilling to continue to furnish their contingents. Cimon at once saw the opportunity of Athens; he persuaded his countrymen not to adopt the obvious course and to insist on the personal service of their allies. Acting on his advice the Athenians allowed those allies to shirk their obligations, and thus 'caught by the bait of leisure,' the confederates lost their warlike skill, while the Athenians, maintaining their navy by the allies' commuted payments, and 'serving continuously' at sea, developed still further that naval force which had saved Greece at Salamis, and which nearly won for Athens the Peloponnesian War. It is too often forgotten that it was Cimon who in this way advanced the Athenian Empire by another and an important step. At the same time he was ready to use force when necessary as well as diplomacy; we may assume that he commanded the fleet which reduced Naxos; at all events that island was reduced to subjection while he was the leading spirit in Athenian politics.

But to Cimon the humiliation of Persia was at least as important as the exaltation of Athens, in fact the two aims were with him largely identical. Hence he now entered on the greatest campaign of his life—that of the Eurymedon. As Meyer[1] has well shown, the object of this campaign was to meet a threatened Persian offensive, planned to prevent Athenian advance along the S.-W. coast of Asia Minor. Cimon's rapid[2] movements secured the

Plutarch obviously means that the money of the allies enabled the Athenians to build ships for them, which being 'crewless' were manned by the Athenians. He writes very loosely, and certainly does not understand the exact position of the allies, but he describes a real result of Cimon's policy.

[1] *U.s.* p. 7.

[2] Plutarch (c. 12) says that for this campaign (τότε) Cimon altered the build of the Athenian vessels, making them 'flatter' so that they could carry more men, with 'communication from one part of the deck to another.' This change in build was clearly to meet the special circumstances of the campaign, not (as is sometimes thought) an unintelligent return to the old-fashioned method of making a sea-fight as much like a land fight as possible.

important town of Phaselis before the unwieldy armament of Persia could strike; the favourable terms granted to that town[1] may well be characteristic of Cimon's liberal spirit towards the allies. From this success he pressed on to meet the Persian force, which he caught at the mouth of the River Eurymedon in Pamphylia. It is needless to describe the battle,[2] but it is all important to notice the daring resolution with which Cimon led his men, already weary from their victory[3] over the fleet, easy as it was, to attack the enemy on land; that these were much superior in numbers and also entrenched must be obvious. There is a real Nelson touch in the desperate courage which would be satisfied with nothing but an annihilating victory, even though the gaining of it involved the risk of losing all that had been already gained, and more.

The victory was not unnaturally said to surpass Salamis and Plataea rolled into one, and it marked the highest point in the fortunes alike of Cimon and of Athens.

The material results of the campaign were the addition to the Athenian Confederacy of new allies in the S.-W. of Asia Minor, and the beautification and strengthening of Athens. The Long Walls were begun at Cimon's expense[4] though they were not for the moment raised beyond the stage of foundations, and at Athens itself the South Wall of the Acropolis was built, and the Agora and the Academy were planted with trees. This lavish expenditure of his war fortune was characteristic of Cimon; he was a true 'aristocrat' in the sense given to the word by Aristotle,[5]

[1] For these, cf. Meyer pp. 5-6 and Inscript. No. 36 in Hicks and Hill, pp. 57 f.

[2] Meyer (p. 8) has well shown the absurdity of the account of the engagements given by Diodorus (xi. 60-2, following Ephorus), who makes the naval battle to be fought off the coast of Cyprus while the land battle on the same day is on the mainland. This absurd blunder was due to the mistake of supposing that certain inscriptions, which really referred to Cimon's last campaign—that of 450-449—commemorated the Battle of the Eurymedon. Plutarch's account is based on Callisthenes (cc. 12 and 13).

[3] C. 13, *ad init.* [4] C. 13 *ad fin.* [5] *Pol.* iii. 7. 3.

i.e. he was for a time the undisputed leader in the city, but his leadership was for the good of all, and not for his own advantage. There is no reason to doubt the stories of his lavish hospitality, at least in the form that is recorded by 'Aristotle'[1]—that he kept open house for his fellow demesmen (his deme was Laciadae). Such generosity was not, in the first place at any rate, prompted by a desire to corrupt the citizens and buy their votes; it was the open-handed lavishness of a soldier, who was ready to share his riches with the men by whose bravery he had won them, and also the traditional generosity of the born aristocrat, who gives as the natural thing to do. It would be as unfair to suppose that Cimon was adopting a deliberate policy of bribery as it is unfair in 'Aristotle' to adopt the scandal that Pericles, on the advice of Damonides, deliberately introduced state pay because out of his private purse he had no chance against his wealthier rival. Cimon and Pericles had different views as to the proper government of the State, and both views corresponded to elements deep down in human nature. A large part of the world has always deliberately preferred the rule of the few, provided that the few recognize and perform duties as well as enjoy privileges; another large part holds, or professes to hold, the view that there is a natural equality among men, and that any distribution of wealth and power which is not arranged on the principle of equality, is fundamentally wrong.

Cimon's theory of the State was the one which had hitherto prevailed in Athens, and it had in its support his personal popularity; it must never be forgotten that a large proportion of the citizens of Athens had served under Cimon and loved him as the commander who had shared their hardships and led them to success.

[1] *Ath. Pol.* c. 27: the exaggerated version of this was that Cimon kept open house for all the poor of Athens (c. 10 *ad init.*). In the same way the supposed universal readiness of Cimon to make his attendants change clothes with any poor Athenian citizen is probably only a generalization from gifts made to Cimon's old comrades in arms in certain definite instances.

Hence his position was strong at home, so long as he had the people's hearty support for his policy abroad. It was on this side that the attack came. The success of the Eurymedon would naturally have been followed by further operations against Persia; why these were not undertaken can only be conjectured, but obviously the great colonization scheme of 465 B.C. was not very consistent with operations on a great scale in the Levant; the 10,000 Athenians who were cut off at Drabescus (Thuc. iv. 102) were so many taken away from aggressive warfare against Persia. Whether Cimon was in any way responsible for the Thrace-ward settlement we do not know; at any rate its failure was a blow to the governing party in Athens which he led. And the subsequent operations against Thasos, successful as they were, were an anti-climax after the Eurymedon; popular opinion had clearly expected that the reduction of Thasos would be followed by conquests at the expense of Macedonia. How far this expectation was justifiable it is impossible to say; certainly the accusation that Cimon was bribed to spare Macedonia lacks all probability; but it is at least possible that his familiarity with the N.-W. Aegean made him disposed to adopt a policy of friendship with Macedonia. However this may be, it is certain that these operations in the years 465 and 464 shook his popularity. We have, as the result of this, the first mention of Pericles as a rival to Cimon; this was a continuation of the old feud between Alcmaeonidae and Philaidae; but it is noticeable that throughout this feud there is between the two Athenian statesmen none of the old personal bitterness; differing as they did in their ideas of politics, they appreciated, as Plutarch says (c. 17 *ad fin.*), each other's ability and patriotism.[1]

[1] Plutarch distinctly says that Pericles did not press the case against Cimon in the trial for bribery (c. 14 *ad fin.*); there is no need to attach importance to the scandals about the influence of Elpinice. And Pericles himself proposed the recall of Cimon. On the other hand Cimon promoted the suspension of hostilities with the Lacedaemonians (c. 18 *ad init.*). On the dates of this *vid. inf.* (p. 144).

It was Cimon's policy to the Lacedaemonians which ruined him. His father's policy had been co-operation with them, and Cimon held in the fullest degree that admiration for Lacedaemonian institutions and character which is so marked and permanent a feature [1] in the Athenian *καλοὶ κἀγαθοί*, the upper classes; no doubt in him it was strengthened by a soldier's love for a nation of soldiers. And he seems to have been by no means judicious in his expression of his admiration.[2]

The crisis came with the appeal of the Lacedaemonians for help against the Helots after the great earthquake of 464. The policy of raising up enemies in the Peloponnese which Themistocles had initiated,[3] which Alcibiades tried to revive, after the Peace of Nicias, and which was finally brought to success by Epaminondas after Leuctra, could now have been carried out without any risk of failure. But Cimon was an idealist; the policy of a united Greece under two leaders, acting in harmony, had been tried with some success in 480 and 479. It was true that there had been 'rifts in the lute,' both in those great years and still more since, but Cimon hoped, by a striking act of magnanimity towards the Lacedaemonians, to revive and cement the Pan-Hellenic ideal. And his influence prevailed; the resources of Athens were thrown on the side of her Peloponnesian rival, and Athens lost once and for all the chance of being the leader of Greece.

If we blame Cimon, we can only blame him for his blindness to the real character of the Lacedaemonians;

[1] Cf. Pater, *Plato and Platonism*, Cap. 8.

[2] Cf. cc. 14 and 16. It may have been natural to have been always telling the Athenians 'That is not the way the Lacedaemonians behave' (Plut. c. 16—quoting Stesimbrotus), but it was not likely to help his policy. It is, however, quite ironical that Critias, who was hand and glove with Lysander, should have dared to reproach Cimon with preferring the advantage of the Lacedaemonians to the interests of Athens (c. 16 *ad fin.*). Cimon was Pan-Hellenic in his policy, but it was only in the names of his children that he was frankly Lacedaemonian (c. 15 *ad init.*).

[3] Cf. Thuc. i. 135.

he ought to have known, even if he did not know, of their intrigues with Thasos; in view of this he might have expected the treatment which he with his 3,000 actually received before Ithome. The guilty conscience of his allies made them fear on the part of Athens conduct such as they themselves had planned, and they dismissed the Athenians with contumely.[1]

Cimon on his return to Athens, with more courage than prudence, attempted to undo the political changes which had been carried through by Ephialtes and Pericles in his absence; they had taken advantage of the unpopularity of the Peloponnesian expedition and of the absence of Cimon with so many of the hoplite class, to press their democratic measures, especially those against the Areopagus, which Cimon had hitherto been able to prevent.[2] He might have still been able to delay the changes, had he never left Athens; but apart from the ordinary difficulty of reversing a decision so recently arrived at, his party had been fatally weakened by his own foreign policy and by the response it had met with at Sparta. His attempt was foredoomed to failure; it only precipitated further changes, and led to his own ostracism.

The great period in the life of Cimon ends here: for fifteen years he had been the leading man in Athens; henceforth he is either an exile or a subordinate. In

[1] This may be inferred from Plutarch's phrase ὡς νεωτεριστάς. E. Meyer argues (*u.s.* p. 54) that, in view of the change of political feeling at Athens, it was impossible to keep the Athenians at Ithome. But this is very doubtful; no doubt those who were serving, as Meyer himself says, were of the Philo-Laconian party. At any rate the conduct of the Lacedaemonian government made inevitable a breach which before had been only probable.

[2] This is implied in c. 14 *ad init.*; that the Peloponnesian expedition was unpopular may be inferred, if direct evidence be necessary, from c. 16 *ad fin.* Ion preserves for us one of Cimon's arguments, which has become one of the historic phrases of Greek history; he urged the Athenians μήτε τὴν Ἑλλάδα χωλὴν μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἑτερόζυγα περιιδεῖν γεγενημένην. Cimon had obviously some of the power which Aristotle credits especially to Pericles, of coining phrases that stuck in the minds of his hearers.

exile he displayed a spirit very different from that of the ordinary Greek. In the campaign of Tanagra (457) he begged to be allowed to fight for the country which had ostracized him. When refused this permission, he left his honour in charge of 100 of his friends, who, dying where they stood in the battle, cleared their reputation and his at the expense of their lives. Plutarch says (c. 17 at end) that, as the result of this, Cimon was recalled at once on the proposal of Pericles.

This is not improbable in itself, but it is clear that he was not allowed to take part in public affairs for some time.[1] It is only in the last year of his life that he is again politically important. Why Pericles then allowed his old rival once more to come to the front it is impossible to say for certain; it may be conjectured that the disaster in Egypt in 454 B.C. had shaken both the Athenian Confederacy and the ascendancy of the democratic party at Athens. It may be suggested also that the concession to Cimon in the matter of foreign policy was connected with Pericles' measure, passed in the year 451 B.C.,[2] enforcing the old principle that Athenian parents on both sides were henceforth to be a necessary condition of citizenship. Cimon, like Themistocles, would have been excluded under this rule, and his opposition may have been bought off by giving him, for the time at any rate, a free hand against Persia.

At all events about 450 B.C. Cimon once more led an expedition to the Levant, no doubt with the intention of striking at Egypt, always the weak point in the Persian Empire, and at this time still in partial rebellion, as Amyrtaeus was holding out in the Marshes. It is significant that the oracle which Cimon consults is that of Jupiter Ammon[3] (c. 18 *ad fin.*), whose authority would commend itself to Egyptians. What happened in the campaign is very obscure; what is clear is that Cimon attempted to conquer Cyprus before making a serious

[1] See note at end.

[2] *Ath. Pol.* c. 26 *ad fin.*

[3] Here again the parallel to Alexander's methods is striking.

attack on Egypt, and that his attempt met with more resistance than he expected; his death destroyed whatever chance of success the expedition had had. It only remained for the Greeks to withdraw as soon as possible, for they were in danger of a repetition of the events of 454. The success of the campaign lay in the avoidance of disaster, but, as it was the last exploit of Athens against Persia, it suited the policy of Pericles to represent it as a brilliant success,[1] and to honour it with special memorials. Cimon's policy, however, both in foreign affairs and in home affairs, never was seriously resumed; the opportunity for free Greece to humble the pride of Persia had been lost, and never came again.

Appendix

CHRONOLOGY IN PLUTARCH'S LIFE OF CIMON

Plutarch's Chronology is always defective, but probably never more so than in his life of Cimon. The most important mistakes are:—

I.—He appears (c. 13) to place the Peace of Callias immediately after the Battle of the Eurymedon. This of course is impossible. Meyer (*u.s.* 3 f.) admirably shows the origin of this mistake; Plutarch is following Callisthenes, who, writing of the next century and contrasting the Peace of Antalcidas with that of Callias, not unnaturally, in a summary narrative, brought the Peace of Callias into close relation with Cimon's most famous victory. Plutarch carelessly confused sequence of thought with sequence of time.

II. The wresting of the Chersonese from the Persians, which he mentions in the next chapter (c. 14), could not possibly have followed the Battle of the Eurymedon;

[1] This point is well made by E. Meyer (*u.s.* p. 19), who discusses the varying authorities admirably, and gives the best account possible of the campaign.

the Persians must have been driven from the Aegean completely before the campaign in the Levant.

III. It is impossible to suppose that Cimon led two expeditions to the help of the Lacedaemonians against the Messenians, as Plutarch narrates in cc. 16 and 17. Plutarch here has made two campaigns out of one, perhaps because he was using two different sources.

IV. The 'Peace' with the Lacedaemonians negotiated by Cimon after his return from exile (c. 18 *ad init.*), is put immediately after the Battle of Tanagra; but we know that the next three years, 456-454 B.C., were all marked by warlike operations against the Peloponnese. The peace was probably a mere suspension of hostilities, and much less important than Plutarch represents.

V. It is quite impossible to put the death of Themistocles as late as Cimon's last campaign (as is done in c. 18). This combination perhaps was due to a desire to show Cimon as victorious not only over the Persians but also over the Persians' conqueror.

Plutarch's arrangement in this life is unusually loose, but one thought clearly dominates it; it was written, as he tells us (c. 3 *ad init.*), as a pendant to the life of Lucullus, whom Plutarch wished to honour for his services to the biographer's native town, Chaeronea (c. 2). The Greek and the Roman resemble each other both in public acts and in private character; they both dealt the heaviest blows to Asia, and they both were robbed by their political rivals of their success, while they both in private life displayed *δαψίλεια καὶ τὸ νεαρὸν καὶ ἀνειμένον ἐν τῇ διαίτῃ*.

It is the changes of fortune, and the acts significant of character, with which the Life of Cimon especially deals; the arrangement of the rest is somewhat haphazard.

VIII.

Recent Criticism on the Persian Wars

[I have left this essay almost as I read it to the Philological Society during the War; dealing as it does largely with general points, I hope that its somewhat personal tone may be excused. This is also the reason why so much space is devoted to an inferior book like E. Obst's *Feldzug des Xerxes* (Klio 1913, 12th Beiheft); this happened to be one of the last specimens of 'critical' history when I was writing. His book is a striking instance of the melancholy results, in the hands of an ordinary man, of the methods which a great historian like E. Meyer uses with comparative safety.]

THE story of the Persian attack on Greece, and especially of the campaigns of Xerxes, has an ever living interest. Even in the days when armies exceed in actual numbers the fabulous figures assigned to the army of the Persian king, men still discuss the old problems. It may be worth while then to leave for a short time our present anxieties and distresses, and to consider some of the recent solutions which have been put forward for the old difficulties, examining certain assumptions, or perhaps it should be said certain conclusions, as to the Persian Wars, which are now in high favour with 'critical' historians, and asking whether they are not, to say the least, unwarranted. The result may throw some light on the value of much modern 'criticism' in other fields of historical inquiry

The first question to be raised is the once much disputed one as to the numbers given by Herodotus. It is not intended here to attempt another solution, since the data are altogether insufficient; but it may be noted in passing that the question need have little or no bearing on our judgment as to the general credibility of Herodotus; accuracy in numbers is one of the most difficult merits for any narrator to achieve, and inaccuracy in this matter is hardly evidence at all for inaccuracy in other respects.

The proof of this can be seen at any time in the daily papers; eyewitnesses describing a London crowd will give estimates that vary almost as much as the estimates which historians base on the figures of Herodotus.

Two comparatively recent solutions, however, of the numbers problem deserve some attention, as good examples respectively how the problem should not, and how it should be, attempted.

The first is the famous calculation of the Persian numbers given by Hans Delbrück, Professor of Modern History at Berlin, and one of the most famous historians in Germany, whose *Art of War in Relation to Political History* is the standard book on the subject in that country. He propounded his view thirty-six years ago (1887), in his *Comparison of the Persian Wars and the Burgundian Wars*, and he has issued it twice since in the two editions of his *Art of War* (1900 and 1908). The mere statement of the results he arrives at is instructive as to the value of his methods. In 1887 he gave the Persians at Plataea a superiority of about 25 per cent over the Greeks, and estimated their number as from 45,000 to 55,000 men; by 1900[1] this figure had come down to '15,000 to 25,000 full warriors,' a force 'as strong or a little stronger than the Greeks.'[2] By 1908,[3] however, the Persian force has become weaker still; the Persians are now, 'with their Greek subjects, approximately as strong as the Greeks,' and at the bottom of the page they are 'probably some thousands weaker' (owing to the distribution of their forces). A method which gives such various results does not inspire confidence.

Professor Delbrück's method is definitely a priori; it is based on two suppositions. First he holds the theory that the Persians were professional soldiers and therefore

[1] *Gesch. des Kriegsk*, p. 82.

[2] *Ges. des Kriegsk* (1900), p. 82. As the Greeks were half of them 'unarmed,' so apparently half of the Persians were also unarmed—a most improbable conclusion in itself.

[3] Cf. *Ib.* 1908, p. 95.

superior to the Greeks, who were merely a popular militia. Secondly he holds that he has proved that the numbers given to Charles the Bold in the Burgundian War were exaggerated, and, to quote his own words, 'it is impossible to see why Herodotus and the Greeks should be deemed more deserving of acceptance than the worthy (*biderben*) Swiss annalists, whose accounts have been accepted for centuries.'[1] The non-sequitur here is obvious; moreover, while Professor Delbrück complains that no historian of Ancient Greece has examined his Swiss figures, he says nothing of the (surely more relevant) fact that Dierauer, writing five years (1892) after his calculation was published, in a modern and critical history of Switzerland, accepts the old figures for the Battle of Granson, and accuses Delbrück himself of under-estimating those of Morat.[2]

But to turn to his first hypothesis. He argues that the army of Xerxes was made up of the bodyguards of satraps, drawn from Persia and from the warlike tribes; he compares it with the armies of knights, which the German emperors led against Italy.[3] The proof of this is furnished partly by a misquotation from Herodotus, and partly by another hypothesis. Let the misquotation be taken first; Herodotus is charged with inconsistency because in one place he speaks of the Persian army as 'unwarlike masses, driven with whips to battle,'[4] and elsewhere (ix. 62) as 'brave and excellent warriors.' A scholar does not need to be told that these two descriptions come in two different parts of Herodotus' work, and refer to two absolutely different elements in the army, and anyone who turns up the second reference will be surprised to find that Delbrück quotes the very words of Herodotus in which he especially emphasizes the lack of military 'science' (*ἀνεπιστήμονες καὶ οὐκ ὅμοιοι τοῖσι ἐναντίοισι σοφίην*) in the Persians. But Professor Delbrück, in defiance of all modern critical opinion, which credits Herodotus with some knowledge of official Persian documents, says that the historian's account of the Persian masses

[1] *Ib.*, 1908, p. 49.
[2] II., pp. 207, 221, 224.
[3] *Ges. des Kriegsk*, 1908, pp. 46-7.
[4] *Ib.* p. 48; Hdt. vii. 103.

must be looked upon 'in great part as pure imagination.' So much for the misquotation.

The hypothesis is more elaborate. There is no doubt that the Greeks were in a state of great alarm at the advance of Xerxes. Professor Delbrück, as he rejects on a priori grounds the huge numbers of Herodotus, has to explain the alarm in some other way, and to do this he says, 'It was not the quantity but the quality of its enemies that endangered the freedom of Greece; but quality is a category that does not suit popular feeling, and therefore tradition substituted quantity.'[1] There is not the least evidence for this supposed superiority in quality; Delbrück quotes[2] in support of it Herodotus' famous statement (vi. 112) that 'before Marathon the Greeks did not dare to look the Persians in the face.' Even if this were to be taken literally, and no one with any historical sense would do this, it would have no bearing on the feelings of the Greeks ten years later, after their victory at Marathon; yet it is at this later period that the alarm was greatest. Delbrück gives two other pieces of evidence: one is the statement of a nameless Prussian officer[3] that the plain of Marathon was 'so small that a Prussian brigade would scarcely have room there for its exercises'; the other is his own calculation that, if Xerxes' army were of the size described by Herodotus, and if it marched as a Prussian army-corps marches, 'the rear would have been able just to be leaving Susa when the van was in front of Thermopylae.' To this it is only necessary to reply that no one accepts the figures of Herodotus, and that, in whatever way a Persian army marched, it certainly did not march like a Prussian army-corps. It would not be worth while to

[1] *Numbers in History*, p. 30. [2] *Ib.* p. 26.

[3] *Ib.* p. 24. We are inevitably reminded of Mr. Justice Stareleigh's rebuke of Sam Weller: 'You must not tell us what the soldier said; it's not evidence.' Professor Delbrück might at least have looked at the calculations of Dr. Grundy, a trained topographer, who having carefully examined the whole plain, calculates the number of combatants at about 30,000 (*Great Persian War*, p. 184).

urge so obvious a point, were it not for the curious light it throws on Professor Delbrück's methods. If any modern analogies are useful for calculations as to the Greek resistance to the barbarians, they are those furnished by the records of British soldiers and military historians as to our campaigns in India ; there a small Western army has again and again beaten a vastly superior number of Orientals. Has any one ever seen a modern scholar use this kind of evidence ? Yet surely the resemblance of the two kinds of warfare is a fairly obvious one.

To sum up: Delbrück's hypothesis is based upon reckless guessing and complete neglect of evidence. It would not be worth while to examine it, were it not that a really great German historian, E. Meyer,[1] to a large extent accepts it, and even in this country it is treated with respect. The University of London invited Professor Delbrück in 1913 to give the two lectures quoted above on 'Numbers in History,' and published them at its Press. Even a great scholar like Dr. Macan[2] has nothing more severe to say of this random criticism than that it is of 'negative value,' but 'affords little or no grounds for positive estimates.' Surely a little plain speaking is desirable; even the greatest professors ought to be told that their results are worthless when they ignore all the rules of evidence and reconstruct history on a priori theories.

A word must be said as to the very different method of examining the numbers given in Herodotus, which has been worked out independently by two English scholars, Mr. J. A. R. Munro (1899)[3] and Dr. Macan (1908)[4]; it is worth while roughly to summarize it. Accepting, as is done by almost all critics, English and foreign, Herodotus' account of the Persian army as based on official native material, both scholars point out :—

(1) That the army is organized on a decimal system, with commanders of 10, 100, 1,000, 10,000.

(2) That it is also divided into army-corps of 60,000,

[1] *G. des A.* iii. 377.
[2] Hdt. ed. 1908, ii. 158 n.
[3] *J.H.S.* xxii. p. 295.
[4] Hdt. ed. 1908, ii. 159 f.

and that there is reason to suppose this number represents actual facts and is not a mere guess.

(3) That we find 29 commanders (ἄρχοντες) of 10,000, and can probably supply a thirtieth in Hydarnes, the commander of the Immortals.

(4) That as one of these 30, Artabazus, afterwards appears as a commander of an army-corps, it is at least possible that Herodotus, or his informant, has confused the position of the commanders of 10,000 and those of 60,000, and so has multiplied his total figure, which should be 300,000, by six. The resulting total, 1,800,000, is also the total of his fighting men given elsewhere in quite a different context.

This coincidence is a striking one, and may well point to the following conclusions :—

(1) That Herodotus' estimate is based upon the real organization of the Persian army, and that,

(2) supposing Xerxes to have brought the whole of it, he would have had a nominal force of 300,000 men. There are of course numerous minor difficulties to be cleared up before these conclusions can be accepted ; but the method pursued gives a result which is based on real evidence, much of it (as has been said) admitted by the best modern critics to be valuable, and the result, too, is one which at any rate approaches possibility of acceptance. As methods and not results are being discussed here, it is needless to say more ; but it may be pointed out how this ingenious conjecture has been treated in Germany. E. Meyer makes absolutely no reference to it in his History, and Obst, the latest critic of the Persian Wars, in his *Feldzug des Xerxes*, rejects it for two reasons, both of which are inaccurate[1] and show ignorance of the text of Herodotus.

[1] The first argument is that Hydarnes is 'Feld-herr,' but not 'Befehlshaber' ; but though Hydarnes is usually called στρατηγός, in vii. 211 it is expressly said that ἦρχε (τῶν ἀθανάτων), and in c. 215 ἐστρατήγεε is used in precisely the same sense. Secondly Hydarnes is said by Obst to have been στρατηγός of the 'coast army' (vii. 135) *before* Xerxes' campaign. Even if this were accurate, it has no

But now I wish to turn to a much more important matter. Modern criticism assumes as proved the fact that Herodotus wrote from an Athenian standpoint, and that he is too favourable to the Athenians. I will quote this view as it is put by E. Meyer[1]: 'Herodotus writes as the defender of Athens and the Athenian policy under Pericles, which led to the Peloponnesian War. Obviously it is not my intention to depreciate Herodotus' work as a party pamphlet, or as an apology for Athens. But just as many German historians of our century have presented the justification of Prussian policy and the necessity of Prussian leadership as the result of an unprejudiced patriotic treatment of history, so Herodotus champions the Athenian standpoint and Athenian hegemony. He would 'like to induce his readers to give up their prejudices. It is this point of view which has caused him, when the great and decisive struggle arose, to gather the many special results of his researches into one work, which concludes with a picture of the great deeds of Athens.'

This view, that Athens was the saviour of Greece, he goes on, 'governs Herodotus' picture of the War.[2] Herodotus further is said to measure other states by a very different standard: 'Corinth and Thebes are bitterly attacked, Sparta is treated with light irony,'[3] Argos and Thessaly are excused 'because they were allies of Athens later.'[4]

All this argument is very familiar to any student of Greek history, but it has hardly the novelty that E. Meyer claims for it; it has hitherto (he writes) 'remained almost unnoticed.'[5] On the contrary, it was a familiar charge in the time of 'Plutarch,'[6] and has been repeated ever since, *e.g.* to give only one instance, by Wecklein[7] in 1876. Its real explanation I will discuss presently; meanwhile it may well be asked if there be not an unconscious humour bearing at all on the argument; but it is a most improbable suggestion; Hydarnes clearly had the post after the campaign.

[1] *Forsch.* ii. 198.
[2] *Ib.* p. 202.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 205, 211.
[4] *Ib.* pp. 212, 215.
[5] *Ib.* p. 197.
[6] *De Mal., Hdt.* c. 26, p. 862.
[7] *Trad. der Pers. K.*, p. 270.

in making Herodotus into a fifth century B.C. Treitschke or Droysen.

But is the charge true ? First of all, it loses a great part of its point if the modern view be accepted—as it is being growingly accepted—that Herodotus wrote his last three books of his history first, and published them—so far as Greek books were ever published—in a more or less complete form before he went to Italy and the West ; Dr. Macan,[1] who has written the most complete presentation of this view, would suggest for their provisional completion a date before 450. This earlier date is very hard to reconcile with the view that it was the influence of the Periclean circle and of the policy of Pericles which made Herodotus a great historian. Jacobi,[2] the latest critic of Herodotus, asserts that 'it was not the Ionian traveller who became the historian of the Persian Wars, but the man who had identified himself with Athens (Wahlathener), and that in this sense it can even be said that' the work 'owes its form to the personal acquaintance of the author with Pericles' ; he even thinks it 'probable' that Herodotus heard the Alcmaeonid story from Pericles' own mouth ; hence he is compelled to attempt to refute Dr. Macan's argument for priority, a thing he completely fails to do, because he does not understand it.[3]

[1] *Hdt.* (1908) *Preface*, p. 52.

[2] P.W. *Supple* (*2nd part*), *s.v. Herodotus*, pp. 360, 414 ; cf. p. 238.

[3] Dr. Macan's argument is that the priority of Books VII.-IX. is rendered probable by the fact that almost all the events later than the end of Herodotus' main work (*i.e.* 479 B.C.), which are mentioned in these books, fall in the years before 457, and that this almost complete silence as to the years 457-431 is most naturally explained by supposing Herodotus to have written at the beginning of them. Jacobi (*ib.* p. 370) writes 'Apart from the reference to Pericles in Book VI., 131, vii. 114 (the story of Amestris) and especially vii. 151 (the story of Callias), are enough to show that the less frequent mention of events between 450 and 430 has nothing to do with the history of the origin of the work.' The refutation seems completely irrelevant ; Macan is arguing from the almost complete *absence* of references ; their *presence* in one or two places is no answer at all.

But leaving the question of priority aside, as it must always remain uncertain, certain considerations must be urged against the view which sees an Athenian version of history in so much of Herodotus; anyone who reads recent criticism knows how continually this view is put forward, as if it were established and universally accepted. I hope to examine one or two definite instances of it later.

I am not going to quote, in the old-fashioned way, passages in which Herodotus censures the Athenians, and others in which he praises Lacedaemonians and Corinthians; of course there are some of both kinds, but they prove nothing. But there are some important general considerations which render very doubtful the view that Herodotus writes as an Athenian partizan. Is it credible that he, if writing from the Athenian point of view, and recasting his work under this condition, about the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, could have escaped so completely from the contemporary political atmosphere? The dominating question in Greek politics at that time was the rivalry of the extreme democrats, now rising into power, with the ὀλίγοι or with the Moderates; on this rivalry Athenian empire was already basing itself, as we see, *e.g.* from the speech of Diodotus about Mitylene.[1] But 'democracy' in this sense comes in Herodotus only in one episode, that of Nicostratus at Aegina (vi. 88, 91), and this episode is admitted by all critics to be a late addition. The issue in Herodotus everywhere is not between the 'Many' and the 'Few,' but between 'Freedom' in the general sense (a 'Freedom' which has for champions Cleisthenes and Aristeides as much as Themistocles and Pericles) and Tyranny. To speak of the 'democratic sympathies of Herodotus,' as is often done, and to argue from them as to his supposed political attitude at the time of the Peloponnesian War, is to be guilty of a most misleading anachronism. I do not think this point has been at all sufficiently recognized by critics.

And his treatment of party politics is of a piece with his

[1] Thuc. iii. 47.

whole history. The questions that interest him are not those of the Periclean age, but of the period which culminated in the defeat of Xerxes. The relations of East and West, Colonization in general, the position and credibility of the Oracle of Delphi, the lines of Greek trade, these and such questions as these are the subjects of Herodotus. Are they the subjects that interested the Periclean circle?

Herodotus is supposed to write as a Periclean; he mentions Pericles only once and that incidentally, while he has as much to say about the services to Athens of the great rival house of the Philaidae, as he has of Pericles' own house, the Alcmaeonidae. Pericles' policy was directed to the affairs of Greece proper; the interest of Herodotus and of his work is with the Greek world in the widest sense and with the East. Certainly if Herodotus put his history together to glorify Periclean Athens, he chose a very unsuitable subject, and treated it in a very curious manner.

One word more on this part of the question. We have a good specimen of the kind of history current at Athens in the fifth century, in the well-known passage about events during the 'Pentekontaetia,' which is common—to a large extent verbally—to Andocides[1] and to Aeschines. Clearly these two orators are borrowing from a common source—*i.e.* probably from the version current in Athens of events in Greece after the defeat of Xerxes. The source that we see here is absolutely different in style and in character from the sources used by Herodotus.

It may be worth while to examine a little further the charge of Athenian prejudice. As has been said, it is as old as 'Plutarch'; what light does his treatise throw on the point? There is no doubt that the author of the 'De Malignitate Herodoti' intended to damage the authority of Herodotus. Does he succeed?

In the first place, he is eager to prove the historian to be as unjust to Athens[2] as to other States. The great victory of Marathon, *e.g.* is said to be degraded to a mere

[1] *De Pace* 3. 12 and *De Fals. Leg.* 183. (*Bekker* ed.)
[2] Cc. 27, 40. *Moralia*, pp. 862, 871.

'temporary check,' and Herodotus is actually blamed for robbing Athens after Salamis of the 'crown of glory,' giving it to the Aeginetans.

The accounts of the conduct of Phocians[1] and of Argives, which E. Meyer finds too gentle, because of the supposed tenderness of Herodotus to Athenian allies, are to 'Plutarch' examples of 'malignity.' These instances, which are absolutely inconsistent with Meyer's theory, may be put down to mere perversity; but what is more important is the almost utter absence in 'Plutarch' of evidence from other authors for Meyer's charge against Herodotus. On one important point only[2] is the historian refuted by an appeal to a definite witness, *viz.* the Boeotian Aristophanes, as to the name of the Theban leader at Thermopylae, and the Theban position generally in that battle. Here 'Plutarch' is held by all modern historians to make good his point. But as a rule, the evidence he quotes is worthless; the charge against the Corinthians at Salamis (which Herodotus, it must be remarked, does not make) is refuted by an appeal to epitaphs (c. 39), the most untrustworthy of sources, and the courage of the Greeks at Artemisium is established by a purple patch from Pindar (c. 34).[3]

If there were a whole mass of good historians of the Persian Wars, whose authority could be set against Herodotus—and this is the hypothesis on which so much modern criticism is based—'Plutarch' does not use it. He himself in his life of Aristeides follows the Father of History slavishly for the account of Plataea, even in parts of the narrative which the most thorough-going champions of the old historian find it hard to accept (*e.g.* the changes[4] in the battle line, by which the Lacedaemonians yield the place of honour to Athens), he attacks things that Herodotus never said, he quotes the feeblest evidence, or gives hardly

[1] *Ib.* pp. 868, 863; Cc. 35 and 28.
[2] Cc. 31, 33; *Ib.* pp. 865, 867.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 870, 867; Cc. 39 and 34.
[4] Aristeides c. 16.

any evidence at all. Either the case against Herodotus was hopelessly weak or 'Plutarch' was a hopelessly bad prosecutor.

But Herodotus is not acquitted of partiality because his first reviewer broke down, any more than Macaulay is acquitted because John Wilson Croker 'went out to commit murder, and only committed suicide.' The main contention against the account of the Persian Invasion given by Herodotus must be examined a little more definitely. It is, to put it shortly, that, apart from special events, he represents the Greek conduct of the campaign throughout as endangered by the selfishness of the Peloponnesians, while the Athenians are always vigorous and patriotic. Let me put this in the words of Mr. Munro[1]: 'The reproaches of selfishness and indifference so freely levelled by the Athenians at Sparta may have been natural at the time, and furnished a favourite rhetorical foil to the sacrifices so nobly borne by Athens, but they are unfair and ungenerous and have propagated an injustice as black as any to be found, even in Greek History.'

It may be said at once that much of the personal colouring in Herodotus must be rightly given up. Few now would accept unhesitatingly, as Grote does, the story of Themistocles bribing the other Greek admirals at Artemisium. Such stories as this, describing what goes on in cabinets and councils, obviously cannot be matters of general knowledge, and though they may come from an individual who was present, it is also obvious that the story is at best a one-man narrative which could hardly be tested. It is a different matter when E. Meyer unhesitatingly rejects the discussions recorded by Herodotus as taking place before the Battle of Salamis, and the desire of the Peloponnesians to run away, as 'completely unhistorical.'[2] This is done on the a priori ground that a fleet so disunited and ready to flee, is 'quite out of condition to gain a striking victory.' E. Meyer has apparently never heard of the courage of

[1] *J.H.S.* xxii. p. 303.

[2] *Forsch.* ii. 204, 205.

despair, or how rats fight in a trap. It is not proposed to argue that this discussion must certainly be accepted as historical; it is, however, clear that there would have been plenty of evidence for it; Herodotus[1] distinctly says that, before the penultimate council, 'some of the commanders were hurrying to their ships and were putting up their sails,' and that the last council was preceded by much private discussion. The historian therefore could have questioned witnesses who had good means of knowing what had gone on in the councils, and there is nothing improbable in the narrative as it stands.

I hope that I shall not be thought to be maintaining that there is no matter in Herodotus which clearly comes from Athenian sources, and which must therefore be looked upon with suspicion. Obviously he must have gathered much of his information in Athens, and acting on his well-known principle, that he must record all that he heard, whether he believed it or not, he must have put down many Athenian stories, even if he did not believe them; that as to the conduct of the Corinthians at Salamis is a typical instance (viii. 94). It is curious how from the time of 'Plutarch' downwards, Herodotus has been abused for putting in this story; yet he himself gives the refutation of it, and the Athenian story, prejudiced as it is, is valuable as giving us an indication of the probable position of the fleet of the Corinthians in the battle. Their absence from the main sphere of operations was due to their being occupied in defending the Greeks from an attack in the rear; by accepting this suggestion we can not only reconcile the two contradictory stories given by Herodotus, but we complete our picture of the Greek tactical arrangements. To say that Herodotus uses much Athenian evidence, however, is not the same as saying that he gives an Athenian version of the history.

When the historian writes that he was bound to tell everything, it is obvious that he was not binding himself by a hard and fast rule. The once famous theory of

[1] viii. cc. 56, 74.

Nitzsch, that Herodotus' history can be split up into a number of independent λόγοι, that these are reproduced by him without modification, and that criticism can say where one ends and another begins, is now given up; it was formerly accepted as gospel in Germany, and was treated by some English scholars with far more respect than it deserved; the critical sense of the French historian of the Persian Wars, Hauvette, rightly rejected it, for it made Herodotus little more than a 'scissors and paste historian,' putting together without regard to consistency the different accounts he received. But the spirit of this exploded theory is too often retained, and the fact is ignored that obviously the historian fused his various accounts together, and worked the statements of one set of informants into the narratives of others. Without doubt, too, he collected his material all over Greece (perhaps with the notable exception of Corinth). But to suppose that we can analyse this amalgam with confidence, and that we can say 'this is Athenian and this Spartan and this Tegean' and so on, is to suppose that painstaking but unimaginative professors can understand the secret methods of an historian of genius.

It is of course impossible to hope for agreement as to the value of the judgment of Herodotus on special actions; but the broad question ought certainly to admit of an answer—did the Lacedaemonians rise to their position as leaders of Greece or did they follow their own selfish interests?

Here I wish to urge two points, striking enough but I think generally overlooked. In the first place, Herodotus' narrative holds the field. Though they may differ from him in details, Plutarch (as has been said above, p. 155) Diodorus, and other secondary authorities[1] follow the line of his main narrative completely. Why is there no evidence against the Herodotean view? Athens was certainly not popular in Greece in the fifth century. Why was she allowed to appropriate the credit of the Persian defeat, when according to the modern view she had at best only a claim to a share in it? It is not sufficient to say that the literary genius

[1] Except that prince of liars, Ctesias.

of Herodotus crushed out all competitors; the literary genius of Thucydides was at least as great, but we know from Plutarch's Life of Pericles that there were abundant authorities against his view of that statesman. Ephorus and 'Aristotle' reject the judgment of Thucydides. Why did they follow Herodotus?

And this point may be urged even more strongly against some of the definite modern attacks on the Herodotean version of the Persian Wars; the Battle of Plataea may be taken as a typical instance. According to most of our critical historians, Athens in that battle disgraced herself and all but ruined Greece. The story of the battle, as told by modern authorities, varies widely, which is not unnatural, because they all produce fancy pictures, based on hypotheses and reconstructed evidence; yet they agree pretty well on the two points, that the Athenians behaved badly, and that the narrative in Book IX. is the Athenian version, composed to cover up their misconduct. Let me quote Bury's[1] summing-up as a specimen of this criticism. 'The plans of the exceptionally able commander (Pausanias), who was matched indeed with a commander abler than himself, were frustrated once and again through the want of unity and cohesion in his army, through the want apparently of tactical skill—most of all perhaps through the half-heartedness of the Athenians. Never do the Athenians appear in such an ill light as in the campaign of Cithaeron; and in no case have they exhibited so strikingly their faculty of refashioning history, in no case so successfully imposed their misrepresentations on the faith of posterity. They had no share in the victory; but they told the whole story afterwards so as to exalt themselves and to disparage the Spartans.'

Bury[2] had previously given the justification for this charge: 'the only chance of accomplishing the general's object of cutting off the enemy from their base lay in a rapid advance, before Mardonius should have time to extend his position Westward and block the Plataean road.

[1] *Greek Hist.* i. p. 317. [2] *Ib.* i. 314.

Upon the Athenians lies the responsibility of having thrown away this chance. It can only have been due to their delays and hesitations that the river was never crossed.' In the later school editions of Bury this second passage disappears bodily, and no real attempt is made to explain the tactics of Pausanias.

It need hardly be said that the whole view rests on no ancient evidence, but only on 'reconstruction' of the Herodotean narrative. It is worth notice, however, that this 'exceptionally able commander' (Pausanias) was credited by Bury in his early editions with the intention of 'striking at Thebes,' *i.e.* of marching his army round the flank of an enemy[1] much stronger in cavalry and light armed troops and admittedly at least equal in numbers. This mad project no longer figures in Bury's narrative, though, presumably owing to the necessity of preserving a stereotyped text, he has made the minimum of alteration in his later edition. The ignorance of the military art shown by Herodotean critics is not a matter of importance, though I confess that as an examiner I have often felt a difficulty as the result of it and of similar weaknesses. When a school boy faithfully reproduces his 'Bury,' how ought he to be marked? He is offering as 'Greek History' a fancy narrative which has little relation to the facts as told by our ancient authorities, or to probability. Ought he to get marks for remembering accurately his 'fancy picture,' or ought he to suffer for the badness of his text-book? I confess that my custom has been weakly to give the marks for what I could only call 'authorized fiction.'

But, to return from this digression. There is a second point of importance to be urged in favour of Herodotus against his critics. It is this. It is admitted on all hands that a complete change took place in Greek international

[1] Other critics describe the manoeuvre equally recklessly; Munro (*J.H.S.* xxiv. 158) and Grundy (p. 473) make Pausanias aim at 'turning the enemy's right flank,' while Woodhouse (*J.H.S.* xviii. 41) calls it 'cutting his communications.' They all fail to show how such a 'surprise' was possible, in view of the composition of the forces engaged.

relations between 480 and 475 B.C. In 480 the Lacedaemonians were the recognized heads of Greece; under their leadership, though with some difficulty, Greece consented to unity. No one in Greece proper (except perhaps Argos vii. 148) ventured to ask for even a share of leadership. Athens, on the other hand, surrendered even the command of the fleet, about half of which was her own, without a question (viii. 3). By 475 the Lacedaemonian confederacy, even in the Peloponnese, was falling to pieces, while Athens had become the head of a constantly increasing league of Greek states, and the unquestioned leader against Persia. What is the meaning of this change? If the narrative given us by all our ancient authorities be accepted in the main, the answer is obvious. An historical miracle had occurred; the Athenian people had risen superior to all their past, as the French people did in 1793, and their changed position in the eyes of Greece was the result. But if Athens had disgraced herself at Plataea, or if, to adopt the milder judgment of E. Meyer, the services of Sparta to Greece were really great, however depreciated by the 'light irony' of Herodotus, what is the meaning of the Greek change of judgment? It would seem to be unnecessary to urge a point so obvious were it not that able critics deal with point after point of detail, but make no effort at all to explain the broad lines of the development of Greek history.

And their attack on details may fairly be said to be based on false principles of criticism. Again the best illustrations can be taken from modern accounts of the Battle of Plataea; for here especially the story has been rewritten from the a priori point of view, and the evidence of Herodotus is 'reconstructed.' Yet, judged by the ordinary rules of evidence, the narrative of Grote, who follows Herodotus implicitly (perhaps too implicitly),[1] can still claim to be the best account of the great battle. History should be based

[1] *E.g.* he accepts without question the story of Spartan unwillingness to fight the Persians, which is hardly credible. It may be noted, however, that 'Plutarch' (*De Malig. Hdt. c.* 42),

on evidence; the narrative of Herodotus without doubt may claim this merit, for clearly he had made the fullest enquiries; no other part of his history is worked out on the same scale, and he had had the opportunity of questioning hundreds who fought in the battle. History should be tested in every possible way; the test that we can best apply to Herodotus is to examine his topography, and here he comes out triumphant; Dr. Grundy, who has made a special study of the field of Plataea, writes of 'the extraordinary manner in which, in spite of certain obscurities, it (the narrative) harmonizes with the present state of the region wherein the events occurred.'[1] The Ninth Book of Herodotus further is very free from those physical impossibilities which shake our faith somewhat in the judgments of Herodotus elsewhere. And finally, as has been said, there is a striking absence of divergent traditions. Yet it is this story, confirmed from so many various points of view, which is explained away and turned upside down by modern criticism.

It may be admitted at once that Herodotus, here as elsewhere, has no grasp of either strategy or tactics, and that his evidence, good as it is, is only that of the man in the ranks. If there were real military aims in the confused movements that he records, his informants certainly did not understand them. But it is very open to question whether Pausanias had any real plan except somehow to get at the Persians and to beat them. Greek military science—apart from some few instances—was still at a very low level in the fifth century B.C., and it is, to say the least, probable that a Spartan leader would be quite incapable of handling the largest army Greece had ever seen. The subsequent career of Pausanias seems to show that he was a very stupid man. If it is objected that he gained great credit for the victory, as he undoubtedly did, it is only an early instance of what has

though he calls the story 'ridiculous,' quotes no evidence against it; Thirlwall, too, accepted the story without question.

[1] *Great Persian War*, p. 457.

been frequent in every war down to our own day; the general is honoured for success which his troops won in spite of him; it would be invidious to mention names to illustrate this, and it is needless.

I submit that Herodotus in his account of Plataea, as in his general picture of the Persian Wars, is a first-rate authority, that we reconstruct him at our peril, and that Grote was in the main right when he followed Herodotus, to the neglect or rejection of the later stories, which had before his time figured so largely in Greek histories, and which, curiously enough, modern criticism is always trying to rehabilitate.

It is interesting to notice the general principle on which this attitude to later authorities is based. The modern critic, especially if he is a German, pays lip homage to the value of the older authorities; but his method of Quellen-Forschung usually enables him to prefer quite late ones, in which he can trace, or thinks he can trace, the evidence of older authorities now lost to us. A very amusing account of the varied results of this 'source seeking' might be compiled, for it need hardly be said that it is by no means the rule for one scholar to accept his predecessors' results, and he is often very severe on their methods and their mistakes. But I cannot do more here than put down a few of the instances in which Obst (*Der Feldzug von Xerxes*), a recent critic of the story of the Persian Wars, prefers later authorities to Herodotus.

He follows Diodorus as to the date when the Medising Greeks joined Xerxes, and again as to the retreat from Tempe (p. 54); he prefers (p. 93) his arrangement of the contingents in Xerxes' army (which by a wild conjecture is supposed to come from a source common to Ephorus and to Herodotus; what could it have been?); in view of this, it is not surprising that he has accepted the figure of that inferior romancer, Ctesias, for the number of the Athenian ships at Salamis (p. 72); in defiance of all tradition and probability he thinks with Ephorus (p. 102) that the Lacedaemonians sent a 'sufficient contingent' to Thermopylae; he prefers

—and rightly—the version given by Ephorus of the conduct of the Thebans at Thermopylae, but he actually puts his artificial narrative of what happened there before the fighting began, on an equality with the plain straightforward account of Herodotus. After this, it is not surprising that, with Cornelius Nepos, he makes the Athenians evacuate Attica before the fighting of Thermopylae (pp. 135-6); this judgment for sheer perversity it would be hard to equal; the Athenians we know would hardly evacuate Attica, even when the foe was almost on them. Later on, Obst prefers Ephorus' account of the positions of the Greek contingents at Salamis (p. 158) and that of Plutarch for the date of the Iacchus portent (164-5), and Ephorus again is quoted with approval as giving the original form of the message to Xerxes after Salamis (p. 169).

In view of these judgments, it is not surprising that Obst thinks Diodorus' account of the Battle of Mycale better than that of Herodotus, which he describes as 'an imaginary picture drawn in the interest of the Athenians' (p. 216) (his ground for this view being its supposed contradictions, which exist only in his imagination), although he himself admits that the account of Diodorus falls into two inconsistent parts.

Enough, and probably more than enough, instances have now been given to show how far criticism has departed from Grote's principle of preference for the older authority. But something more must be said as to the way in which new and 'critical' historians use their evidence. Two points may be briefly laid stress on. The first is the insufficient use of other than literary evidence; it is in the furnishing of this that Dr. Grundy's book *The Great Persian War* is so valuable, and it is the neglect of this that makes some recent criticism so weak. A good instance may be found in the account of the Battle of Salamis. Beloch has rediscussed (*Klio* 1908, pp. 478-486) the whole question of the position of the hostile fleets, and has reasserted the old and exploded view that the battle was fought inside in the Bay, and not outside in the

Strait, without any reference to Goodwin's arguments in the papers of the American School of Athens,[1] which showed almost to demonstration that such a position was geographically impossible. Beloch is notoriously an historian for whom evidence has little value in comparison with his own theories; it is even more surprising that Obst, though rejecting Beloch's new view, equally fails to consider the geographical evidence, and also never mentions Goodwin. In view of this ignorance of geography, it is not to be wondered at that Obst follows the view of Ctesias and Strabo, that Xerxes really thought of constructing a causeway to Salamis (p. 153). It need hardly be said that in Herodotus (viii. 97) this impossible plan is a mere pretence to cover Xerxes' idea of retreat.

But it is perhaps natural that other than literary evidence should be neglected when we see with what scant respect the literary evidence is treated, if it fails to square with a priori theories. Obst denies that any turning movement was attempted at Salamis, although Aeschylus, Herodotus, and Diodorus, writing from different points of view, agree in affirming this. But all the evidence has to go because it will not square with Obst's theory of the Persian numbers; he says they had not ships enough to venture to divide their forces; therefore they could not have divided their forces. If all our ancient authorities assert that they did this, so much the worse for our authorities. And this is criticism as it is served up in the best Continental journal (*Klio*) for research in Ancient History! To give another instance—the message of Themistocles to Xerxes before the Battle of Salamis, which is reported by all the ancient authorities, is cut out and its truth denied on a priori grounds.

There is one more favourite theory of the modern critic of which I wish to say a word. Here again E. Meyer may be quoted as giving it in a definite form, though it would be obviously unfair to hold him responsible

[1] *Papers of American School at Athens*, vol. i., 1885, pp. 239 f., espec. pp. 241-4.

for all the uses to which his theory is put. Meyer[1] writes: 'He (*i.e.* Herodotus) has besides, for the campaign of Xerxes from Phrygia to Thermopylae, used a written authority, into which he has introduced many additions.' Meyer's reference to an earlier passage in his history (p. 6) shows that this source is supposed to be a Greek one (he mentions Dionysius of Miletus) in which authentic Persian material was introduced. There is no evidence at all for such borrowing on the part of Herodotus, and it is inherently improbable. If the theory be accepted in the sense that there was a Persian written account of the campaign, we can only say, with Professor Oman, that it would have been about as trustworthy as the Turkish official bulletins in the recent war. Obst brings in this supposed 'schriftliche vorlage' everywhere; to it, according to him, Herodotus owes his clearness in his account of the Persian movements, and he professes to trace to it supposed resemblances between Herodotus and Diodorus. What could have been the form of this 'schriftliche vorlage'? It is most unlikely that there was any written narrative possessing the excellence which Obst supposes. If it had ever existed, who wrote it? What became of it? Why is Herodotus never accused of copying it? This theory of a 'written source' for what is best in Herodotus' narrative, is a mere hypothesis, and not a very happy one.

I have tried to show that modern versions of Greek history neglect the evidence, misinterpret the evidence, over-ride the evidence. I wish to conclude with asking a question as to the most famous event in the whole campaign of Xerxes—the fate of Leonidas and his 300 at Thermopylae. It is usually now said that they met their death through the failure of some tactical manoeuvre, as to the nature of which widely different views are held, that Leonidas had no intention of devoting himself and his contingent to certain destruction, and that the story of their self-devotion is a later embellishment. Does not

[1] *G. des A.* iii. p. 245; cf. pp. 6-7.

this explanation raise more difficulties than it solves? According to it the Lacedaemonians succeeded in establishing a reputation for desperate bravery, a reputation which lasted to the time of the Peloponnesian War[1] and which stood them in good stead, on a story which thousands of Greeks knew to be false. The explanation supposes that the Greeks in the other contingents which had been at Thermopylae, knew that Leonidas had at least hoped to get away safely, and yet held their tongues and allowed currency to an explanation glorious to Leonidas and not very creditable to themselves. If it be said that they held their tongues because their own contingents had failed in the duties assigned them, even this leaves an almost impossible difficulty; the reputation of Leonidas depended on the keeping of a secret known to thousands. Dr. Grundy urges that the ordinary story of the self-devotion cannot be true, because it does not account for the conduct of the 700 Thespians, who according to Herodotus shared the fate but not the fame of the Spartans. But the modern explanation equally leaves unaccounted for the ill-luck of the Thespians in missing a share of the reputation which the Spartans abundantly gained. The simple explanation of the Thespians being forgotten lies in the words of Horace:—

Omnes illacrimabiles
Premuntur ignotique longa
Nocte, carent quia vate sacro.

Herodotus is the *Vates sacer* who has made Leonidas a proverb; but the facts were the same for Spartan and for Thespian.

The story of the Persian Wars needs re-writing from generation to generation, as it is one of the glorious episodes in human history, a story which records the triumph of spiritual over material forces, a story of the victory of liberty and thought over despotism and reackless aggression.

[1] Cf. Thuc. iv. 40 for the surprise at the surrender in Sphacteria.

Not the least of the drawbacks of the present critical methods is that the student is apt to look on the whole narrative as a series of problems, and to neglect all thought of the real issues and lessons of the struggle. Of one thing I am sure—that the account of Herodotus will be considered again and again, even if it be with only scant favour, so long as History is studied at all, while his present generation of critics will be forgotten, and most of their theories will be consigned to limbo.

IX.

Aristophanes and Herodotus

[References to Aristophanes in this essay are to Hall and Geldart's text (*Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis.*)]

THE greatest of the Athenian comic poets is a sure guide as to the knowledge and the taste of the ordinary Athenian, since it is essential for the point, and so for the success of comedy, that its references should be familiar; a joke that has to be explained is bound to fail. The familiarity may be shown in varying directions, either with approval or with disapproval, but it must exist. Two instances may be briefly given from Greek poets. The opening of the famous chorus in the *Knights* with the words of Pindar [1]

ὦ ταὶ λιπαραὶ καὶ ἰοστέφανοι καὶ ἀριζήλωτοι Αθῆναι

is a compliment at once to Athens and to the memory of the great Theban poet; on the other hand the almost wearisome parodies of Euripides, while they show Aristophanes' dislike of the innovating tragedian, show also how familiar the Athenians were with his plays. Parodies in fact imply that the works parodied are well known.

The parodies of Aristophanes then render it likely that an author, who is quoted or referred to, if he is not an established classic,[2] had recently published his work, and so had brought himself to the notice of the Athenian public. Pindar, without doubt, was already a classic, and his purple passages, when parodied, would be at once recognized, especially if in praise of Athens. But the same familiarity could hardly be expected for less famous

[1] L. 1329; The opening of Pindar's dithyramb 54 (46); for a similar borrowing cf. the opening of the previous chorus in the *Knights* 1264 f., which is also Pindaric.

[2] A parody of a familiar passage of Shakespeare might well be a success at any time in an English theatre.

poets, unless their works had been recently published, and still less for a prose writer, whose work would lack the striking appeal which is the combined effect of poetic diction and of meter. In England a parody of most poets, and certainly of all prose writers (except the Authorized Version), would, in default of special testimony, be taken as clear evidence that the work parodied was one that was new and attracting public attention at the moment. One illustration may be given; Canning's inimitable 'Needy Knife-Grinder,' appearing in November 1797, would enable a critic to date with certainty Southey's halting sapphics, even if we did not know from other sources that these were published in Bristol in that year. We have only to compare :—

'Needy knife-grinder, whither are you going?
Rough is your road, your wheel is out of order,
Hard is your lot, your hat has got a hole in it,
So have your breeches'

with

'Weary, weary wanderer, languid and sick at heart,
Travelling painfully over the rugged road,
Wild-visaged wanderer! God help thee, wretched one,'

and the date of the second verse is obvious. If this is so with a written parody, it is much more so with a spoken and acted one. Hence we may fairly seek from the parodies of Herodotus in Aristophanes some evidence as to his life and the times of his literary productions.

There are two groups of passages in Aristophanes which have been generally agreed to be humorous attacks on Herodotus. Before, however, referring to these in detail, two or three other points may be briefly made.

The first is that it is somewhat surprising that Herodotus' work should have been sufficiently familiar for it to be parodied at all. The essence of success in burlesque is that it should tell at once and without fail; what parallel is there in Aristophanes' attacks on any other author to his

references to Herodotus? The Sophists, who are satirized in the *Clouds*, were made familiar figures by the conversation of Socrates, whom the ordinary man identified with them. Meton the astronomer probably owes his place in the *Birds* (992 *seq.*) to his forebodings about the Sicilian expedition and his practical expression of them,[1] not to his astronomical cycle for combining solar and lunar reckoning. The fact that Herodotus is an exception is surely good proof of the popularity of his work.

Secondly, the fact that it is the work of Herodotus that is ridiculed and not the historian himself, is pretty good evidence that, whatever amount of knowledge the Athenian people had of his history, the historian himself was not at all a familiar figure. The points in Aristophanes are generally personal in the most definite sense, allusions to character or to physical form; and they are very often made definite by the actual introduction of a name. The name of Herodotus does not occur at all, and more than that, there is no indirect allusion to him personally, apart from his work.

Thirdly, it is curious that the references to Herodotus seem to be almost confined to two of Aristophanes' comedies, which are more than ten years apart. If this is so, some explanation must be sought either in the circumstances of the poet, or in the events contemporary with or just preceding the appearance of the plays.

The two plays in which the work of Herodotus is clearly referred to are the *Acharnians* and the *Birds*. As has been said, these are in this respect peculiar; but an exception may perhaps be made of the *Clouds*; lines 576-7 in that comedy:—

> ἠδικημέναι μὲν ὑμῖν μεμφόμεσθ' ἐναντίον·
> πλεῖστα γὰρ θεῶν ἁπάντων ὠφελούσαις τὴν πόλιν
> δαιμόνων ἡμῖν μοναῖς οὐ θύετ' οὐδὲ σπένδετε.

have been thought to refer to Pan's message to the Athenians before Marathon (Hdt. vi. 105); but there is not the least verbal similarity, and the thought is an

[1] Plutarch, *Nicias*, 13.

obvious one. Still less striking are the references (ll. 272-3) in the same play to the overflow (*προχοαῖς*) of the Nile and to the Palus Maeotis, which are purely general: so too is the reference to Thales (l. 180). But the gibes as to the Socratic map (ll. 206 f.) certainly gain more point if we think the audience were familiar with the map of Aristagoras (Hdt. v. 49). The object of the Ionian tyrant was to show how near Lacedaemon was to Susa, the joke in Aristophanes is that it was only too near to Athens (l. 215).

There are, it is true, in several other comedies allusions to 'Bakis,'[1] a mythical prophet, who probably had been made familiar to the Athenians in the time of Peisistratus by the Orphic oracle-monger, Onomacritus; but only one of these contains anything like a distinct allusion to Herodotus, and that is in the *Birds*, and will be discussed later. The other passages and the allusions in the *Knights* and the *Birds* to a famous oracle of Bakis comparing Athens to an 'Eagle' (*αἰετὸς*, an oracle which is not given by Herodotus) prove nothing as to Athenian familiarity with the historian, as they obviously appeal to a common belief in Athens derived from other sources.[2] On the whole, then, these two plays seem to be peculiar in the familiarity with the work of Herodotus which they imply, though an exception should perhaps be made as to a passage in the *Lysistrata* (675), which will be spoken of later.

It is necessary now to examine closely the passage in the *Acharnians*, 68-92.

In this passage there are about a dozen words or expressions which can be well illustrated from Herodotus.

ΠΡ. *καὶ δῆτ' ἐτρυχόμεσθα διὰ Καϋστρίου*
πεδίων ὁδοιπλανοῦντες ἐσκηνημένοι,
ἐφ' ἁρμαμαξῶν μαλθακῶς κατακείμενοι,
ἀπολλύμενοι.

ΔΙ. *σφόδρα γὰρ ἐσωζόμην ἐγὼ*
παρὰ τὴν ἔπαλξιν ἐν φορυτῷ κατακείμενος;

[1] *Knights* 123, 1003 and 1087; *Peace* 1070; *Birds* 962 and 978.
[2] Cf. Plato, *Theages* 124 d.

ΠΡ. ξενιζόμενοι δὲ πρὸς βίαν ἐπίνομεν
ἐξ ὑαλίνων ἐκπωμάτων καὶ χρυσίδων
ἄκρατον οἶνον ἡδύν.

ΔΙ. ὦ Κραναὰ πόλις,
ἆρ' αἰσθάνει τὸν κατάγελων τῶν πρέσβεων;

ΠΡ. οἱ βάρβαροι γὰρ ἄνδρας ἡγοῦνται μόνους
τοὺς πλεῖστα δυναμένους καταφαγεῖν καὶ πιεῖν.

ΔΙ. ἡμεῖς δὲ λαικαστάς τε καὶ καταπύγονας.

ΠΡ. ἔτει τετάρτῳ δ' ἐς τὰ βασίλεἰ ἤλθομεν·
ἀλλ' εἰς ἀπόπατον ᾤχετο, στρατιὰν λαβὼν,
κἄχεξεν ὀκτὼ μῆνας ἐπὶ χρυσῶν ὀρῶν.

ΔΙ. πόσου δὲ τὸν πρωκτὸν χρόνου ξυνήγαγεν;

ΠΡ. τῇ πανσελήνῳ· κᾆτ' ἀπῆλθεν οἴκαδε.
εἶτ' ἐξένιζε, παρετίθει θ' ἡμῖν ὅλους
ἐκ κριβάνου βοῦς.

ΔΙ. καὶ τίς εἶδε πώποτε
βοῦς κριβανίτας; τῶν ἀλαζονευμάτων.

ΠΡ. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ὄρνιν τριπλάσιον Κλεωνύμου
παρέθηκεν ἡμῖν· ὄνομα δ' ἦν αὐτῷ φέναξ.

ΔΙ. ταῦτ' ἄρ' ἐφενάκιζες σὺ, δύο δραχμὰς φέρων.

ΠΡ. καὶ νῦν ἄγοντες ἥκομεν Ψευδαρτάβαν,
τὸν βασιλέως ὀφθαλμόν.

But it will be at once obvious that the majority of them might have been familiar to an Athenian audience from many other sources, and so by themselves they prove nothing.

It will be well to classify the coincidences or references. First we have the Oriental name[1] *καϋστρίων*. This, like the mention of 'Ecbatana' above (l. 64), no more proves knowledge of Herodotus' work than the mention of Calcutta and the Ganges would prove that an Englishman was familiar with such and such a book on India. In the second place we have clear references to Persian customs recorded by Herodotus; line 70 as to luxurious travelling can be illustrated from Herodotus' account of Xerxes'

[1] Cf. Hdt. v. 100, where the river is mentioned which gives its name to the 'plains.'

effeminacy (vii. 41); the Persian hard drinking of l. 73 is recorded in Herodotus i. 133, and Aristophanes is quite capable of attributing to the Persians that fondness for their wine 'neat' (l. 75) which Herodotus attributes to the Scyths. The luxury of the Persian table-fittings (l. 74) would remind anyone familiar with Herodotus of his account of the compulsory entertainments of Xerxes' court (vii. 119), or of the unwarlike richness of Mardonius' camp outfits (ix. 80).

Less clear are the possible references in l. 79 (cf. Hdt. i. 135) and l. 82, where the 'mountains of gold' might be looked on as a poetic extravagance for the conical blocks of gold in which the Persian king kept his accumulation of tribute (iii. 96). But all the above passages, though they resemble the words of Herodotus, and would have more point if heard by those who knew Herodotus well, yet are by themselves too general to prove anything.

But two passages are so definitely parodies of Herodotus that their point can hardly be mistaken. 'Having created in the first part of the passage, as might be said, an 'Oriental atmosphere,' so that his hearers would be on the look out for the coming points, Aristophanes drags in the historian's story that the Persians were such feasters that they roasted their animals 'whole' (ll. 85-87, cf. Hdt. i. 133). The closing words *τῶν ἀλαζονευμάτων* are sufficient evidence what the comic poet thought of the historian. Almost more clear is the passage below (l. 92) where the 'Royal Eye'[1] is introduced, the point of which depends on the Persian custom recorded in Hdt. i. 114.

Some, too, have seen a reference to Herodotus' account of the Phoenix (ii. 73) in the introduction of the 'weird bird' the *φέναξ*, but the words are too different for this to be likely.

The cumulative effect of Oriental touches and of definite allusions has made most scholars[2] believe that in the passage

[1] His name *Ψευδαρτάβας* is a Herodotean coinage (cf. i. 192).

[2] So Mitchell (1835), Starkie (1909), B. B. Rogers, Kock; but it is not meant that these scholars accept all the allusions referred to.

we have certainly a definite and intentional parody of Herodotus. This raises the interesting question why in this play especially does Aristophanes make a humorous attack on his contemporary.

The first answer is that perhaps at this time an important negotiation had been going on with the Great King, which came to an end towards the close of 426 B.C. Busolt quotes the following evidence[1] for it. We know from Thucydides (iii. 34) that Colophon had been captured by the Persians in the first half of 430; if we accept the figures of Aristophanes (our sole authority for the facts), an embassy[2], sent to arrange the matter peaceably, would have reached Susa towards the end of 427 (ἔτει τετάρτῳ l. 80), and being kept waiting 'eight months' (l. 82) might just have got back to Athens in time to be jeered at in the *Acharnians*, which appeared in February 425.

The combination is very ingenious but not quite convincing; for the envoys must have travelled home very fast to give Aristophanes time to devise and compose his scene. It is perhaps safer to say that negotiation with Persia was in the air; we know that the Lacedaemonians were sending embassies to Persia before this time, and that at the end of 425, the Athenians took the opportunity of the capture of Artaphernes to open negotiations themselves (Thuc. iv. 50). Of course the scene in the *Acharnians* could not refer to these[3] Athenian overtures; nor is there any reference in Aristophanes to the somewhat problematic negotiations of Epilycus, uncle of Andocides,[4] who is said to have concluded a treaty of 'perpetual friendship' with the Great King shortly after this time.

[1] iii. 960 n.

[2] They started in the archonship of Euthymenes (l. 67), *i.e.* 431-430; but the figures in Aristophanes, which are the base of Busolt's argument, may well be comic exaggerations.

[3] Grote (vi. 140) speaks of the *Acharnians* as being 'in the year before this event'; presumably he is reckoning by the archons.

[4] Andocides *de Pace* 29: for the arguments for putting this about 423 B.C., cf. Busolt iii. 348 n.

The exact occasion of the *Acharnians'* scene must then be left doubtful; but the play makes it extremely probable that Herodotus' work had been brought especially before the notice of the Athenian people in 426 B.C. or about that time. And this view has been generally held on other evidence. It may be taken as certain that Herodotus was one of the early colonists of Thurii[1] founded in 443. It is certainly probable that he had read to Athenian audiences, in whole or in part, his story of the Invasion of Xerxes shortly before he left Athens,[2] and that he received a public grant of 10 Talents. It is generally assumed that he must have returned to Athens about the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, as he has inserted in his narrative at least four allusions to events which happened about 431-430.[3] We may then well suppose that his work was

[1] For the exact date of his going, cf. p. 106.

[2] That Herodotus wrote first his last three books has been often maintained, and is convincingly argued by Macan (1908) vol. I. xlv. f.; that he gave public readings at Athens is not only probable in itself, but may be said to be almost proved by Thucydides' contemptuous reference in i. 21-22 (though Herodotus is not named either here or anywhere in the work of his younger contemporary); that he received a reward from Athens ('Plutarch' *de Mal. Hdt.* c. 26) rests on the authority of the historian Diyllus (*circ.* 300 B.C.), very probably quoting from the ψήφισμα making the grant. This award is dated by the Chronologer, Eusebius, 445 B.C. or a little later; there is no sufficient reason (with E. Meyer, *Forsch.* i. 200) to reject this as a 'mistaken combination,' still less to suppose the reward was given for 'diplomatic services' rendered by Herodotus to Athens. The amount of the grant, '10 talents,' has been thought impossibly large; but Periclean Athens was a lavish paymaster, and funds were still abundant in 445 B.C. The Athenians gave Pindar '10,000 drachms' for a 'single phrase' (ἓν ῥῆμα, Isocrates περὶ ἀντιδ. 166); the reward of Herodotus therefore can hardly be thought extravagant; Jacoby (*P.W. Supt. Band.*, *s.v.* Herodotus, p. 228), who thinks the grant to Herodotus impossibly large, reads '1,000' in the passage of Isocrates, without any reference to the usual reading; this way of dealing with inconvenient evidence is hardly 'critical.'

[3] Three of these belong to 431 B.C. Theban attack on Plataea, vii. 233; Sparing of Decelea, ix. 73; Expulsion of Aeginetans, vi.

familiar at Athens in the early years of the war, and that allusions to the Oriental parts of it would be effective at a time when the idea of help from the Great King was being entertained by both parties in Greece.

But it is to be noticed that the allusions in Aristophanes are not complimentary; the good faith of Herodotus obviously is doubted, and his interest in things oriental is held up to ridicule.

It is not surprising that for ten years after the production of the *Acharnians*, the comic poet goes elsewhere for his objects of attack; the oriental interest had died away under the pressure of events in Greece. Why then does Herodotus once more become the butt of Aristophanes in the *Birds?* The main passage is printed below. There are two other passages, and some allusions, which by themselves would not have been convincing, but which may well be thought not accidental when we see clearly on other grounds that Aristophanes had Herodotus in his view in this play. These minor allusions may be taken first. Some of them give only what has been called an oriental atmosphere, *e.g.* the reference to the 'Camel' as the essential attribute of the Mede (l. 278), or the Persian names in l. 484, or the allusion to Thales (l. 1009).

There is also a curious verbal similarity to Herodotus' phrases in l. 510, 'the bird on the sceptres' (cf. Herodotus i. 195), and in the description of the 'Persian bird' (l. 485) which like 'the Great King' (l. 486) has his κυρβασία ὀρθή (l. 487).[1] Hence it is possible that, l. 488, οὕτω δ' ἴσχυσέ τε καὶ μέγας ἦν τότε καὶ πολύς may be an intentional, and not a merely accidental, echo of the μέγας καὶ πολλὸς of Herodotus in speaking of Xerxes (vii. 14).

But, as has been said, these resemblances though real are so general that they can only be quoted as adding cumulative support to more definite evidence. This is

91; to the next year (430 B.C.) belongs the capture of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, vii. 137.

[1] Cf. Hdt. vii. 64 for the same custom among the Sacae; but Herodotus does not mention the Great King's 'upright tiara.'

found in three passages; the longest (ll. 1124-1138) and most important is as follows:—

ΑΓ. Α. *ἐξῳκοδόμηταί σοι τὸ τεῖχος.* ΠΕ. *εὖ λέγεις.*

ΑΓ. Α. *κάλλιστον ἔργον καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον·*
ὥστ' ἂν ἐπάνω μὲν Προξενίδης ὁ Κομπασεὺς
καὶ Θεογένης ἐναντίω δύ' ἅρματε,
ἵππων ὑπόντων μέγεθος ὅσον ὁ δούριος,
ὑπὸ τοῦ πλάτους ἂν παρελασαίτην. ΠΕ. *Ἡράκλεις.*

ΑΓ. Α. *τὸ δὲ μῆκός ἐστι, καὶ γὰρ ἐμέτρησ' αὖτ' ἐγώ,*
ἑκατοντορόγυιον.

ΠΕ. *ὦ Πόσειδον, τοῦ μάκρους.*
τίνες ᾠκοδόμησαν αὐτὸ τηλικουτονί;

ΑΓ. Α. *ὄρνιθες, οὐδεὶς ἄλλος, οὐκ Αἰγύπτιος*
πλινθοφόρος, οὐ λιθουργὸς, οὐ τέκτων παρῆν,
ἀλλ' αὐτόχειρες, ὥστε θαυμάζειν ἐμέ.
ἐκ μέν γε Διβύης ἦκον ὡς τρισμύριαι
γέρανοι, θεμελίους καταπεπωκυῖαι λίθους.
τούτους δ' ἐτύκιζον αἱ κρέκες τοῖς ῥύγχεσιν.

The allusion in ll. 1127-1129 to Hdt. i. 179 and the walls of Babylon is unmistakable; only Aristophanes 'goes one better' than the historian, whose chariot had only 'room to drive round' (*περιελασιν*) on the top of the wall, while in the Bird-town two chariots could 'pass.' The jibe is continued in the next lines; the wall of Babylon is about 340 feet (i. 178 *ad fin.*), that of the city of Peisthetairus is 600 feet (l. 1131), and then the point is clinched by a reference to a different part of Herodotus, which has not previously been referred to; the *καὶ γὰρ ἐμέτρησ' αὖτ' ἐγώ* irresistibly recalls Herodotus' complacent confirmation of the size of the pyramid of Chephren (ii. 127) *ταῦτα γὰρ ὧν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐμετρήσαμεν.* A much more doubtful reference, but one which might not be beyond a quick-witted Athenian audience, whose attention had been turned to so familiar a passage in Herodotus as the account of the Pyramids, comes in the following lines; the '30,000 cranes from Libya,' who bring 30,000 stones for the foundation of the

new city, are only a mild exaggeration compared to Herodotus' story in his previous chapter of the princess who built a large pyramid out of the stones contributed one by one by her lovers. There is a further reference in Αιγυπτιος (l. 1133).

The other two clear references are in single lines. One of them is, like the passage just discussed, an allusion to Herodotus' descriptions of Oriental buildings. The proposal of the versatile Athenian Peisthetairus as to his cloud-city (l. 551) περιτειχίζειν μεγαλαῖς πλίνθοις ὀπταῖς would be an unmistakable allusion to Herodotus i. 179 πλίνθους ἱκάνας ὤπτησαν, even if this had not been made clear by the poet in the closing words of the line, ὥσπερ Βαβυλῶνα. And the same attitude of ridicule for Herodotus is seen in ll. 961-2 :—

ὦ δαιμόνιε τὰ θεῖα μὴ φαύλως φέρε
ὡς ἔστι Βάκιδος χρησμὸς ἄντικρυς λέγων

against the Cloud City : this warning is put in the mouth of the oracle-monger, who is shortly to be expelled with ignominy (l. 990), and undoubtedly is a gibe at Herodotus' definite profession of faith in the infallibility of Bakis (viii. 77), as confirmed by his accuracy as to the localities of the Battle of Salamis.

It is then, I think, abundantly clear that Herodotus was looked upon as a good subject for a joke in 414 B.C., while Aristophanes had left him alone for more than a decade. There must have been a reason for this ; but no clear reason can be found in the circumstances of the time, such as has been suggested in regard to the references on the *Acharnians*. We are then justified in looking for a reason in the life of Herodotus himself, and this might be found if we could believe that Herodotus did not die about 425, as is usually thought, but lived on into the next decade, and about 415 had (once more) for some reason especially attracted the attention of Athenians : such a reason may be found in his return to Athens, full of his Egyptian experiences, and in the publication of Book II. at this time. Bauer suggested nearly fifty years ago that Book II. was written by Herodotus after some of the other

books; there certainly seem to be clear evidences of a change of mental attitude in several of its chapters,[1] and the assumption of a later date for it would fit in well with its general features. Why is it so disproportionately long? Why is such an amount of space assigned to Egypt? In spite of Herodotus' exaggerated belief in the obligations of his countrymen to Egypt,[2] it cannot be maintained for a moment that Egypt was of anything like the same importance in his subject as the history of Persia or even of Lydia. Yet his narrative is overburdened, and its sequence interrupted, by an unnaturally long digression, much longer even than the one on Scythia, which is dealt with at length as the subject of the first Persian attack on Europe. These peculiarities would be explained if we could suppose that Herodotus' travels in Egypt, in whole or in part,[3] belong to the decade after 425 B.C.

Again, it has been urged with some plausibility that in three passages[4] of his work at any rate Herodotus seems to speak as if the Peloponnesian War were over.[4]

It then may be suggested that Herodotus published Book II. shortly before the appearance of the *Birds* in

[1] Cf. H. and W. Introd. p. 14 for Bauer's theory: in his *Die Entstehung des Herod. Gesch.* (Vienna, 1878) he maintained this; but he did not argue for placing Herodotus' death after the date usually given.

[2] Cf. ii. 50 n. and Appendix ix. in H. and W.

[3] Herodotus may well have been in Egypt twice, approaching it once by land (cf. iii. 5-6, especially 6), and once by sea (ii. 5); he seems to have detailed knowledge of the land route, and if this visit be put early, it would account for his observations on the battlefield of Papremis, which it is natural to suppose were made not long after 459 B.C. But this is mere conjecture.

[4] vi. 98. 2; ix. 73. 3; see H. and W. for notes on these passages. Certainly the reference in vi. 98 to the 'generation' (γενέα) of Artaxerxes is very odd, if the passage were written about 425 when that King had only just come to the throne, and the use of the aorist participle in ix. 73 would rather imply 'the war' was a thing of the past; vii. 137 is less definite. The supposed references to events in the last decade of the fifth century (i. 130. 2; iii. 15. 3) are clearly unlikely on other grounds; (see H. and W. notes *ad loc.*).

414, and so gave Aristophanes occasion for a fresh burst of jokes. This date may be said to gain a little confirmation from a curious feature in the contemporary plays of Euripides. In 415 that dramatist, in his *Troades*, used the story of Helen in the usual form; she is one of the women captured. But three years later in the *Helen* he introduces the extraordinary story which Stesichorus had invented, that Helen was never in Troy at all, but only a phantom of her. And, further, he introduces into this story details apparently added to it by Herodotus (ii. 112 f.), who was the first to bring the real Helen, as opposed to the phantom, to Egypt. Other details in Euripides which are Herodotean are the virtuous self-restraint of Proteus and the taking of sanctuary by fugitives. So pleased was Euripides with this version that he also introduces it at the end of his *Electra* (1280-1), the date of which is uncertain, but which is usually placed in the last period of the Peloponnesian War. This employment of a very unpoetical fiction fits in naturally with the view that it had the attraction of novelty.[1]

There is at any rate nothing impossible in the suggestion that Herodotus may have been living and writing after the Peace of Nicias, when the war was nominally ended. What is certain is that his attitude to Greek History is such as would have been natural to one writing at that time. The words in vi. 98 would be appropriate if written before the Peloponnesian War, and still more if written about 425 B.C., but they suit best of all the period of uncertainty after 421, when it was clear that the struggle between the 'rival heads of Greece' was not settled, but was to be fought to the death. This attitude on the part of Herodotus is clearly that of Aristophanes himself: the gross burlesque

[1] It may be noted also that the one undoubted reference to Herodotus in Sophocles (cf. ii. 35 with *Oed. Col.* 337) belongs to this period; the play was produced in 406 B.C. The more striking parallel between Hdt. iii. 119. 6 and Antigone 904 *seq.* is thought by many (cf. Jebb *ad loc.*) to be an interpolation in the poet's text. All that can be said is that this passage in the *Oedipus Col.* slightly supports the date here suggested for Herodotus' Book. II.

of the *Lysistrata* only partly conceals the real pathos (*e.g.* in ll. 591 f.) of the long continued war, and the poet's statesmanlike desire to end strife by a federal compromise (cf. ll. 574 f.).

But if Aristophanes and Herodotus agree in their attitude to the war, the comic poet still continues his gibes: the fact that Herodotus' heroine queen, Artemisia, is coupled (*Lysis.* 675) with the Amazons as a threat to Athens, proves nothing, for it is the appropriate expression of the prejudices of the chorus of Athenian elders; but it surely is a deliberate attack on Herodotus that her name is used and misused in the *Thermophoriazusae* (l. 1200 f.) for a lady of more than doubtful reputation.

The points in this paper may then be briefly summed up.

I. The allusions in Aristophanes prove clearly that the work of Herodotus had for a time a great vogue at Athens.

II. They seem to indicate a special interest in his work about 425 and again in and after 414.

III. If this be true, they tend to confirm the generally accepted view that he was in Athens early in the Peloponnesian War, while they support the view which has been put forward but not generally accepted, that he was alive and writing after the Peace of Nicias.

IV. They illustrate strikingly the contrast between Herodotus' cosmopolitan interest and the narrow Hellenism of Periclean Athens.

X.

Herodotus and the Intellectual Life of his Age

[This essay has probably cost me more thought and more reading than any other, and I am profoundly dissatisfied with the result. Probably the subject is too large for treatment in the space, and requires at least a small volume to itself. It has been dealt with in parts by many scholars, but I do not know any book dealing with it as a whole, though W. Nestle's *Herodot's Verhältnis zur Philosophie und Sophistik* (Stuttgart 1908) is very useful and interesting.]

IT is, I think, a generally accepted view with most modern critics that Herodotus not only visited Athens more than once, but that he resided there for some time, and that he was materially affected by this residence both in his political views and in his general intellectual development. So E. Meyer says that the conviction that the hegemony of Athens was the natural and well justified result of her conduct in the Persian Wars, was the cause 'which has led him, when the great decisive struggle began, to combine the numerous special results of his researches in one single work.'[1] This thesis is worked out in great detail by Jacoby,[2] who considers that the original idea of Herodotus was geographical, to write a γῆς Περίοδος like that of Hecataeus, and that his results were first given in the form of lectures delivered on his travels (p. 353); it was the influence of the Periclean circle which made Herodotus an historian; 'it is not the Ionian traveller who has become the historian of the Persian Wars, but the 'Wahlathener,' 'the Athenian by adoption' (p. 360). So he even suggests that the form of the work of Herodotus was partly due to his intimacy with Pericles himself' (cf. also p. 379). In a similar sense Diels[3] connects Herodotus with the Sophoclean circle (cf.

[1] *Forsch.* ii. p. 198.
[2] *P. W.* viii. 2nd supp. pp. 205 ff., cf. especially p. 362.
[3] *Neu. Jahr. für K.A.*, 1910, p. 21 quoting *Vit. Soph.*

p. 186), and thinks he was introduced, as a member of Sophoclean *θίασος ἐκ τῶν πεπαιδευμένων*, into the 'higher region' of Philology.

An endeavour has been made elsewhere (p. 153) to show that this view of Herodotus does not correspond with the political standpoint from which he writes. The question must now be discussed whether his work, from the point of view of general culture, shows a strong Athenian influence, or whether it is not rather true that such views as those quoted above are only new instances of the old tendency to exaggerate the part played by Athens in the intellectual life of Greece. That Herodotus was influenced by Athens is of course obvious; but an endeavour will be made to show that his culture is mainly due to influences not specially Athenian, or not Athenian at all, in fact that Herodotus' peculiar position in Greek culture is rather that he is the crown of the intellectual greatness of the Asiatic-Greek sea-board, driven by Persian conquest into exile, and developed in new fields and on new lines by the enterprising life of the Greek world in the West.

Before speaking in any detail as to the intellectual relations of Herodotus, perhaps two general points may be discussed briefly. It was the policy of Pericles to make Athens artistically the most glorious city of Greece. The treasures of the Delian League gave her a unique opportunity, and her great statesman took full advantage of it. We must not exaggerate the supremacy of Athens in art; the largest Greek temples were not there,[1] and Time has been kinder to her buildings than to those of any other Greek city of the first rank. But the fact remains that the period when Herodotus knew Athens, was, by universal admission, the greatest artistically that Greece or the world has ever seen. Herodotus never refers to this artistic development at all,[2] and yet he goes out of

[1] Cf. Meyer, *Forsch.* i. 155 n.

[2] The reference to the *προπύλαια* in v. 77 is generally taken to refer to the earlier Propylaea, not to the famous work of Mnesicles.

his way to give some details about the Heraeum at Samos (iii. 60), and to single out certain Greek temples for comparison with those of Egypt (ii. 148). He had an obvious occasion at which he might in the same way have introduced some reference to the Athenian Acropolis, when he speaks of the dedication of the Bridge Cables (ix. 121); but he leaves them vaguely in the 'temples.'[1] It would almost seem as if Herodotus purposely avoided mention of the greatness of Periclean Athens; without doubt he did not go out of his way to make mention of it, as an enthusiastic Philo-Athenian might certainly have been expected to do.

The second point is as to the literary quotations of Herodotus. There is no doubt that he was a well-read man, and that he shows by direct reference an extensive acquaintance with almost every branch of literature. Homer and the Cyclic poets might be taken for granted in a Greek. But Herodotus quotes from didactic poets like Hesiod, from 'hymn' writers like Olen, from lyric poets like Archilochus, Alcaeus, Sappho, Solon,[2] Pindar, Simonides, from geographical poets like Aristeas, from philosophers like Pythagoras, from dramatists like Phrynichus and Aeschylus, from chroniclers like Hecataeus, not to mention a wide range of oracular literature.[3]

These quotations are all from writers by name. In addition he mentions Anacreon, Aesop and Lasus without quoting from them. In contrast with this, he does not mention by name a single writer among his own contemporaries, and where parallel passages can be quoted

[1] For other references to Athenian temples left quite vague, cf. v. 71, 72.

[2] Not many will be attracted by Diels' quaint suggestion (*ib.*, p. 23) that Herodotus quoted Solon to please the Athenians. Apart from the fact that there were so many more obvious quotations by which Herodotus could have pleased the Athenians, it was hardly happy to remind the Athenians that the 'founder of their democracy' had been friendly with, and had praised, the semi-Asiatic tyrant Philocyprus.

[3] For references for these quotations, cf. H. and W. i. 21.

from them for Herodotean ideas and phrases, either they are of the vaguest kind, or they seem to be clearly borrowed from Herodotus and not borrowed by Herodotus.

The most obvious instance is that of Sophocles. That he was acquainted with Herodotus is practically certain; he wrote a poem to him about 445,[1] a date which is interesting as confirming the statement in the chronologers (see p. 176) that Athens in that year passed a vote in honour of Herodotus. There are at least three passages[2] where the parallelism is so curious as to seem more than accidental, *viz.* *Antigone* 904 compared with Herodotus iii. 119 (the preference of a brother above all other relatives); *Electra* 62-4 with iv. 95 (the return to life after pretended death), and *Oed. Col.* 337-41 with ii. 35 (the topsyturviness of Egypt). The first of these has seemed so forced and inconsistent in the play[3] that many critics think it an old interpolation, perhaps by the poet's son Iophon; the second is intolerably forced in the mouth of Orestes, while the story of Zalmoxis is completely in Herodotus' manner; the third is so inappropriate in the mouth of Oedipus that it might almost be quoted as a justification of the malicious suit brought against the old man at the end of his life, as being no longer in possession of his powers; in Herodotus, on the other hand, the passage, however incorrect in its striving after antithesis, makes a natural introduction to the account of Egyptian manners and customs. All probability then is that Sophocles borrowed from Herodotus (not very happily) and not that the historian took ideas and stories from the dramatist.[4]

[1] Plut. *An Seni Res. Ger.* c. 3, p. 785.

[2] No attempt has been made to consider passages where there is no special resemblance in form.

[3] See Jebb, *ad loc.*

[4] Other instances may be found in H. and W. i. 7 and in *Woch. für Klas. Phil.* 1913 (No. 23), p. 620. They are either commonplaces of Greek thought, *e.g.* *Oed. Col.* 1225 compared with vii. 46; *Ajax* 758 compared with vii. 10—the jealousy of the gods (quoted by Stein *ad loc.*), or purely accidental, *e.g.* *Ajax* 61 f. with ix. 39, with no special verbal resemblance.

With Euripides the evidence against borrowing on the part of Herodotus is very much stronger. There is indeed a fairly considerable number of passages where the dramatist and the historian utter the same sentiments; the evils of a tyrant as set forth in *Supplices* 445 f. remind us of the speeches of Otanes and of Sosicles (iii. 80, v. 92); but then the points are commonplaces in Greek literature; so is the view of the mutability of Fortune, which allows us to call no man happy till he is dead; Herodotus' well-known story of Solon (i. 29) agrees verbally with Euripides'[1] *Andromache* 100-1 and *Troades* 509-510. The reference to community of wives in Euripides' fragment (No. 655) from the *Protesilaus* may have some connection with Herodotus iv. 104, but the idea was much in Greek minds at the time; and the pessimistic view which looks on Life as an evil, which is found in Euripides' fragment 452 (from the *Cresphontes*) and in Herodotus v. 4, is another commonplace.[2] Rather more striking, because less obvious, is the verbal resemblance between the fragment of the *Oenomaus* (578) τεκμαιρόμεσθα τοῖς παροῦσι τἀφανῆ and Herodotus ii. 33; but this idea had been expressed earlier by Solon (Stobaeus *flor* iii. 79) and was also used by Sophocles (*Oed. Rex.* 916). On the whole it may be said that there is no resemblance between Herodotus and Euripides which may not well be accidental, except the curious and arbitrary use of the myth of Helen in the *Helena* and the *Electra* of the dramatist (see p. 181), which clearly are borrowings, and not very happy ones, on his part from Herodotus.

It then seems well established that Herodotus does not quote from Athenian contemporary literature, as he quotes

[1] On the relations of Herodotus and Euripides the book of W. Nestle (Stuttgart 1901) is very useful, at any rate as a collection of material; but his inferences must be accepted with caution, and his references need verification.

[2] Cf. the string of parallels quoted by Dindorf in *Poet. Scen. Grae. ad loc.*

from that of earlier generations. It may be answered that he only quotes passages from the historic point of view, passages relevant to the events which he describes, and that therefore he does not quote Sophocles and Euripides as they had nothing to say on the subjects which he treats. But this objection does not apply to two passages at any rate in his work; he might well have illustrated his conception of Νομος in iii. 38, from *Hecuba* 800-1 instead of from Pindar, and it is hard to believe that he could not have found in Sophocles and Euripides variant myths such as he quotes from Aeschylus (ii. 156). But he carefully avoids doing so.

On the whole then his treatment of literature corresponds to his treatment of art; on both subjects it is pre-Periclean work which fills his mind. Such pre-occupations are strongly against the view that Herodotus' mental atmosphere was completely changed in Athens.

But it is more important to turn to something positive, and to consider what are the subjects that fill the mind of Herodotus, and what affinities to other writers he shows in dealing with them.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Herodotus as an historian is his attempt to combine all knowledge, as he understood it, and could attain to it, in one work. History in the strict sense fills but a comparatively small part of his books; Geography, Science in many branches and especially what we now call Anthropology, Philology and last but not least, Theology find a place there. In this respect he is not altogether an innovator; rather he continues the old tradition of Ionia, where the Philosophers took all knowledge for their province. Where he marks a development is in the greater prominence of the human element, *i.e.* of History proper. Of the developments which are characteristic of Athenian literature and culture more will be said later.

It has been suggested that Herodotus in his attitude to knowledge was strongly influenced by the theories of Hippocrates and his school; according to them, accurate

study of the body required study of the whole of nature, of which the body was a part.[1] So Hippocrates in his treatise Περὶ Ἀέρων[2] speaks at length of the influence of climate and natural features on national character. This doctrine is not very prominent in Herodotus, and in fact the clearest example of it (ix. 122), the last chapter of his history, comes in so oddly that it may well be an addition, the form of which at any rate was suggested from outside, perhaps even directly by Hippocrates himself. But if this were so, it seems equally clear that Hippocrates may well have derived some of his data from the travels of his older[3] contemporary, and perhaps from personal intercourse with him. It is noticeable that the range of countries from which the physician draws his illustrations, corresponds largely to the range of Herodotus, though it is somewhat less extended, and it is a marked feature of Herodotus' observations that he everywhere is interested in medicine and its practitioners.[4] It is not suggested for one moment that Herodotus is the Father of Medicine; he had not the scientific aptitude for deducing a principle from diverse facts.[5] But he was a diligent and accurate collector of material, with a curious instinct for distinguishing true statements from false, and

[1] Plato, *Phaedrus* 270 B.C.

[2] Especially c. 23, but elsewhere also.

[3] Hippocrates' birth is placed 460 B.C.

[4] Cf. his remarks on the practice of Babylonians (i. 197) and Egyptians (ii. 77), his story of Democedes with its open triumph in the superiority of Greek medicine (iii. 129 f.), his account of the Scyths generally in Bk. IV. and especially of the θήλεα νοῦσος (i. 105), a complaint which has puzzled ancients and moderns alike, his reference to the cautery of the Nomads (iv. 187), his studies in craniography (iii. 12). The list might be considerably extended. For the whole subject of Herodotus and Medicine, cf. W. Nestle *Hdt's. Verhältris*, pp. 12-13.

[5] It is somewhat curious that Hippocrates applies his doctrine of the happy 'blending' of climates (κρῆσις, Περὶ Ἀέρων, c. 12) to Asia, while Herodotus (iii. 106) applies it to Greece; Herodotus (i. 142) also speaks of Ionia in similar terms, though he does not use the exact word. For a similar looseness, cf. Euripides fr. 971.

so he helped to lay the foundations of science. It need hardly be added that he belonged to the same quarter of the Greek world as Hippocrates; Cos is the nearest island to Halicarnassus. So far as Athens was concerned, she had little or nothing to teach Herodotus in the way of medicine. The breakdown of her physicians in the presence of the Plague (Thuc. ii. 51)[1] is well known. Croton[2] in the West, Epidaurus in the Peloponnese, and S.-W. Asia Minor were the special seats of Greek medicine.

But other branches of Physical Science interest Herodotus as well as medicine. Probably the most striking instances of this come in Book II., which there is good reason to believe (see p. 180) was written later than much—perhaps than all—of his other work, and long after he had left Athens and resided for a time at any rate in South Italy. He employs geological evidence in determining the effect of rivers in land extension (ii. cc. 10-12). He has been supposed to derive this idea from Xenophanes, who may have been the first to use this line of evidence; but it is noticeable that the Elean philosopher appeals only to sea creatures (*κόγχαι, φῶκαι, ἀφύη*), while Herodotus extends his observations to the general character of the soil, including the sea bottom (ii. 5 *ad fin.*). Here as elsewhere the most probable view is that an idea, once launched, became part of the common stock of men of intelligence. Knowledge in our day is circulated by the printed page; in the sixth, and even in the fifth century, in Greece, it reached men far more through the spoken word and the ear than through the written word and the eye.

A different problem as to the physical geography of rivers is that of the rising of the Nile, which also Herodotus discusses in Book II. (cc. 19-25). That Herodotus should be interested in this is not in the least surprising; the effects of the Nile flood were so important, and its rise in summer

[1] But it must be added that the stories as to the success of Hippocrates in dealing with the Plague are more than doubtful. (Littré *Oeuvres d'Hippoc.* i. 39 ff.)

[2] Alcmaeon of Croton is said to have been the first to dissect.

seemed so paradoxical, that the causes of it were a much discussed problem from the earliest times till modern geographical exploration furnished the solution. But it is surprising to note the thoroughness with which Herodotus goes into the problem; he carefully avoided the supernatural element, which we know some of his older contemporaries had introduced into the matter—Pindar[1] *e.g.* thought the rise of the Nile the work of a δαίμων; he also rightly pours contempt on the a priori geography of Hecataeus. His own theory is as absurd as it is elaborate, and is only valuable as showing how completely he had failed to grasp some of the elementary facts of Physical Science; hence he refused to appreciate the theory—true in great part—that the rise was due to melting snow. It may be noted in passing that his familiarity with this is not at all a proof that he had met, at Athens or anywhere else, Anaxagoras, his younger contemporary, who maintained this view. The theory was a commonplace of the educated Greek world at least as early as the generation before Herodotus and Anaxagoras, for Aeschylus employed it.[2]

One more example of Herodotus' interest in Physical Science must be referred to, as it illustrates in the most curious way his mental attitude, *viz.* his discussion of the Gorge of Tempe in its bearing on the geography of Thessaly (vii. 129). He accepts the orthodox view that it was the work of Poseidon; but the scientific spirit in him asserts itself, and he feels bound to see in it 'the result of an earthquake.' He then quaintly combines the Positive and the Theological explanations, by making the earthquake the instrument of Poseidon.

To attempt to collect and comment on all the scientific data of Herodotus would require a volume. The instances that have been quoted are enough to show in the first place his deep interest in the subject, next that he endeavoured to theorize about it, not very successfully, and lastly that his scientific affinities are with Asia Minor and the

[1] Quoted in Philostratus *Vit. Ap. Ty.* vi. 26.
[2] Fr. 304.

generation before his own, not with the intellectual circles of Athens in his own day. Their interest had shifted from the fields with which Herodotus was familiar; in the Periclean circle, as Dr. Singer says,[1] 'The Department of Philosophy that dealt with nature receded before Ethics. Of that intellectual revolution, perhaps the greatest that the world has seen, Athens was the site, and Socrates the prophet.' How completely Herodotus was a stranger to it can best be appreciated by comparing the scientific pages of Herodotus with the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon. When Socrates does touch on Natural Science (i. c 4, iv. c. 3), it is in its ethical aspect, as when he argues for Divine Providence from the wonderful conformation of man. 'Nature interested' him 'mainly in relation to himself.'[2] Of course, however, this point of view occurs in Herodotus as well, and may be next considered.

The idea that there is a cycle in human affairs is one which Herodotus seems to have held in common with many Greeks: he expresses it most clearly in the warnings given by the mouth of Croesus to Cyrus (i. 207) on his last campaign. The idea was at least as old as Heracleitus,[3] and had no doubt passed into the current thought of Greece by the fifth century. An extension of the same idea is the belief in the uncertainty of all things human as contrasted with the unchangingness of 'the Divine.' This is the doctrine of Xenophanes and Parmenides, and recurs verbally in Sophocles[4] as well as in Herodotus (i. 5), who gives it as a motive for his history. The natural result of these doctrines was a confirmed pessimism; for man, in his helplessness to move the powers that control him irresistibly, is almost certain to look on these powers as likely to be unfriendly, and then to see in life a confirmation of this expectation. The pessimism of Herodotus is so familiar a feature that it is hardly

[1] *Legacy of Greece*, p. 175. [2] Singer, *u.s.* p. 167.

[3] Fr. 70 (Bywater).

[4] Fr. 93. For Xenophanes, cf. fr. 26 *αἰεὶ δ' ἐν ταὐτῷ μίμνει κινούμενος οὐδέν.*

necessary to illustrate it[1]; the most striking instance is the speech of Artabanus to Xerxes at the Hellespont. In view of the general prevalence of such views among the Greeks, views which are put by Homer in the mouth of Achilles (*Il.* xxiv. 525) and are expressed by Theognis (425 f.) in almost the same terms as by Sophocles (*O.C.* 1,225 f.), it seems quite unnecessary to suppose that Herodotus derives his pessimism from Prodicus, although the latter's discourse on the evils of life (Plato, *Axioch* 367) contains Herodotus' story of the sons of the Argive priestess.[2]

A more characteristic passage about the relation of man to the universe is the vindication of the goodness of Providence in iii. 108, where the resemblance to the same doctrine in Plato (*Protagoras* 321 B) seems too close and verbal to be accidental; Protagoras, in the form of a myth, attributes to Epimetheus the arrangement which Herodotus gives to τοῦ Θείου ἡ προνοίη; by it πολυγονία, fecundity, is made the attribute of the weak, and ὀλιγογονία of those that prey on them. As Herodotus and Protagoras both took part in the colonization of Thurii, it is most probable that this resemblance is due to their actual intercourse; but by all the rules of criticism, Herodotus is the more likely to be the giver and not the receiver, for in him the doctrine is stated much more fully than by Protagoras, and he gives interesting examples, unknown to the sophist. Moreover, the attribution to 'Providence' seems decidedly more primitive than the myth form of Protagoras. Herodotus may easily have learned from Protagoras some of his information[3] about the native place of the sophist, Abdera, but it is hard to see why he should be thought to have copied the antithetical form of some of his speeches (*e.g.* that of Themistocles at Salamis viii. 83) from Protagoras. The sophist, it is true, composed two

[1] Cf. H. and W. nn. on i. 31, vii. 46, and Introd. p. 49.

[2] i. 31. Their names are given by Herodotus, not by Plato, who on his part gives another familiar instance not mentioned by Herodotus.

[3] Cf. vii. 120, 137; viii. 120. For Protagoras' birth at Abdera and for his legislation at Thurii, cf. *Diog. Laer.* ix. 50.

books of Ἀντιλόγιαι, and Herodotus uses this word twice in viii. 77; but the method and the word are equally obvious and prove nothing as to copying.

Herodotus, however, only rarely holds the cheerful view of Divine Providence which is implied in the passage quoted above; it would be inconsistent with the pessimism already mentioned. And it is a commonplace in the history of Greek religious thought that he, on the whole, is in a state more primitive than his predecessor, Aeschylus. The conceptions of the dramatist that pride leads to a fall and that sin inevitably brings punishment, are found in the historian (cf. i. 34); but they are less common than the older and more vulgar conception of the Divine jealousy, which is envious of human greatness in itself, quite apart from any moral fault.[1] Hence Herodotus does not, like the Eleatic philosophers or Heracleitus, criticize the gods; he holds his peace and will not venture to conjecture as to their action (cf. ix. 65); he describes obscene ceremonies[2] without a hint of censure, and carefully avoids explanation of them.

But whatever Herodotus' view of the gods' character, he has no doubt of their constant interference in men's affairs; interpositions of gods are almost as frequent in him as in Homer, though their actual personal appearances are rare. While he is not quite free from the tendency to minimize their direct action,[3] he gives many instances of the prophetic power of dreams; when, morever, he introduces the rational explanation of them, which has

[1] Cf. H. and W. i. 32 n. and Introd. p. 49-50.

In one respect, however, as Meyer well shows (*Forsch.* ii. 262-3), Herodotus, like Sophocles, is less primitive than Aeschylus; they recognize that the innocent may suffer and that man cannot always explain Divine action, and show its justice, though he submits to it as Divine.

[2] Cf. ii. 48-9. It is hard to see here the 'criticism between the lines' which Nestle detects (*u.s.* p. 9). The attitude of Herodotus is the very opposite to that of Heracleitus (fr. 127, Bywater, No. 15, Diels), who contemptuously says the rites would have been 'most shameless were they not to Dionysus.'

[3] Cf. p. 191 *sup.* and vii. 191, of the storm off Cape Sepias.

been urged continually from his own time to this, putting it in the mouth of Artabanus, who tells Xerxes that *πεπλανῆσθαι αὗται μάλιστα ἐώθασι αἱ ὄψιες τῶν ὀνειράτων τά τις ἡμέρης φροντίζει* (vii. 16), it may be urged with confidence that his narrative shows that he did not accept the explanation,[1] but that, here as elsewhere, he looked on dreams as revelations from some supernatural power. Herodotus, moreover, is essentially a ritualist rather than a dogmatist; he is largely in the early stage of thought when religion is held to consist in the thing done, rather than in the thing believed. He is always careful to describe the religions of the nations he introduces, but his descriptions are mainly from the outside. Hence, though he is familiar with the Pythagorean doctrine of Metempsychosis, he expresses no opinion as to its truth; the points that interest him are whether the Greeks borrowed it from Egypt (ii. 123), and whether the Greeks were right in making the Thracian Zalmoxis learn it from Pythagoras; the former view he accepts, the second he rejects.[2]

So far then as religion is concerned, it may certainly be said that, while Herodotus is familiar to some extent with the developed thought of the fifth century, he hardly ever accepts it; his standpoint is conservative and cautious, very different from the bold negations of the teachers acceptable to the Periclean circle or from the rational piety of Socrates.

Turning now to the practical side of religion, *i.e.* to morals, it is easy to find traces of fifth-century thought in Herodotus. But it must be added that he does not seem to have a very clear grasp of the philosophic questions underlying morals. One of the most fundamental of these is the discussion as to the nature of 'Law,' whether it rests

[1] It was first given by Empedocles fr. 108; Diels, whom Nestle (p. 7) follows, gives the reference in Herodotus wrongly as vii. 46. Nestle is singularly unhappy in this passage, which he quotes elsewhere as vii. 116 (*Euripides*, p. 442).

[2] It was the doctrine of Empedocles (cf. fr. 115); but it is interesting to contrast his *τρὶς μυρίας ὥρας* with the '3,000 years' of Herodotus.

on the actual enactment of states or is ἐν πάσῃ χώρᾳ κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομιζόμενος; this is the point discussed by Socrates and the sophist Hippias in the *Memorabilia* (iv. 4). Herodotus raises something of the same point in his discussion of the conduct of Cambyses, but his Νόμος, which is the determining element in settling what may be done, is only 'custom,' and he quotes Pindar to that effect. But apparently the very passage which he quotes was being used by the teachers of the day as the expression of the 'natural law' that

> 'They should take who have the power,
> And they should keep who can.'

So Callicles uses it in Plato's *Gorgias* (484 B). In view of this unphilosophic misconception on the part of Herodotus, it is not surprising that we get few traces of the sophistic morality in him. Some, however, there are. A curious and very marked instance is the defence of a lie which he puts in the mouth of Darius as conspirator (iii. 72). It has been compared to the Aeschylean fragment[1] ἀπάτης δικαίας οὐκ ἀποστατεῖ θεός, but the idea is not worked out there as it is in Herodotus and by Socrates[2] in his talk with Euthydemus. The argument that truth and a lie are the same because 'their end is the same' is clearly part of the new education which Aristophanes so bitterly denounces, and is all the more inappropriate in Herodotus because he rightly lays stress (i. 136) on Persian love of truth. But this part of Herodotus' narrative is very probably derived from the Hellenized Persian, Zopyrus, (see p. 99), and such an exaggeration of sophistic method is very natural in a half-educated Oriental, who outdoes Western thought in aping Western ideas.

This suggestion of origin is much more probable than that of Jacoby (*u.s.* p. 501), who thinks we may have here an 'echo of the discussions' in 'intellectual circles at Samos.' Why should Samians go out of their way to credit Persian chiefs with Hellenic ideas?

[1] No. 287. A similar sentiment in *Soph.* fr. 823.

[2] Xen. *Memor.* iv. 2. 14-15.

Another characteristic passage in Herodotus is that in which he argues that all men would, if allowed the choice, choose their own misdeeds rather than those of others; but this sentiment seems to have been derived from Solon,[1] and like the passage as to 'Law' quoted above, is misunderstood by Herodotus, for Solon certainly referred to 'misfortunes' and not misdeeds, and is followed in that sense by Socrates.[2]

Herodotus' own moral standards are more old-fashioned; they are seen better in such a narrative as that of Periander and his son (iii. 50-3) than in the passages just discussed; the Corinthian story is full of the gnomic wisdom of the sixth century. In morals, as in religion and in science, Herodotus is not a member of the Periclean circle; he is a sixth-century Greek, with the interests of an Ionic philosopher, not of an Athenian sophist.

One more branch of knowledge must be briefly referred to—the beginnings of Philology. Diels[3] well describes the attempts of Herodotus in this science, and considers that he owes them to the sophists, first at Athens, 'the centre point of Hellenic culture,' and then at Thurii, 'the ideal state of up-to-date sophism.' It has been suggested that he borrowed his etymology of *θεός* (ii. 52) from Anaxagoras, because his derivation of the word from *κόσμῳ θέντες* might be taken to refer to the philosopher's doctrine[4] that *νοῦς* duly ordered everything; but if Anaxagoras really did derive *ψυχη* from *φύσιν ἔχει, i.e.* making it equal to *φυσέχη* (*Cratylus*, 400 B), Herodotus shines by comparison with his tutor. Another absurd etymology is that of *σελήνη* in *Cratylus* (409 B); the fact that the Phrygians are referred to in the next page (410 A) has been thought to show a source similar to that of the story of the experiment of Psammetichus in Hdt. ii. 2; but this seems accidental and trifling. We may sum up that the resemblance in the

[1] vii. 152; for its form in Solon cf. *Val. Max.* vii. 2.
[2] Plut. *Moralia.* 106 B.
[3] *U.s.*, p. 14 and note.
[4] Cf. Plato, *Cratylus* 413 C. *νοῦς πάντα κοσμεῖ τα πράγματα.*

methods of Herodotus and of Anaxagoras is too vague to warrant any conclusion.

In the same way Herodotus' somewhat over-elaborate contrast of ὁ ὄλβιος and ὁ εὐτυχής in the speech of Solon, (i. 32) is supposed to owe something[1] to the synonym-splitting of Prodicus; but again the mode of expression might occur to any intelligent man.

That Herodotus was interested in language as language is clear, even though his remarks on the subject are more confident than accurate[2]; such questions were in the air, and Herodotus was attracted by them as by the other intellectual movements of his time; but there is no sufficient evidence to connect him with any one teacher, and he was as likely to hear linguistic subjects discussed in Ionia or in Magna Graecia as at Athens.

To turn from the subject matter of Herodotus to his style,[3] there is no doubt that here he is no borrower from Athens or Athenian models. Whether we agree with Mure[4] or not that his 'work may rank at least on a par with the Attic masterpieces,' Herodotus certainly lay outside the new influences in Greek prose, though, as Mahaffy[5] says, his 'genius was unable to stem the tide' of Attic influence.

The style of Herodotus was always contrasted by the Greek critics with the style of Thucydides; that of the

[1] In the same speech the stress laid on being αὐτάρκης is supposed to have been suggested by the boasts of Hippias as to his self-sufficiency; but there does not seem to be any resemblance beyond a merely verbal one between the amusing account of Hippias appearing at Olympia (Plato *Hipp. Min.* 368 B.) in his self-made garments and the more general use of the word by Herodotus. Certainly, however, the passage in the historian seems so irrelevant to his argument that it is at least a possibility that it is an ill-judged piece of borrowing.

[2] Cf. *e.g.* i. 139 on Persian names.

[3] Jacoby's (*u.s.* §31, especially pages 491-504) treatment of this subject is most interesting, and he is the more valuable, as being less confident than usual in his inferences; in discussing Herodotus, his merits and his sources, it is often necessary to be content 'not to know.'

[4] *Hist. of Greek Lit.*, iv. 127.

[5] *Hist. of Greek Prose Writers*, i. p. 15.

Ionian writer was εἰρομένη καὶ τῷ συνδέσμῳ μία ('loosely joined and only united by connecting words'), that of his great Athenian successor 'Periodic,' 'having a beginning and end in itself.'[1] There is no need to exaggerate the simplicity of this 'Ionic' style, for Herodotus was, as Cicero[2] says, rightly quoting Theophrastus, one of the first to write artistic prose in history: 'primis ab his (Hdt. and Thuc.) historia commota est ut auderet uberius quam superiores et ornatius dicere.' It is especially in his speeches that he uses those figures of speech which are so familiar to us in Attic prose; Mahaffy rightly says that a speech like that of Xerxes to Artabanus is decidedly 'Thucydidean' in tone.[3] These figures came to be known as 'those of Gorgias,' though certainly they were employed, consciously or unconsciously, in Athens before Gorgias[4] came on his historic embassy there in 427, and introduced definitely the new style of prose. Aristotle[5] gives three of these figures, ἀντίθεσις (which needs no explanation), παρίσωσις, the balance of the two parts of the sentence, and παρομοίωσις, *i.e.* similarity of terminations either at the beginning or at the end. That Herodotus uses all these is certain: Norden (*v.i.* p. 28) quotes various striking instances, *e.g.* ii. 72 is an especially good example of antithesis, ὁμοίωσἀν ὅ τε ἀληθιζόμενος ψευδὴς εἴη καὶ ὁ ψευδόμενος ἀλη-

[1] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* iii. 9 (p. 1409 *a. ad fin.*). It is significant that Aristotle ignores Hecataeus, unlike the late critic Demetrius (περὶ Ἑρμην. 12), who uses about the style the phrases διηρημένη . . . ἐς κῶλα λελυμένη.

[2] *Orator* 39, cf. *de Orat.* ii. 55, where Antonius admires Herodotus 'so far as he can understand' the Greek.

[3] *U.s.* p. 33. But it is extraordinary that he should go on: 'it proves how fully Herodotus sympathized with the enterprise of Imperial Athens.' The speech is put into the mouth of Xerxes, who is always made by Herodotus to be wrong, and the futility of its arguments is demonstrated no less by Herodotus' whole narrative than by the arguments of Artabanus, which the King is attempting to answer.

[4] E. Norden, *Antike Kunst Prosa*, i. 27-9; cf. Diod. xii. 53 for Gorgias' embassy.

[5] *Rhet.* iii. 9. 1410 *a.*

θής, for in it thought and expression are alike Sophistic (cf. p. 196); other instances quoted by him are i. 210 (the blessings conferred by Cyrus on the Persians) and iv. 132, the triple symbolic warning of the Scyths to Darius. But the list could be indefinitely extended.

The question is, however, whether Herodotus, when he uses these, is consciously following any rules of style. The general opinion of antiquity was against this view; so Dionysius of Halicarnassus[1] says that he does not use ἐναγώνιοι λόγοι, while he blames Thucydides for his use of rhetorical figures, and Quintilian contrasts 'contiones' in which 'similiter cadentia quaedam et contraposita deprehendi,' with Herodotus, in whom 'omnia leniter fluunt.'[2] And this surely is the rational view. Prose was developing everywhere in the Greek world, and Herodotus is, as Jacoby well says (p. 486), the 'first great champion in the struggle which has decided the supremacy of Prose in the Greek Literature of the Future.' Antithesis and its kindred figures come naturally to a man who thinks and wishes to make his thoughts tell; such figures must have been used, and we know they were used, long before Gorgias, or any other fifth-century teacher, laid down rules for their use.[3]

Herodotus is often credited with adorning his pages with borrowed phrases, and it is undoubtedly clear that Homeric

[1] p. 866. Περὶ Θουκυδίδου, cc 23-4. *ad fin.*

[2] Quint. ix. 4. 18. The whole subject is well treated by A. Nieschke in his *De figurarum quae vocantur* σχήματα Γοργίεια *apud Herodotum usu* (Munden 1891; Bodleian press-mark 2919 *e.* 11; it is bound up curiously with a pamphlet on school children's names). He examines the instances collected from Herodotus by P. Kleber (not Weber as quoted by Jacoby, p. 500), and concludes that the instances in Herodotus are 'neque ex rhetorum praeceptis orta nec ex libris prosa artificiosa scriptis hausta,' but that Herodotus was imitating the poets, who had freely used 'illa ornamenta,' and especially Homer.

[3] Cf. Macaulay's Essay on 'Lord Bacon' (*Essays*, p. 408). 'A drayman in a passion calls out "You are a pretty fellow," without suspecting that he is uttering irony, and that irony is one of the four primary tropes.'

diction coloured his writing,[1] probably without conscious aim on his part, just as the Authorized Version of the Bible coloured seventeenth-century prose, *e.g.* in Milton. But the borrowing from contemporaries is a very different matter. It is only possible here to examine the view that Herodotus does this also, in regard to one example, the famous ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ τὸ ἔαρ ἐξῃρῆται, put by Herodotus in the mouth of Gelon (viii. 162). This phrase we know was used by Pericles[2] in a funeral oration on the young warriors lost to Athens, and it was there a most noble metaphor; we are asked to believe that Herodotus had the incredibly bad taste to use it inappropriately in a context where it was entirely out of place, and where, if the present text be genuine, he actually found difficulty in knowing what it meant. But in the mouth of Gelon it is as appropriate as it would be in that of Pericles, though less poetical. We in England have no difficulty in appreciating the boast of a 'colonist,' who considers the old country effete, 'in the sere and yellow leaf,' while he rightly feels all the vigour of youth and spring in his own.[3] As used by the Sicilian tyrant then it is a vigorous expression of political feeling, as used by Pericles it is high poetry. But had the second sense been that in which it was originally used, the first sense would have been impossible. Herodotus, if his text be genuine, did not see the full force of Gelon's metaphor, and added a most feeble and dull explanation; but this is a very different thing from spoiling a glorious phrase, which all men knew, by a theft which he himself half condemns.[4]

[1] A striking passage from Professor Diels' article in *Hermes* (xxii. p. 424), *Herodotus and Hecataeus*, puts this view admirably.

[2] Arist., *Rhet.* iii. 10, and also i. 7 (1365 *b*.).

[3] We may compare the last of Bishop Berkeley's verses on the Planting of Learning in the New World:—

'Westward the course of Empire takes its way,
The first four acts already past;
The fifth shall close the drama with the day,
Time's noblest offspring is the last.'

[4] The last four lines of the chapter, containing the explanation, are often bracketed as a gloss.

All probability then is that Herodotus had the phrase from some Sicilian source; whether Gelon used it must of course remain doubtful, but Pericles, at any rate, immortalized it by a glorious plagiary. The subject of Herodotus' other supposed borrowings, especially those from Hecataeus, is too large to be discussed here.

So far the aim of this essay has been mainly negative, to show that there is no clear evidence that Herodotus was consciously following any contemporary teacher, still less such teachers as were acceptable to the Periclean circle at Athens. This point may be summed up in the words of Ivo Bruns[1]: 'It will be found almost incomprehensible that only a few decades lie between the work of Herodotus and that of Thucydides. It might have been conjectured to be a century. And that holds good equally of the whole "Culture circle" to which Thucydides belongs. It is hard to fit Herodotus into this Athens. Asiatic by birth, he only came in contact with it in later years. Powerfully as this culture attracted him, he was already developed, and he has not been transformed. He was and remained a stranger on this ground.'

It is time to turn to something positive. The most probable explanation of Herodotean development is to be found in two facts:—

(1) The oppression of his native town Halicarnassus by the Persian partizan, Lygdamis, who is said to have driven Herodotus into exile, and (2) his travels, probably inspired mainly—at least at first—by commercial motives.[2] The

[1] *Das Liter. Porträt der Griech*, 1896, p. 108.

[2] The evidence for this can be found in any edition of Herodotus (cf. H. and W., p. 17) for full references; it may be briefly summarized here:—

(1) He is careful to mention articles of commerce, not only when romantic and rare (cf. iii. 110-111), but of ordinary kinds (ii. 105; iv. 74).

(2) He carefully describes methods of transport (cf. i. 194; ii. 96) and is familiar with the equipment of a sea-faring life (cf. iv. 195, 'Pierian Pitch').

(3) He notes how far a river is navigable: *e.g.* Euphrates, i. 194; Nile, ii. 96; Dnieper, iv. 53.

former cause made him choose his subject—the clash of East and West, the second cause made him preface it and adorn with all the varied knowledge he had acquired.

The variety of interest, the strong practical turn of thought, the avoidance of political questions where possible, the acceptance, in spite of sympathy with more developed views, of the orthodox opinions of Greece on religion, on morals, on science—all these characteristics suit well the sober man of business, who retires, when his fortune is made, to develop the literary ambitions which have long been growing in him.

A widely accepted modern view is that Herodotus was a lecturer by profession, at any rate during part of his life. So Jacoby writes (p. 341, cf. p. 379 *et pass*) that the various λόγοι had an 'independent existence' before they were combined in one great work, 'certainly as lectures—das beweisen die mannigfachen gegenseitigen Beziehungen'—nicht als literarisch verbreitete Werke.' It is a little hard to see what exactly is meant; of course a work in antiquity had to be largely 'published' by recitation, at least at first. But that Herodotus was ever mainly a lecturer is refuted by the character of much of his work; it is hard to conceive that minute discourses as to the marriage customs of barbarians or the natural features of remote regions would ever have attracted Greek audiences. To the Athenian at any rate things Oriental were matters

(4) He mentions curious forms of trade, *e.g.* iv. 24. 196 (the 'dumb commerce of West Africa').

(5) He uses what seem to be 'trade terms,' *e.g.* Lesbian bowls, iv. 61.

His whole attitude to trade is that of the sixth century or earlier; he shows none of the contempt for it which is implied in Thucydidean silence, and which was characteristic of fifth century Athens, and indeed of contemporary Greece generally (cf. ii. 167 for a similar sentiment as to handicraft). It is astonishing that Jacoby (p. 248) can write: 'Herodotus, who always found difficulties in his calculations, does not show any of the marks of a merchant'; the first half of this sentence—the relative clause—can hardly be meant as a serious argument, the second half is simply inaccurate.

for jest and gibe. The chapters of Herodotus have few of those μεγαλειότερα ῥήματα[1] with which Prodicus, a typical lecturer, adorned his discourses, and which Socrates felt unable to imitate. Herodotus no doubt made part of his work known by public readings; it is difficult to understand how otherwise he could have earned the magnificent reward which Athens is said to have voted to him (cf. 176). But this is very different from being a regular lecturer.

Herodotus found fame and some profit at Athens when he came there; but he did not take up his abode there permanently. Tradition is worth little, but on this part of the life of Herodotus it is confirmed by the character of his work, and the most probable view is that when Herodotus had gone to Thurii, Athens was never his regular home again. We can imagine that he had something of the spirit of Tennyson's Ulysses:—

'This grey spirit yearning in desire
To follow knowledge like a sinking star
Beyond the utmost bound of human thought.'

[1] Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1. 34.

XI.

Herodotus in English Literature

(*This Paper in substance was read to the Oxford Philological Society in the Summer Term of* 1922.)

SOME ten years ago I published an edition of Herodotus with Mr. How of Merton. To that book the reviewers were very kind, certainly almost too kind so far as my share of it was concerned; but there was one feature in it which I had thought rather important, and which no one noticed at all. We had made a special point of illustrating our author on the literary side by quotations from modern literature, of course from English literature especially, and I believe that no great English writer from Chaucer to Tennyson was unrepresented.

I wish therefore to make another attempt at emphasising the obligations to the Father of History on the part of our English writers. I do not claim for this paper either deep thought or careful study; my only hope is that it may be not uninteresting, since it gathers together passages and points, familiar and unfamiliar, from the works of very great men.

But a word must first be said as to the English Translators of Herodotus, which if it needs excuse, may excuse itself on the ground that an adequate English version of him is at last appearing in the Loeb series. The oldest version of the historian belongs to that golden age when English translations had much of the vigour of original literature, the days of Elizabeth. In 1584 B. R. (his full name is uncertain) published a version of the first two books[1]; but apparently it met with little success, for it was never continued, and copies are very rare. It was a paraphrase rather than a translation. *E.g.* he renders :—

> ἐς τοῦτο δὲ ἐλθεῖν Χέοπα
> κακότητος ὥστε χρημάτων δεόμενον.

[1] Republished by D. Nutt, 1888.

'All which things drave the King to such a narrow straight that he was fain to cloute out his devises with a most wicked intention, which was this:

'Perceiving his golden mine to draw low that the divell might dance in the bottome of his bagge and find never a crosse.' Fifty words for nine.

I cannot find out by comparison of passages that his version was used by the writers of the time; Shakespeare's passages about the crocodile and his tears owe nothing to Herodotus, even when rendered with imaginative vigour by 'B. R.'

As will be seen, Herodotus was familiar to some of the great Elizabethans, and still more to the 17th century men of letters; but if they read him in translations, they must have been Latin ones.

Apparently the first attempt to translate Herodotus as a whole was that planned by Tonson the bookseller at the end of the 17th century. It was the high day of Translations, for the greatest writers of the time were willing to do this hack work; Dryden himself not only published his translation (1697) of Virgil and of other poets, but had had a share in the joint translation of *Plutarch's Lives* (1683), for which he wrote a dedication and a Life. Early in 1696 Tonson, it appears, was arranging in Oxford to produce an English version of Herodotus; Addison, who was then a demy of Magdalen (he did not obtain his fellowship till 1698), seems to have been a sort of editor general and enlisted for the work Dr. Blackmore of St. Edmund Hall, who anticipated Tennyson in writing a poem on 'Arthur',[1] Charles Boyle of Christ Church, who had just (in 1695), by his edition of the *Letters of Phalaris*, thrown down the glove to the great Bentley, and others. Addison himself was to do Book VII., but did not like it (was this because it was one of the longest books?), and so undertook Book VIII., which he promised should be ready in the middle of March. Unfortunately the translation of Book VII. was 'lost on the road,' by the negligence

[1] It has good claims to be called 'the dullest of English epics.'

of the carrier, and for this or some other reason the translations never appeared. The honour of producing the best version of Herodotus was reserved for another Magdalen fellow more than two centuries later.[1]

But the first complete English translation soon followed. In 1709 Isaac Littlebury produced his version in two volumes, and it reached a second edition in 1739. It seems hard that this pioneer should not be even recognised by the *Dictionary of National Biography*, but it must be owned that his version is too Augustan for our modern taste. Let one specimen suffice: the account of the 'rashness of democracy' in Herodotus iii. 81 :—

> ὠθέει τε ἐμπεσὼν τὰ πρήγματα ἄνευ
> νόου, χειμάρρῳ ποταμῷ ἴκελος.

is rendered 'precipitating all their actions with a fury resembling an impetuous torrent.' This has about the same resemblance to the simplicity of Herodotus that Pope's stately couplets bear to the simple majesty of Homer. Herodotus had to wait nearly another century for his next translation, and then the Rev. William Beloe, Keeper of the printed books at the British Museum, brought out a version in 1791. As it went through six editions in forty years (the 6th was in 1830), it may fairly be called a success, and it was at any rate better than Littlebury's, although the judgment of the *Dictionary of National Biography* that he was 'admirably fitted for reproducing the limpid simplicity and amiable garrulity of Herodotus,' seems somewhat over-kind to Beloe. But A. Lang's epithet 'Beloe the proverbially flat' is certainly too severe. Beloe's accompanying commentary can still be read with pleasure, at any rate by one who values the literary side of Herodotus as opposed to the strictly historical.

There were at least four versions in the 19th century, of which Rawlinson's and Macaulay's are familiar to Oxford, and now our Public Orator has given us the larger

[1] For these facts see Addison's letters to Tonson x. 319-321 (ed. Bohn's, 1856).

part of a version which is at once readable and accurate Happy is the fate which has found in Dr. Godley a translator for Herodotus: his version and that of 'B. R.', in very different ways, may justify the introduction of the subject of 'translations' into a paper of which the title is 'Herodotus and English Literature.'

If the widest extension were given to this title, the subject would be endless. The great masters of literature in all ages and of all countries express the same sentiments, and reproduce the same situations, for human nature is everywhere the same.

The complaint of the King in Shakespeare's Henry IV. (Part II. Act 4, sc. 5) :—

"It hath been prophesied to me many years
I should not die but in Jerusalem,
Which vainly I supposed the Holy Land.
But bear me to that chamber, there I'll lie;
In that Jerusalem shall Harry die,"

irresistibly recalls the 'juggling' oracle as to 'Ecbatana' (iii. 64) which deceived Cambyses, and Beloe well compares the refusal of Psammenitus (iii. 14) to mourn for his own woes with Lear's outburst (ii. 4. *ad fin.*) :

'You think I'll weep;
No I'll not weep.
I have full cause for weeping, but this heart
Shall break into a hundred thousand flaws
Or ere I weep.'

Such parallels are most interesting; but it is not proposed here to illustrate Herodotus from our Literature when the resemblance is almost certainly accidental; parallels will only be gathered when there is a reasonable probability, if not a certainty, that, directly or indirectly, our countryman has been influenced by Herodotus.

Another wide field will also be passed over almost without mention, the accumulation of pseudo-science and of travellers' tales, which formed no small part of the reading of our forefathers. Sir John Mandeville's *Travels* and

Topsell's '*Beasts*' may be taken as representing this. Herodotus is the oldest author (and also probably the most discriminating) out of whom this mass of most interesting rubbish was gradually compiled. Mandeville, at all events, whoever he really was, took his stories from Herodotus only at second hand, but Topsell quotes him continually, though he, too, may have taken his quotations from the Swiss polymath, Gesner. One brief specimen may perhaps be given, which if not justified by its own liveliness, may at any rate serve to illustrate the superior wisdom of the old Greek as compared to the Renaissance Scholars. Herodotus devotes seven lines to the Trochilus as the 'only creature which is at peace with' the crocodile; Topsell improves on this with 'when the crocodile feeleth his mouth sufficiently clensed, he waggeth his upper chappe, as it were to give warning of avoydance, and in favour of the good turn.' But this is not the story he accepts; on the contrary he goes on 'The ingrateful crocodile endevoureth suddainely to shut his chappes together upon the Bird, and to devoure his friend, like a cursed wretch who maketh no reckoning of friendship.' Fortunately for the Trochilus, 'Nature hath armed her with sharpe thornes upon her head' . . . so that 'full sore against his unkind nature,' the crocodile 'letteth her flye safe away.'[1]

The value of these delightful stories is that they at once amuse us, and raise our opinion of Herodotus; his narrative has many marvels, but they were as nothing compared to the 'embroidery of fiction' which his successors worked out, and which was far more to the taste of the earlier modern scientist.

But it is time to turn to Literature proper. Two of the great Elizabethans at any rate were familiar with Herodotus. One of these, Sir Walter Raleigh, was naturally obliged to use him for his *History of the World;* he not only employs him for the story of the Persian Wars, but

[1] Topsell, *History of Beasts*, London, 1608, ii. 136. Cf. Hdt. ii. 68.

also uses the description of Mesopotamia to illustrate the fertility of the Garden of Eden, which was only 'twelve miles from Nineveh.'[1] In the more historical part, he ventures to doubt Herodotus' figure of over 5,000,000[2] for Xerxes' army; he himself is content with 2,000,000; he defends the accuracy of the story of the repulse of the Persians at Delphi on the curious ground that, as Xerxes believed Apollo was a god, his attempt to rob his temple was a sin, and that the true God therefore allowed Apollo, who to Raleigh as to Milton is the devil, to work a miracle in repulsing the sacrilege.

Edmund Spenser was not like Raleigh required by his subject to use Herodotus, but his familiarity with him is not unnatural in the friend of Gabriel Harvey, and in a Cambridge scholar. He introduces references to Herodotus' account of the Scyths in his *View of the State of Ireland*, where he is trying to prove that the native Irish were descended from those early barbarians[3] whose name they had inherited, for were not the Irish 'Scots' and the 'Scots' Scyths? The most striking of several references is perhaps his description of the Scythian battle-cry as 'the very image of an Irish hubbub' (p. 370). Then Spenser at once goes on to convict himself of careless reading by crediting Herodotus with a tale which is not his; he also quotes from the Life of Homer ascribed to Herodotus, though he erroneously assigns the quotation to Plutarch. There are several references to Herodotean stories in the *Faerie Queene*; some of these, like that to Croesus as a type of pride or to Arion, are among the commonplaces of antiquity; but the reference to the 'Oaraxes feared for great Cyrus fate,' and to the change in the course of the sun, are much less usual, while,

> 'What the Fates do once decree
> Not all the gods can change, nor Jove himself can free,'

[1] Raleigh, i. 3. 12.
[2] *Ib.* iii. 6. 2. and 4.
[3] Spenser works (Todd's ed., 1805), viii. 344 f.

reproduces almost verbally the answer of Apollo to Croesus (i. 91).

But it is time to pass to an even greater poet: Milton was learned in all the wisdom of the Greeks, and clearly knew his Herodotus well, though, curiously enough, in his *Tractate on Education*, he names neither him nor Thucydides as subjects for boys' study; the 'choice' histories of Greece only come in as the crown of a classical training, when Grammar, Natural Philosophy and Ethics are well conquered. Milton himself, as a boy, had read Herodotus at St. Paul's; in his verses, 'on the death of a Fair Infant,' written when he was only seventeen, he refers to 'grim Aquilo,' Winter's Charioteer, who 'by boisterous rape the Athenian maiden got,' a clear reference to the story of Boreas and Oreithyia in Herodotus (vii. 189).

In *Paradise Lost*[1] there are several distinct quotations; the Phoenix appears almost verbally from Herodotus (ii. 73):

> 'Gazed by all as that sole bird
> When, to enshrine his reliques in the Sun's
> Bright temple, to Egyptian Thebes he flies.'

Herodotus says it was 'to Heliopolis,' but poets cannot be expected to verify their references.

> 'Sabean odours from the spicy shore
> Of Araby the Blest,'

where

> 'Many a league
> Cheered with the grateful smell old ocean smiles'

is a direct reminiscence of Herodotus' account of Arabia (iii. 113); even clearer is the comparison of the Fallen Archangel in his flight to the 'gryphon' of Herodotus (iv. 13), when he

> 'Through the wilderness
> Pursues the Arimaspian, who by stealth
> Had from his wakeful custody purloined
> The guarded gold.'

[1] The references in *Paradise Lost* are for the 'Phoenix' v. 272-4, for the 'Sabean odours' iv. 162-5, for the 'Gryphon' ii. 943-7.

These references are beauties typical of Milton, and we can excuse the somewhat pedantic reference to Herodotus, in the Latin poem to Manso, the friend of Tasso, as

'Mycalen qui natus ad altam
Rettulit Aeolii vitam facundus Homeri.'[1]

But Milton does not add to either the charm or the cogency of his argument with Salmasius when, in his 'Defence of the People of England,' he follows his opponent into Ancient History and drags in Sesostris and Chephren, Cambyses and Otanes, and other Herodotean examples[2]; it is noticeable that in these Milton combines the narratives of Herodotus with the embellishments of Diodorus. By far the finest illustration from Egyptian mythology in Milton, the comparison in the 'Areopagitica' of the search for the 'Virgin Truth' with the search of Isis for the mangled body of Osiris, owes nothing to Herodotus; Milton here as so often prefers the later and more elaborate version of Plutarch.

A brief reference must be made to Milton's contemporary Cambridge poet, Samuel Butler, perhaps as great in burlesque as Milton in real poetry. Herodotus contributes to his curious store of learning, and the references are so odd as to be almost certainly direct from his own reading.[3] That to Astyages' dream about his daughter Mandane is unquotable, but the borrowing is unmistakable in the lines:—

'As once in Persia, 'tis said
Kings were proclaimed by a horse that neighed,'

and there is also a reference to the Egyptian observations on the changed course of the Sun, which have already been mentioned as introduced by Spenser.

The Prose Writers of the time are also familiar with

[1] It will be noticed that Milton, like Spenser, erroneously attributes the 'Life of Homer' to Herodotus.

[2] Cap. 5. Bohn's ed., 1848, pp. 119 f.

[3] For Mandane cf. Hudibras ii. 3. 691 with i. 107, and for Darius' horse cf. *ib.* i. 2. 137-8 with iii. 85, and for the changed course of the Sun, *ib.* ii. 3. 865.

Herodotus. Burton hardly quotes him as much as might be expected in his vast collection of miscellaneous learning; Herodotus' careful weighing of evidence was probably too sober for his omnivorous taste. But two of his quotations at least are so characteristic that they must be mentioned. When referring to the Babylonian custom of empirical prescription for (i. 197) the sick by those who had been previously sufferers, and to the Egyptian custom of specialist treatment for each separate diseased organ (ii. 84), he quotes the 'learned' Tholosanus 'I had rather believe and commit myself to a mere empirick than to a mere doctor.'[1] Herodotus again would have been considerably surprised and shocked to find his story of the Babylonian god (i. 181) and his human brides quoted to justify Burton and the Jesuit Lipsius in believing the horrible stories, the product of mediaeval superstition, of witches' intercourse with the devil. Burton also quaintly observes that those who, like Candaules, dote foolishly on their wives' beauty 'make a rod for their own tails.'

This not very edifying story is one of several passages in Herodotus referred to by Jeremy Taylor. In his *Holy Dying* he quotes the conversation of Xerxes and Artabanus at the Hellespont on the Misery of Mortal Life, and he also brings in the well-known stories of Cleobis and Bito and of the Thracians shooting at their God in the Sky.[2] There are also other references. Herodotus seems to have been not unpopular with the divines of the day, for the ever memorable John Hales introduces,[3] in rather a forced way, the story of Aristagoras' shoe, made by Histiaeus.

It need hardly be said that later on in the century Sir T. Browne rejoiced in Herodotus. In his *Vulgar Errors*[4]

[1] *Anatomy of Melancholy* (Shilleto's edit. 1893) ii. 243; for the belief in witches cf. iii. 52; for the reference to Candaules' folly, iii. 353.

[2] *Holy Dying*, iii. 8, where there are also references to the scourging of the sea (vii. 35), and to Cyrus' revenge on the Gyndes (I. 189-90).

[3] *Golden Remains*, p. 303 (cf. ed. 1688).

[4] Bk. I. cap. 8, *ad.*

he puts him first among the 'excellent and useful authors,' who 'either being transcriptive, or following common relations, are not to have their accounts swallowed at large or entertained without all circumspection.' But after this safe beginning, the old Norwich physician carefully points out that scholars have 'effectually endeavoured to frustrate the arguments of Plutarch or any other' against Herodotus; and he then lays stress on the definite statement of Herodotus (vii. 152), too often forgotten by his modern critics, that 'he was not at all bound to believe all that he felt bound to tell'; so, Sir Thomas goes on, 'if any man be deceived, the author is not so culpable as the believer.' After this, he proceeds to examine a number of stories in Herodotus and other writers, of which perhaps the best example is the well-known fable of the matricidal viper (iii. 109) who avenges his father by eating his way to life through his mother's flesh. Sir Thomas shut up female vipers to test the truth of this, but unfortunately they always died before their young were brought forth; he tells us, however, that he was convinced by the experiments of other learned men that Herodotus was mistaken. The fact is that this story of the vipers was a great favourite, and Dryden makes use of it in a fine simile in Absalom and Achitophel,[1] where he says of the witnesses in the Popish plot that

> 'Viper like, their mother plot they tear
> And suck for nutriment that bloody gore
> Which was their principle of life before.'

So good a literary man as Dryden no doubt quotes Herodotus elsewhere, but I have not noted any further example from his voluminous works.

Whether Herodotus has been neglected by Dryden or not, this cannot be said of the great writers of the next generation.

Dean Swift would hardly be considered to rank among our most learned authors, but he was obviously familiar

[1] Part I., ll. 1013-5.

with his Herodotus, a familiarity which he uses with characteristic bitterness in the *Tale of a Tub*.[1] Here he interprets Herodotus' story of 'horned asses' (iv. 191) to be a 'hieroglyph,' by which he taxes 'true critics of ignorance and malice,' and immediately after he tells us that the story that the cavalry of the Scyths were put to flight by the braying of an ass (iv. 129), according to the 'conjecture of certain profound philologers,' proves that 'the great awe and reverence paid to a true critic' by British writers 'has been derived to us from those our Scyth ancestors.' So, too, we 'derive from those same ancestors' the verbosity of our writers, which the Greeks expressed by 'saying that in regions very far to the North it was hardly possible for a man to travel, the air was so replete with feathers' (iv. 31). (This jest is borrowed by Thomas Gray[2] in his letter to Wharton.)

Swift also in his *Battle of the Books*[3] makes Herodotus and Livy command the infantry of the ancients, while 'Voss and Temple' brought up the allies in the rear. He characteristically gives in the same burlesque an unpleasant turn to Herodotus' stories of the horse of Darius, and of the large horns of the asses in hot countries. Swift's character of Herodotus, written in his copy of Stephens' edition (the book is in the library of Winchester College) praises him as 'apprime laudandus': though he condemns him as 'digressing wearisomely,' 'unde oritur legentibus confusio,' a criticism the truth of which every 'Greats' Tutor knows from long experience of pupils' reading. Swift's great rival, Addison, is equally familiar with Herodotus and makes a similar satirical use of him, though with less bitterness and no unpleasantness; Addison never forgot to be a gentleman. His numbers 433 and 434 of the *Spectator*, with their burlesque common-

[1] The references are to Swift's Works (ed. 1907). For those in the *Tale of a Tub*, cf. i. pp. 74, 75, 106.

[2] Tovey's edition i. 234. *Tovey Letters* i. 234.

[3] For the reference in the *Battle of the Books*, cf. i. pp. 174, 205, 276; for the MS. character, xi. 186.

wealths of men and women, are a sort of fantasia based on Herodotus' account (iv. 110 f.) of the Scyths and the Amazons, and are quite amusing still.

In a later number of the *Spectator*, 483, he irreverently condemns Herodotus' judgments (along with those of Plutarch) on human affairs as being as 'impertinent' as those of the old maid who is 'so good a Christian that whatever happens to herself is a trial and whatever happens to her neighbour is a judgment.' Again in No. 511 of the *Spectator* he makes Will Honeycomb much impressed with the account of the Babylonian Marriage Market which he finds in Herodotus (i. 196), whom he thinks to be an 'English' author; he suggests that the practice might well be introduced into England, only that in our country the rich men instead of purchasing beauty, would seek to obtain 'the richest piece of deformity'; even then it seems that 'the jingling of the guinea' was supposed to be the strongest motive of our countrymen. In a more serious mood Addison justifies his view that 'obedience of children to their parents is the basis of all government' (*Spectator* 189) by an appeal to the belief of the Ancient Persians that parricide was unthinkable in a legitimate son (Hdt. i. 137). Addison also, at least once in his poems, uses a striking Herodotean image, when he describes how the traveller

'Sees the dry desert all around him rise
And smothered in the dusty whirlwind dies,'

thus meeting the fate of the armies of Cambyses marching against Ethiopia (iii. 26).

Pope had been trained in the Classics early, though his knowledge of Greek had to be supplemented by the work of hackwriters like Fenton. But he certainly seems to know more of Herodotus than the stock quotations. His famous character of Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough as 'Atossa' may be thought insufficient to prove first-hand acquaintance with the historian, and the references to 'Achaemenes' [which he, it is sad to say, makes a plural noun], to Osiris, and to Mitra come in his version of Statius' Thebais,[1] and so

[1] Elwin and Courthope's edit. I. 85.

prove nothing as to his own reading; but in the *Temple of Fame*[1] there is an unmistakable reference to Herodotus and the rock of Kara Bel (ii. 104) in the account of Sesostris

'His hands a bow and pointed javelin hold,'

while just below the Scythian Zalmoxis (*sic*) 'with erected eyes' comes in, and the Scythian 'rude iron columns smeared with blood' are distinctly reminiscent of Hdt. iv. 62 and his account of Scythian worship. The barbarians of the Greek historian seem to have had a special attraction for English poets; we have already had the references to them in Spenser and in Milton; Pope refers to them again,[2] in speaking of the 'Scythian winter expeditions,' in a letter to Lord Orrery, written late in his life. There are further references to Herodotus in the heavy fun of Martinus Scriblerus and in the scurrilous attacks on Curll.[3] It may be added as characteristic of 18th century scholarship that Bolingbroke,[4] writing to Pope on the 'image of ancient Greece,' puts Herodotus on a level with Pausanias, Strabo, and Plutarch. Certainly the conception of Greek History in the Augustan age of England owed much more to the later writers than to the authorities whom modern historical scholarship makes supreme.

It is not necessary to say much on the literature of the 18th century; after the great Augustans, Pope and Swift, had passed away, Johnson and Gray are the only two outstanding figures, in Literature, apart from History, for half a century. Gray, we know, 'valued' Herodotus as 'the Father of History,' as an author of great veracity, and never fabulous except when he gave the relations of others, which he carefully distinguishes[5]; later on he makes a brief but excellent comparison of Froissart with the Greek historian in a letter to Nicholls written in 1771. But there do not seem to be any clear allusions to Herodotus in Gray's all

[1] *Ib.* i. 209, ll. 113 f.
[2] *Ib.* viii. 410.
[3] *Ib.* x. 413. 478.
[4] *Ib.* vii. 395.
[5] Cf. Nicholls' *Reminiscences in Tovey's Gray* ii. 285 and iii. 299.

too brief poems, though the pessimism of the *Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton*

> 'To each his sufferings: all are men
> Condemned alike to groan,
> The tender for another's pain
> Th' unfeeling for their own'

may have been suggested by the grim comfort with which Artabanus stopped the tears of Xerxes (vii. 46). Certainly Xerxes' reply: 'Concerning human life, being such as you decide it to be, let us cease speaking, and let us not remember ills, when we have good matters in hand' is very suggestive of the words that follow at the end of Gray's ode

> 'No more—where ignorance is bliss
> 'Tis folly to be wise.'

In Johnson's splendid talk as recorded by Boswell, I cannot find a single direct reference to Herodotus, but it is clear the Greek historian must have been in his mind when he tells Boswell[1] that at the sight of the crowd at Ranelagh he felt like Xerxes weeping over his army; but Johnson's sadness was prompted by the thought not that all the men must die, but that 'there was not one in all that brilliant circle that was not afraid to go home and think.' Xerxes' tears, however, are one of the commonplaces of Literature, and a reference to them proves little or nothing.

The classical tone of the 18th century may be briefly and perhaps not unamusingly illustrated by a reference to one of the dullest poems that ever had a great success. In 1737 Richard Glover, a London merchant and later a Tory M.P., published a poem in nine books on 'Leonidas,' which went through four editions, was translated into French and German, and was afterwards republished in an expanded form in twelve books. As the *Dictionary of National Biography* rightly says 'its dreary blank verse' is 'unreadable.' The keynote of the poem is given in the opening book, where Herodotus' famous oracle (vii. 220) that 'either Sparta or its King must perish,' is reported to

[1] Hill's edition, iii. 199.

the Spartan Assembly. But the success of the poem was undoubtedly caused by the fact that Glover has in the preceding lines[1] reported the debate in that Assembly, and put in the mouth of Leonidas a speech in defence of a 'spirited foreign policy' to help Athens. He is made to say:

'O most ungenerous counsel, most unjust
And base desertion of the Grecian weal!
What! Shall the Athenians whose assiduous fleets
Undaunted watch the innumerable foes
Where'er they menace our affrighted shores,
Shall they hear
That we, disowning thus the general cause,
Maintain the Isthmus only?'

The reference to Herodotus is unmistakable; but it was the equally unmistakable though indirect reference to Walpole's peace policy which pleased Glover's readers and took the poem at once to a fourth edition. England was eager for war after twenty-five years of rest, and when Leonidas pleads

'My friends, reject
Such mean and dangerous counsels'

English society read it as an argument for a war with Spain. It was this which got Glover his popularity and a gift from Frederick, Prince of Wales of a 'complete set of the classics beautifully bound.'

The Romantic Revival naturally did not lead to classic references, and Herodotus does not seem to have formed part of Shelley's mental furniture; Wordsworth's *Laodamia* owes nothing to Book IX., and the wonders recorded by Herodotus as to Protesilaus do not include the sympathetic trees of the English poem. When Wordsworth pleads[2]——with uncertain voice—for fiction in History against Niebuhr, and writes that the Muse

[1] Bk. I. ll. 43-51.

[2] *Memorials of a Tour in Italy.* Sonnets 4-6, iii. pp. 198-9. (Moxon's Centen. edition, 1874). For 'The Persian' and Babylon, cf. vi. 132-3.

'Revered her mother, sage Mnemosyne,
And taught her faithful servants how the lyre
Should animate, but not mislead, the pen'

he is thinking of Livy, not of Herodotus.

The Lake poet had, however, read, though too carelessly, some Herodotus for himself, as is shewn by his lines in the *Excursion* :—

'The Persian—zealous to reject
Altar and image and the inclusive walls
And roofs and temples built by human hands—
To loftiest heights ascending, from their tops,
With myrtle-wreathed tiara on his brow,
Presented sacrifice to moon and stars.'

The allusions to i. 131-2 are too minute to be accidental, but the 'myrtle-wreathed tiara' is quite inappropriate to the 'mountain sacrifice'; they both are Herodotean, but they come in different passages (i. 131, i. 132); and the English poet, and not the Greek traveller, is responsible for the blunder of bringing in 'moon and stars.' The lines as to Babylon that follow the passage quoted, are also a clear echo of Herodotus.

In Byron, as might be expected, the familiarity with Herodotus is considerable: whether it was the 'grand old fortifying classical curriculum' of Harrow—now alas! decaying there—or his familiarity with Greece and his sympathy with her struggles against an Eastern despot, or both, there is no doubt that Byron read Herodotus for himself and used his works. The allusion to Persian worship in *Childe Harold*[1] may be called too general to prove anything

'Not vainly did the Ancient Persian make
His altar the high places and the peak
Of earth-o'er-gazing mountains, and thus take
A fit and unwalled temple . . .
Come and compare
Columns and idol dwellings—Goth or Greek—
With Nature's realms of worship.'

[1] III. 91; for the Isles of Greece, cf. *Don Juan* iii. 86. For Cheops, cf. *Don Juan* i. 219, and for Persian education *ib.* xvi. 1.

But this passage is free from the incongruous elements introduced by Wordsworth, and the contrast with the Greeks is a real Herodotean touch. Even clearer are the references in *Don Juan*. The 'Isles of Greece' is surely the finest poem which ever was begun in a spirit of banter; the attack on Southey is forgotten at once in the inspiration of the theme, and that inspiration comes from Herodotus. The passage beginning

> 'A King sat on the rocky brow
> Which looks o'er sea-born Salamis'

in it is too familiar to quote, and the Herodotus detail had been borrowed by Byron's predecessors freely. But some of the later verses clearly must have come direct from the Greek historian himself; I will quote two following stanzas, which have three distinct allusions to Herodotus, and two of them at least are all Byron's own.

> 'You have the letters Cadmus gave,
> Think ye he meant them for a slave?
>
> 'Fill high the bowl with Samian wine!
> We will not think of themes like these,
> It made Anacreon's song divine:
> He served—but served Polycrates.
> 'A tyrant; but our masters then
> Were still at least our countrymen.
>
> The tyrant of the Chersonese
> Was freedom's best and bravest friend,
> That tyrant was Miltiades;
> Oh that the present hour would lend
> Another despot of the kind.'

Byron's allusion in *Don Juan* to Cheops is not very distinct: he

> '. . . erected the first Pyramid
> And largest, thinking it was just the thing
> To keep his memory whole and mummy hid.'

But there is no doubt about the allusion to Herodotus at the end of Byron's great burlesque epic :—

'The antique Persians taught three useful things,
To draw the bow, to ride, and speak the truth.
This was the mode of Cyrus, best of Kings,
A mode adopted by our modern youth :
Bows have they, generally with two strings ;
Horses they ride without remorse or ruth ;
At speaking truth perhaps they are less clever,
But draw the long bow better now than ever.'

Not much stress can be laid on Landor's familiarity with Herodotus ; but he makes Aspasia[1] write a letter to him in which she extols his charm, but tells him that Pericles will have none of his theory as to the rise of the Nile and the Sun; while shortly after in another letter she refers to his story about the play of Phrynichus, whose name, it is sad to say, Landor spells with a 'c' instead of a 'ch'; but perhaps the inaccuracy is an intentional hit at a lady's spelling. Aristotle later on is made to hold an 'imaginary conversation' on Herodotus, where he propounds the curious view that 'history if true' would be 'undignified and unsightly.' This is put forward as a defence of Herodotus' 'Asiatic' style; but it is more than doubtful if Herodotus himself would have accepted it.

If Landor was expressing his own opinion through the mouth of Aristotle, we may set against it that of his contemporary scholar and critic, De Quincey, who over and over again defends and glorifies Herodotus: he[2] tramples on that elegant but somewhat dilettante schoolmaster, Vicesimus Knox, who had rudely called Herodotus the 'Father of Lies,' he argues that Herodotus' book is one which would have the best claim to be chosen a reader's sole companion on a desert island, he describes the position of the 'Froissart of antiquity,' the 'first respectable

[1] For Aspasia's letters, cf. v. 386, 387 (ed. 1876) ; for Aristotle's judgment, cf. ii. 180.

[2] Ed. of 1863, viii. pp. 177, 173, 161 ; x. 206.

artist in prose,' in pages which, in spite of his irritating style, still have a claim to be considered as the best statement of Herodotus' place in universal literature. But this point belongs rather to historical than to literary criticism.

Of later 19th century writers Tennyson goes elsewhere than Herodotus for his classical subjects, while Browning[1] in his 'Pheidippides' adds to his story, which is Herodotean, the spurious pathos of Lucian's ending,[2] that Pheidippides brought the news of the victory of Marathon to Athens—and died: 'Athens is saved!'—Pheidippides dies in the shout for his meed. This is quite alien to the Herodotean simplicity. It is curious that our '19th century Chaucer,' William Morris, perhaps the best English storyteller in verse, only gives us one tale from Herodotus—that of 'the Son of Croesus,' in which he follows the Greek historian very closely. Perhaps he was well advised in being so sparing; at any rate he had a warning in the *Poems Legendary and Historical* (published 1850) of Professor Freeman and his college contemporary, Rev. G. W. Cox. Five of these are Herodotean, and obviously inspired by a desire to do for Greece what Macaulay had recently done for Rome in his *Ancient Lays*. Macaulay says somewhere of his own prose style that he thought it had real merit, but that it was a very bad style to imitate; this (*pace* Matthew Arnold) is very true of his verse on both counts; at any rate the Oxford historians fail completely; Freeman shows little of the vigour which marks his own prose, while Cox is as flat as his own 'History of Greece'—it is impossible to say more.

Two other of our modern minor poets have adopted Herodotean themes. Sir Francis Doyle devotes a poem to his Hyperborean maiden who died at Delos,[3] while the Athenian *Battle Hymn at Marathon* is laden somewhat heavily with names and epithets drawn from Herodotus' Persian army list; but our old Professor of Poetry was never great except when he wrote of 'Doncaster' or of the

[1] ii. 582 (ed. of 1896).
[2] Cf. Hdt. iv. 34.
[3] *De Lapsu* 3.

British Army, and Herodotus only once inspires him to good verse, when he celebrates the 'Return of the Guards':—

'Then from their place of ancient glory
All sheathed in shining brass,
Three hundred men from the Grecian glen
Marched down to see them pass.
And the long silent flutes of Sparta
Poured haughty welcome forth,
Stern hymns to crown with just renown
Her brethren of the North.'

Whatever may be thought of the expression, the idea is a fine one of the heroes of old joining with the fallen of Alma and Balaclava to greet 'Those who return.'

It is interesting to compare one of Mr. Housman's 'Last Poems,' *The Oracles*, where Thermopylae is once again joined with the battles of our own day;

'But oh, my lass, the news is news that men have heard before,
The King with half the East at heel is marched from lands of morning;
Their fighters drink the rivers up, their shafts benight the air,
And he that stands will die for nought, and home there's no returning;
The Spartans on the sea-wet rock sat down and combed their hair.'

Professor Housman is a better scholar than Sir Francis Doyle, but there is no doubt that the older English poet has more of the spirit of Simonides than the modern one.

Slightly more successful than Sir Francis Doyle is M. Arnold in his *Mycerinus* which versifies a well-known episode in Herodotus (ii. 133):—

'My father loved injustice and lived long;
Crowned with grey hairs he died, and full of sway.
I loved the gods he scorned, and hated wrong—
The gods declare my recompense to-day:
I looked for life more lasting, rule more high;
And when six years are measured, lo I die.'

This soliloquy had better have been left in Herodotean prose; but the blank verse which follows has some finer lines, *e.g.*:—

'While the deep burnished foliage overhead
Splintered the silver arrows of the moon.'

Perhaps one more quotation may be made from a very modern young poet—now unfortunately dead—James Elroy Flecker, who, in his *Golden Journey to Samarcand* (p. 32), devotes a whole poem of real beauty to an Aegean island, whose mountain proudly boasts as its title to fame :—

'To such an island came with pompous sail
On his first voyage young Herodotus.'

But unfortunately, as happens sometimes with greater poets, the hero is lost in the beauty of his scenery; it would be almost possible to enjoy the whole poem without even remembering Herodotus.

So far, since the discussion of Sir W. Raleigh's treatment of Herodotus as an authority, little has been said about the attitude of the historians and the critics to him; this is really a different subject altogether, for historical criticism, however necessary and however variable, is not of necessity literature, and is often far from literary.

But two or three of our great English stylists have used Herodotus freely, when composing works which, though primarily historical, are part of the treasure of English Literature. And among these the pride of place of course belongs to our greatest historian Gibbon; very early in his work[1] he goes out of his way to praise Herodotus as an authority on the history of religion. 'There is not any writer who describes in so lively a manner as Herodotus the true genius of Polytheism. The best commentary may be found in Mr. Hume's *Natural History of Religion*.' The most casual survey of that treatise proves the justice of Gibbon's remark, and also the high value which the Scotch philosopher gave to the Greek historian; Herodotus is directly quoted by Hume a dozen times. Gibbon himself[2]

[1] Cap. ii. *ad init.* note.

[2] For Persian religion, cf. i. 216, for Mesopotamia ii. 522, for the story of Rosamund v. 13 (Bury's ed. of 1909). For the Circumnavigation story, cf. *Miscell. Writings*, v. 182 (ed. of 1814).

goes to Herodotus for his account of the Persian religion, and his description of Mesopotamia is largely that of Herodotus, who, Gibbon quaintly observes, 'sometimes writes for children and sometimes for philosophers.' It is no small compliment to an ancient writer that one of the greatest of modern historians takes from him many details on a subject which is only accidentally, as it were, treated of by him. Gibbon, too, loves to compare his own stories to those of Herodotus, especially when they are a little 'risky,' *e.g.* his account of the vengeance of Rosamund. He continued to study Herodotus after he had finished his great History, and one of the latest of his miscellaneous papers, written in 1790 or 1791, is an examination of the story of the Phoenician circumnavigation of Africa, which ends with the remark 'I cannot persuade myself that these infant navigators sailed round Africa in three summers to amuse the curiosity of a King of Egypt.'

But Gibbon's attitude to Herodotus is as a rule one of the greatest respect; his praise, though quaint, is sincere: 'He has erected an elegant trophy to his own fame and that of his country.' It is instructive to compare the critical views of an historian of genius with those of a narrow specialist, who yet was a real student. While Gibbon was slowly unrolling his panorama of History, John Richardson, who may be claimed as a member of my own College, was advancing Oriental scholarship by his Persian Dictionary: but in an evil hour he forsook linguistic for historical studies, and wrote a preface to his dictionary, which almost outdoes the wildest German scepticism. The silence of the Persian historians makes Richardson conclude the invasion of Xerxes to be 'improbable'[1]; he thinks the great King had no part in it; that it was simply a local movement of the governors of Asia Minor. It is not worth while discussing his arguments; they are only mentioned as showing that learned men are capable of maintaining any paradox, and to emphasize the fact that, as has been said, the real historian like Gibbon ignores the subtleties of the minute critic.

[1] P. 11 (ed. of 1777).

On the whole the British historians have accepted the greatness of Herodotus; Hume's use of him for *Natural Religion* has been already mentioned; it must suffice here merely to refer to the fact that he draws from Herodotus some of the arguments in his famous treatise on the Population of the Ancient World.

Dr. Arnold [1] delighted in Herodotus; Macaulay,[2] reading whole books of him at a sitting in his characteristic way, calls him 'an admirable artist,' though he adds the somewhat ill-judged comment 'undoubtedly his arrangement is faulty.' The leading historians of modern Oxford (Stubbs, Freeman, Gardiner) were trained in the 'Greats' School, for which Herodotus has always been one of the leading authorities.

It is time to sum up this discursive paper. May it be done briefly thus?

In the first place, Herodotus' importance in the popular study of Greek History and Thought, as it is represented by English Literature, has been largely overshadowed by the work of subsequent Greek historians; his severe restraint, compared to the sentimental and romantic developments of later writers, has made him in many ways less popular. But on the other hand he has had his reward in the fact that the best representatives of English Literature have always defended him against the attacks of partial critics. His shrewd common sense and wide outlook have commended him to the taste of English historians; he has on his side the judgment of those best able to judge.

And here we may leave him with quotations from the sonnets of two Oxford men who have in various ways done much for his study. A. Lang, who made him the recipient of one of his 'Letters to Dead Authors,' admires him as the Father of Anthropology as well as the Father of History; I cannot quote his fine sonnet as a whole, but I give its opening lines:—

[1] Stanley's Life, i. 130.
[2] Trevelyan's Life, ii. 247 (1878).

'Far travelled coaster of the Midland seas!
What marvels did those curious eyes behold—
Winged snakes, and carven labyrinths of old,
The emerald column raised to Hercules.'

Oxford piety makes me end with some lines from another Oxford Scholar, who, after devoting many years to furthering the study of Herodotus, charmed his friends by publishing (privately) a few sonnets about him. May I quote the end of that on Thermopylae?

'Dead Sparta still is worshipped for their sakes,
Who did in awe of her their lives devote
That day; and spite of envy, slander, schism,
Upon their flawless deed pure history breaks
To gorgeous flecks of myth and anecdote,
Like light dissolved upon a crystal prism.'

Have we not here the union of History and Literature in a great Herodotean Scholar?

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